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Summary 
The theory of grounded cognition proposes that abstract thinking involves 
mental simulations of acquired sensorimotor experiences.  In this thesis, my primary 
aim was to investigate whether the mental representation of gender stereotypes is 
related to sensorimotor experiences associated with space.  In a series of experiments, I 
asked participants to complete a spatial task and categorise as quickly as possible which 
person (one female name; one male name) of two vertically displayed on the screen (top 
and bottom) was socially powerful or powerless.  As predicted, stereotypically 
constructed power-gender associations involved simulations of males as powerful at the 
top as opposed to females as powerful at the top.  This was specific to spatial location, 
as males as powerful, but not females, were chosen faster at the top than at the bottom.  
Further, I replicated the above findings using pupillometry.  Additional mechanisms as 
well as consequences of spatial simulations were further examined.  I found that spatial 
simulations in gender-power associations are dependent on simultaneous power and 
gender salience.  Finally, I demonstrate that spatial features involved in the 
representation of gender stereotypes have consequences for gender perceptions by 
promoting stereotype-consistent thinking.  
Altogether, my studies show that the representation of power and gender 
involves spatial simulations that are influenced by stereotypic thinking.  When making 
judgements about power differences, the spatial cues and socially constructed 
stereotypical beliefs compete for activation to accomplish conceptual integration and 
produce meaning.  Such findings imply that mental representations of stereotype-
consistent knowledge are more pronounced as they involve concrete spatial simulations.   
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Chapter 1: General Introduction2 
 
Overview 
 
In this chapter, I review the literature on grounded cognition as well as discuss 
research and theories concerning spatial simulations.  Subsequently, I present currently 
available knowledge about mental representations of gender stereotypes and summarise 
research on social power.  Finally, I integrate the findings on grounded cognition and 
spatial simulations with research on stereotypes and power to present the rationale 
behind investigating spatial simulations in gender stereotyping.  At the end of the 
chapter, I provide an overview of my studies and discuss potential implications of my 
project. 
 
“Space: Literally it means nothing, a vacuum between stars and planets, but by 
the same token it means everything.  It's what connects all our worlds.” -  Captain 
Janeway, Star Trek Voyager3  
 
While physical space exists in the distance between objects, space is also a 
medium that connects abstract ideas within our mental worlds.  It provides the context 
for our daily lives and interactions with other individuals.  From our early days, humans 
are exposed to physical spatial distances and orientations, and experience them through 
perceptual and motor capabilities.  Such experiences shape human physical and mental 
development (Smith & Gasser, 2006).  Indeed, numerous studies and social cognitive 
theories suggest that abstract cognitive processing is grounded in sensorimotor 
experiences (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; 
                                                 
2 This introductory chapter is partly based on two manuscripts in preparation (Zarzeczna, von Hecker, & 
Haddock, 2018a, 2018b) 
3 The quote was obtained from: Quotes. (n.d.). Retrieved June 18, 2018, from 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0708942/quotes 
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Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009), and that in this way, abstract concepts (e.g., power) 
are likely to be understood by means of concrete concepts (see Bargh, 2006; Barsalou, 
2003; Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Mandler, 1992).  Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999) further argue that abstract concepts can be illustrated by concrete concepts in 
linguistic metaphors.  Literally, bigger and stronger animals are more likely to win a 
fight, and those who win are on top of their opponents.  The winners, in turn, become 
powerful within the social hierarchy.  Hence, metaphorically, physical size is linked 
with being on top, implying greater power.  In terms of social relations, power is 
commonly conceptualised as an ability to control or influence others (see Guinote, 
2017, for an overview).  Lakoff & Johnson (1999) suggests that literally it is easier to 
control/exert pressure or influence someone when we are physically positioned at the 
top as opposed to the bottom.  Consistent with this framework, Jamrozik, McQuire, 
Cardillo, and Chatterjee (2016) claim that metaphors do not simply reflect thought 
processes about linking abstract concepts with concrete ones, but serve as a tool that 
guides the development of the links between embodiment and abstraction.  To 
summarise, space might not only connect all our physical worlds, but it also seems to 
connect abstract ideas in our mental worlds. 
Spatial simulations of power 
In the second half of the twentieth century, cognitive scientists did not consider 
the potential significance of the interrelation between human mind and sensorimotor 
experiences.  Due to advances in computer science, mental processes, such as reasoning 
or thinking about abstract concepts, were seen as an array of codes or symbols 
functioning like computer software (see Shapiro, 2011, for an overview).  However, by 
integrating empirical evidence from cognitive and social cognitive experiments, 
Barsalou (1999) suggested that the mental representation of abstract concepts involves 
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re-enactment of previously acquired perceptual/motor experiences (i.e., perceptual 
symbols).  This process is also referred to as simulation.  The perceptual symbols, 
grounded in experiences, were no longer seen as being completely abstract.  For 
example, regarding the concept of power, this theory suggests that thinking about power 
likely involves a simulation of associated and memorised perceptual symbols of space.  
As implied by this example, simulation involves a mental representation of a concept 
that makes use of knowledge based on sensorimotor experiences with a physical 
dimension.  The sensorimotor experiences that conflate power with verticality might be 
based on human relations formed early in life (see Schubert, 2005, for an overview).  
Specifically, through interactions with their parents, children notice that adults are taller 
and have more power than them.  Therefore, children learn that having more power 
involves being taller.  In this way, a perceptual symbol, whereby power is associated 
with upper vertical positions (i.e., tall-powerful parents), is created (Schwartz, Tesser, & 
Powell, 1982).  The perceptual symbol of space and power is reinforced further during 
adulthood.  Research indicates that physical height is correlated with social status and 
power.  That is, taller individuals tend to have a higher social-esteem (i.e., more positive 
social evaluations), they are more likely to emerge as leaders, and they enjoy greater 
success at work, as compared to physically shorter individuals (Judge & Cable, 2004).  
Finally, Fiske (2004) demonstrated that people use spatial language (high, up, top) in 
order to determine power differences among individuals, whereby physical distances 
between vertical positions indicate power differences (see Giessner & Schubert, 2007).  
Specifically, placing an individual in a higher position on the vertical dimension 
indicates that the individual has more power than those placed below them.  Overall, it 
appears that early social interactions with powerful and physically tall adults form the 
basis of associations between space and verticality.  Such associations are further 
reinforced by language and our perception of the social world where tall people are 
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more successful than short people.  To illustrate how such perceptual symbols function 
in cognition, below I provide an example of the involvement of verticality cues in the 
mental representation of power. 
The idea that spatial simulations take place in the representation of power is 
supported by empirical studies.  Schubert (2005) demonstrated that power primes higher 
vertical positions, whilst lack of power primes lower vertical positions.  In his research, 
participants indicated as fast as possible which group, as displayed vertically on a 
computer screen (top versus bottom), was the powerful or powerless in a pair (e.g., 
master versus servant).  The vertical position of the groups was counterbalanced across 
trials.  Participants were faster at responding to powerful groups that appeared at the top 
(compared to bottom) while looking for powerful groups, and faster at responding to 
powerless groups when they appeared at the bottom (compared to top) while looking for 
powerless ones.  This pattern indicated a congruency between participants’ mental 
representation of power-related concepts and the physical spatial locations of these 
concepts.  That is, when mentally representing abstract concepts (power), people 
simulate the concepts in the associated spatial locations derived from sensorimotor 
experiences (see Giessner & Schubert, 2007).  Similar findings have been obtained in 
the context of dominance (von Hecker, Klauer, Wolf, & Fazilat-Pour, 2016), social 
status (von Hecker, Klauer, & Sankaran, 2013), valence (Meier & Robinson, 2004), and 
agency (Suitner & Maass, 2016).  Such embodied simulations take place automatically 
when people represent abstract concepts (i.e., power or valence) associated with 
sensorimotor experiences (verticality).  Therefore, it is different to other forms of 
simulations, namely, mental imagery or mechanical reasoning.  This is because these 
forms are deliberate processes of representing how objects move in working-memory.  
Such simulations are used to solve a given problem (e.g., mental rotation, see Hegarty, 
2004 for simulations in mechanical reasoning, and MacInnis & Price, 1987, for mental 
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imagery).  Further, it is important to note that mental representation is an internal 
mental image of an acquired concept that may or may not use spatial simulations.  
Specifically, spatial simulation used in a mental representation of abstract concepts 
would involve a mental positioning of those concepts on a spatial dimension. 
In addition, evidence from cueing paradigms also indicates that the processing 
of concepts associated with power directs attention to vertical positions.  Zanolie et al. 
(2012) asked participants to complete an attention-cueing task.  The task was to identify 
as quickly as possible the location of a target stimulus on a computer screen.  However, 
before the presentation of the target stimulus, participants were primed with power-
related concepts (one concept at a time; e.g., king or servant) and asked to determine 
whether the concept represented a powerful or powerless person.  They found that 
participants were faster to identify the target when it was presented in the upper vertical 
position after being primed with powerful individuals as opposed to powerless ones.  
The opposite was true for the powerless groups and bottom vertical positions.  Similar 
findings were obtained for other concepts.  For example, in a study by Taylor, Lam, 
Chasteen, and Pratt (2015), when participants were primed with positive self-esteem 
traits, they were faster to detect a target stimulus at the top as opposed to the bottom.  
The same was observed for negative traits presented at the bottom.  Interestingly, these 
results only occurred when the targets were presented on the vertical dimension, but not 
the horizontal dimension.  Also, semantics was essential for the effect to occur, as 
superficial processing of the cues (i.e., considering orthography versus valence) did not 
produce verticality effects.  Altogether, research indicates that reasoning about abstract 
concepts, such as power, involves activation of sensorimotor experiences associated 
with the vertical spatial dimension. 
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Spatial simulations in conceptual integration 
The spatial simulation process described above is relevant to work on conceptual 
integration or blending, proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1998).  Specifically, 
conceptual blending refers to a process whereby semantics of two or more consistent 
concepts are combined or conflated.  This process results in a combined meaning of the 
blended concepts.  To illustrate this process, Casasanto (2009, pp. 362) provided an 
example of blending among primacy, left horizontal position, and goodness, in which 
semantics of these concepts are combined: “Linguistic expressions like “the prime 
example” conflate primacy with goodness (i.e., this phrase can mean the first example, 
the best example, or both).  Speakers of languages like English may be predisposed to 
consider the leftmost item to be the first and therefore the best.  This metaphorical blend 
of left, first, and best should result in a culturally constructed Good Is Left bias.”  The 
concepts that can be combined in a mental representation to produce meaningful 
outcome are defined as “blendable,” that is, their semantics overlap.  Further, relevant to 
the work on grounded cognition, Fauconnier and Turner (1998) argue that simulations 
are not merely mental representations of integrated or blended abstract concepts, but in 
fact, the simulations can actively assist in the blending or integration of concepts and 
serve meaning production.  Such blending and involvement of spatial elements is again 
dependent on the compatibility or consistency between the concepts.  For instance, 
conflating concepts whose mental representations involve spatial features (primacy) 
with non-spatial concepts (goodness) produces a blend where goodness is represented 
on the left.  Likewise, von Hecker et al. (2016) demonstrated that dominance  (in the 
sense of abstract magnitudes, e.g., “older than,” “richer than”) is blended with primacy 
and hence associated with the left side in cultures with left-to-right writing/reading 
habits, whilst with the right side in cultures with right-to-left habits, where primacy is 
associated with the right.  To summarise, it is likely that blending of concepts might 
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involve spatial processing as long as one of the blended concepts is grounded in 
perceptual experiences with space.  
Social beliefs in conceptual integration  
Extant literature, as discussed above, has focused on spatial simulation of 
generic concepts that have strong power-related implications.  That is, in Schubert’s 
(2005) research, a long-term memory connection between presented stimuli and power 
via the literal meaning of the stimulus (e.g., boss, subordinate) was likely responsible 
for spatial simulations of powerful-top and powerless-bottom, as the boss has the ability 
to control the subordinate.  Yet, in real contexts of thought and conversation, concepts 
vary in the degree to which they are associated with power.  Many concepts are 
malleable with respect to their associations and implications.  For example, “master” in 
relation to “servant” likely carries stable power implications and therefore may be 
reliably simulated in terms of vertical space (“master” = top, “servant” = “bottom”).  On 
the other hand, whether or not the relation between specific individuals or group 
members is simulated in vertical mental space may be more malleable and dependent on 
whether both concepts are seen in a particular power relation or not.  If they do, I argue 
that this will be a case in which a blending takes place between concepts that are 
reliably simulated in vertical space (“high power” vs. “low power”) and concepts that 
are simulated in vertical space only if the context is semantically relevant (e.g., when 
seen in a power context; see Taylor et al. 2015).  Likewise, Fauconnier and Turner 
(1998) further suggest that blending between concepts, that is, their compatibility, may 
also depend on personal beliefs.  As the main aim of the present thesis, I wish to 
demonstrate that personal social beliefs, such as stereotypic associations, can have the 
effect of eliciting a blend, and therefore initiating spatial simulation of concepts that are 
otherwise not necessarily simulated spatially. 
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Mental representation of stereotypes  
 In the current thesis, I focus on investigating the precise features in the mental 
representation of gender stereotypes in relation to social power. First, in this section, I 
stress the importance of studying gender stereotypes associated with power in the 
context of their undesirable social consequences, such as prejudice.  Here, I present 
initial research indicating that stereotypes have stable characteristics (they are activated 
across contexts).  Second, I present more recent research findings showing that 
stereotypes are situated.  In this context, I suggest that social power can be considered 
as one of the attributes of gender that provides salient and diagnostic information when 
categorising and differentiating males from females in relevant situations (Ellemers, 
2018; Ford & Stangor, 1992).  
Despite the fact that many research studies have been conducted to broaden our 
understanding of stereotypes, it seems that stereotypes still represent a social problem.  
Biased beliefs about social groups still shape people’s judgements of others.  For 
example, undergraduates in biology tended to overestimate the academic performance 
of male students, despite the fact that female students had higher grades.  This bias was 
only demonstrated by males (Grunspan et al., 2016; see also Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, & 
2015; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2012).  Also, female university professors are 
awarded fewer prestigious positions than males, even though they exhibit equal levels 
of academic performance relative to males (Trevino, Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Mixon, 
2015).  Another recent study indicated that people evaluate teachers’ performance more 
positively when the teacher is identified by a male rather than a female name (MacNell 
et al. 2015).   
Furthermore, gender stereotypes seem to be linked to prejudice such as sexism.  
While stereotypes are incorrect beliefs about social groups functioning on the level of 
cognitive associations, prejudice is a biased and typically negative attitude towards a 
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group member based on faulty premises (Allport, 1954).  That is, prejudice represents 
an overall negative attitude towards an individual belonging to a stigmatised group.  
Although initial research indicated that stereotypes are only modestly related to 
prejudice (r = .25; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), studies on 
sexism suggest that sexist attitudes are associated with stereotypes that can be both 
negative, but also ostensibly positive in nature (Katz & Hass, 1988; Glick & Fiske, 
1996).  That is, the endorsement of ostensibly positive beliefs about women having 
communal traits complements the endorsement of negative beliefs suggesting that 
women do not possess the intellectual skills needed to succeed in a professional career.  
Both types of stereotypes are linked with overall prejudice against women, 
characterising them as weak and incompetent.  Such prejudice, in turn, might lead to 
discrimination against women (e.g., lower employability; see Ellemers, 2018; Glick & 
Fiske, 1996; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998).  To summarise, stereotypes seem to 
be associated with biased and inaccurate stable judgements about females.  While such 
inaccurate beliefs impact social judgements, they are also linked with an overall 
negative evaluation of females in the form of prejudice that has been further associated 
with discrimination.  This indicates that it is important to identify ways to reduce 
stereotyping.  To achieve that we need to better understand when stereotypes are likely 
to be activated and applied.  It is important to note that not all stereotypic attributes are 
salient, activated, and applied to judgements of stereotyped groups at the same time and 
across all situations.  Below, I explain why the attribute of social power is relevant in 
gender stereotyping and when it is the most likely to be applied to judgements about 
gender. 
First, using a stereotypic attribute (social power) to distinguish social groups 
(gender) represents an efficient way of processing and understanding the complexity of 
the social world (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001).  Even though stereotypic judgements 
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are inaccurate (Ellemers, 2018), Fiske and Taylor (2010) suggest that when evaluating 
others, people are not motivated to engage in deep mental processing.  Instead, people 
prefer to rely on shortcuts, e.g., stereotypes, that are less cognitively demanding.  This 
functionalist approach to stereotyping suggests that using stereotypic attributes in social 
categorisations is mentally beneficial, providing quick and efficient judgements. 
Therefore, assessing an individual’s level of social power on the basis of their gender 
would involve engaging fewer cognitive resources than analysing a number of attributes 
represented by that individual. 
Second, people might be motivated to categorise males and females according to 
the stereotype of social power due to its salience across social contexts.  This is because 
within the Western societies, men occupy more powerful social roles than women 
(Ellemers, 2018).  Further, people endorse ostensibly positive beliefs that women have 
communal traits, e.g., they are caring or kind, so they are good mothers and wives.  In 
turn, such beliefs might be linked with negative stereotypes suggesting that women 
would underperform in more powerful roles, such as leadership or career development 
(Glick & Fiske, 2001).  Both forms are complementary in maintaining social inequality 
at workplace, with men still occupying the most powerful social positions (Carli & 
Eagly, 2001; Ellemers, 2018; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Rudman & Phelan, 2010).   
Such beliefs are present, even though it appears that cognitive performance or 
leadership skills do not differ between groups of men and women (Hyde, 2014; see 
Ellemers, 2018, for an overview). 
Finally, while people might be prone to automatically activate the stereotype of 
power and gender and apply it to their judgements, the concept of power might not 
always be activated in the mental representation of gender.  As mentioned earlier, 
although it is likely that the concept of power is used in the representation of gender 
stereotypes, this will only be the case when the attribute of power provides relevant and 
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essential information that would differentiate males from females.  This notion stems 
from the research on central tendency and variability in stereotypic attributes.  For 
example, Ford and Stangor (1992) showed that people use the central tendency and 
variability of stereotype-relevant group attributes in order to evaluate that group.  In 
their experiment, participants were presented with behaviours of individuals belonging 
to two groups (i.e., blue and red).  The two groups differed on two dimensions in terms 
of friendliness and intelligence ratings.  However, the extent of such differences was 
manipulated in terms of the mean ratings.  The difference in mean rating between the 
blue and red group on one dimension (friendliness in one condition; intelligence in the 
other) was always higher than the difference in mean rating between the two groups on 
the other dimension (intelligence and friendliness, respectively).  That is, one dimension 
represented larger differences in mean ratings than the other dimension.  When 
participants were then asked to characterise the two groups, in both conditions they 
relied more on the dimension that represented the larger mean differences in 
comparison to the smaller mean differences.  Further, Ford and Stangor (1992) found 
that when characterising social groups, their participants tended to use attributes that 
were associated with smaller, rather than larger, within-group variability.  Overall, this 
research indicates that when forming impressions of social groups, people tend to rely 
on attributes that (a) are associated with the largest differences between the groups and 
(b) denote small within-group variability.  Sani and Bennett (2001) provided further 
support for such findings by showing that 7-year-old children’s use of gender 
stereotypes when evaluating their in-group depended on the comparison context.  For 
example, boys were more likely to categorise their in-group as brave and strong only 
after being asked to evaluate girls, but not men (see also Bennett & Sani, 2006).  In line 
with the above findings, Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, and Barsalou (2015) 
demonstrated that spatial attributes (i.e., top versus bottom) associated with words such 
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as sky or basement are activated only in relevant contexts, when the spatial location is 
salient.  Such findings further suggest that it is unlikely that concepts carry stable 
mental representations that are activated in all contexts. 
Research on multiple categorisations also supports the notion that stereotypic 
features of a social group are activated only in relevant conditions.  Hall and Crisp 
(2005) asked their participants to consider groups that students may belong to other than 
their university membership.  They found that when students considered such 
alternative affiliations, they were less likely to exhibit in-group favouritism when 
evaluating students from their own university (in-group) compared to the students from 
another university (out-group).  To summarise, this research suggests that the attributes 
activated in mental representations of gender stereotypes will depend on the context in 
which a judgement about males and females is being made. 
The literature discussed above indicates that stereotypic attributes associated 
with social groups are not fixed or stable mental structures.  This implies that 
stereotypes might not be automatically activated or applied to judgements under all 
circumstances.  On the one hand, initial research on stereotype activation proposed that 
stereotypes are automatically activated upon encountering a member of a stereotyped 
group.  Devine (1989) demonstrated that stereotypes are characterised by two 
components, automatic and controlled.  Because most people have knowledge about 
stereotypes, she suggested that stereotypes are automatically activated when a member 
of a stereotyped group is encountered.  Only people who are not prejudiced are able to 
inhibit such automatically activated stereotypes and report unbiased thoughts.  
Subsequent research indicated that in fact only highly prejudiced individuals 
automatically activate stereotypic content upon encountering a group member, but that 
all individuals (regardless of level of prejudice) evaluate stereotyped individuals 
negatively after direct priming with a negative stereotype (Lepore & Brown, 1997).  On 
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the other hand, recent models of stereotyping emphasise the importance of several 
factors that contribute to the stereotype activation, application, and inhibition.  These 
factors are associated with person’s goals, the level of prejudice, available cognitive 
resources, and learned associations (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, 
Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999).  Kunda 
and Spencer (2003) further proposed that the stereotype activation and application 
depend on comprehension goals (i.e., the need to simplify events and understand them), 
self-enhancement goals (i.e., the need to enhance or affirm self-esteem), and the 
motivation to avoid prejudice.  Each of these factors might inhibit or encourage 
stereotyping in situations where stereotype activation and application enable a goal 
achievement.  For example, if stereotyping promotes the goal of enhancing self-esteem 
via in-group favouritism, aids the understanding of complex events, and there is a low 
motivation to avoid prejudice, then people would be more likely to activate and apply 
(rather than inhibit) a stereotype.  Which of these goals is salient depends on situational 
factors that might promote a specific goal activation.  Such activation might be either 
spontaneous and automatic or deliberately activated due to certain thoughts.  To 
summarise, the model clearly indicates that the stereotype activation, application, or 
inhibition are determined by situational factors. 
In summary, the presented research suggests that the content and use of 
stereotypes in social judgement is based on personal goals and the functionality of 
stereotypes in a given situation.  Therefore, stereotypes do not carry stable mental 
representations that are activated and applied automatically across different contexts.  
Instead, mental representations of stereotypes are malleable.  Therefore, in my own 
research, I investigated the features associated with the mental representation of gender 
stereotypes in contexts where the attribute of power is salient and can serve the function 
of distinguishing males from females. 
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The above insights on stereotyping broadens our knowledge of how stereotypes 
impact people’s behaviour and why it is important to reduce their impact.  However, 
there is also a need to investigate the mechanisms and representational features that 
might be associated with specific stereotypes.  Therefore, one of the aims in my thesis is 
to address this issue.  People develop stereotypes over time due to socialisation but once 
stereotypes are acquired, they are usually maintained and reinforced in cognition.  
Therefore, to find ways of reducing or at least controlling negative consequences of 
stereotyping, we need to understand them also at the level of their mental 
representation.  However, the precise semantic features of a mental model at this 
abstract level of stereotype representation are not currently known.  In this thesis, I 
attempt to address this issue by integrating the existing literature on stereotyping with 
the perspective of grounded cognition.   
In the context of grounded cognition. Suitner, Maass, and Ronconi (2017) found 
that stereotypes about agency (males are perceived as more agentic than females; Maas, 
Suitner, Favaretto, & Cignacchi, 2009) are associated with the horizontal spatial 
dimension.  They suggest that people hold associations between gender, agency, and 
horizontal positions in space.  First, Suitner et al. (2017) demonstrated that participants 
associated males with agency, which in turn was associated with the rightward spatial 
trajectory (i.e., moving from left to right).  Second, they found that in a reaction-time 
test, participants were more accurate to categorise pictures of male faces when the 
pictures of males showed their profiles facing the rightward trajectory (versus leftward), 
whilst the opposite was found for female faces.  Such a pattern was possibly due to a 
congruency between males being seen as agentic, and their rightward-facing profiles.  
This pattern of results was reduced when participants were trained to associate female 
faces with the rightward trajectory, which also appeared to diminish self-reported 
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benevolent sexism.  This study indicates how cognitive associations formed on the basis 
of developed stereotypes are associated with sexist attitudes. 
To conclude, it appears that gender stereotypes are unlikely to be based on 
actual biological differences between males and females.  Given the negative 
consequences of stereotypes for how men and women are treated within the society, it is 
important to investigate them further, also on the level of their cognitive and 
representational features. 
The significance of power in social cognition 
 In the current thesis, I focused on mental simulations associated with the concept 
of power.  This is because power is an important psychological construct that impacts 
human cognition in multiple ways.  For instance, Guinote, Willis, Martellotta (2010) 
found that feeling socially powerful increases implicit negative attitudes towards 
different races.  In a series of studies, participants were led to believe that they either 
had high or low power (e.g., they thought they could or could not influence someone 
else’s decision-making).  Then, their racial implicit and explicit attitudes were assessed.  
Participant in the high-power, as opposed to the low-power condition, were significantly 
faster at categorising negatively valenced words after being primed with Black versus 
White faces.  This implies that participants in the high-power condition associated 
Black faces with negativity.  These findings were further replicated when assessing 
attitudes towards another racial group (i.e., Arabs) with an Implicit Association Test 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  Specifically, powerful participants had a 
higher tendency than powerless or neutral participants to associate Arabs with 
unpleasant words.  Interestingly, manipulating the target group’s power (i.e., high-
power versus low-power Black person) did not affect racial prejudice.  Overall, Guinote 
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et al. (2010) demonstrated that a perceiver’s high power increases implicit prejudice 
against stigmatised groups. 
Similarly, Guinote and Phillips (2010) examined the effect of holding power on 
stereotyping.  In their research, participants were recruited from a population of 
managers and subordinates who worked in hotels.  Participants were presented with 
descriptions of potential candidates for a job.  The descriptions were either stereotype-
consistent or -inconsistent and included information about candidates’ ethnicity (e.g., a 
stereotype-consistent description would present an English person applying for a 
teacher position, and a stereotype-inconsistent would present an Afro-Caribbean person 
applying for a teacher position).  Both groups, managers and subordinates, were asked 
evaluate the candidates.  It was found that managers (i.e., the powerful group) assessed 
out-group candidates by relying on stereotype consistency of the presented job.  In 
contrast, subordinates (i.e., the powerless group) focused more on individuating 
information and did not rely on stereotyping.  Such findings imply that power holders 
pay more attention to stereotypic information when it is relevant to a task at hand.  
Furthermore, in a recent review of literature on power, Guinote (2017) 
concludes that power holders rely more on stereotypical beliefs, commit more self-
serving biases, and they might be less socially attentive than those who are not 
powerful.  Powerful individuals are focused on their own desires and needs to meet their 
goals.  They are also motivated to maintain their power (e.g., Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013).  
Overall, the above findings indicate that power might be one of the most important 
factors influencing human cognition.  Specifically, holding power increases biased 
attitudes and beliefs.  Therefore, in my project, I focused on trying to better understand 
the representational features of power in relation to gender stereotypes. 
Another set of findings suggesting that the concept of power is important in 
social cognition is that showing an automatic readiness to identify social hierarchies.  
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For example, Stewart et al. (2012) demonstrated that people are able detect dominance 
(an attribute associated with power) automatically at the preconscious level.  These 
findings were corroborated by Rule, Adams, Ambady, and Freeman (2012).  In their 
study, participants were asked to judge dominance from neutral, submissive, and 
dominant body poses.  Despite time constraints, participants judged dominance levels 
based on poses more accurately than chance after seeing the stimuli for only 40ms.  The 
time constraint did not impact the accuracy of their judgements.  Overall, these studies 
indicate that people exhibit a readiness to process dominance cues.  In line with the 
above studies, Zink et al. (2008) demonstrated that people process social hierarchies on 
the neural level even when hierarchy cues are irrelevant to their task performance.  
Participants were presented with a simple computer game requiring them to press 
buttons on a computer keyboard.  The participants played the game simultaneously, 
ostensibly with other players.  The other players’ faces were presented on the computer 
screen.  The social hierarchy or rank of the other players was manipulated by presenting 
different symbols of military rank next to their faces (e.g., three stars would indicate a 
high rank).  Participants did not compete against the other players and the other players 
did not determine participants’ success in the game.  Nevertheless, the findings 
indicated that participants’ brain activity (in the occipital/parietal cortex, ventral 
striatum, and parahippocampal cortex) was greater when viewing players with higher 
rather than lower ranks.  Another study by Chiao et al. (2009) further demonstrated that 
people employ distinct neural pathways while representing social hierarchy, as opposed 
to number magnitudes.  Overall, these findings suggest that people are able to detect 
social hierarchy cues, that is, infer targets’ status and power, very efficiently, even 
following a brief exposure.  These processes are reflected in distinct, status-related 
neural circuity. 
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Integrating grounded cognition, conceptual blending, and stereotyping 
 As noted above, the theory of grounded cognition assumes that thinking about 
abstract concepts implying sensorimotor properties involves a spatial simulation of 
these concepts (Barsalou, 2008).  Within this process, response facilitation occurs when 
there is a congruency between a concept’s physical spatial position, as perceived, and its 
spatial position in terms of its simulated mental representation.  For instance, in the 
context of power, power is associated with upper vertical positions, so people are faster 
at selecting powerful groups when they are shown at the top of the visual field than at 
the bottom (Schubert, 2005).  I propose that spatial vertical simulation can be also 
associated with thinking about gender, such that the simulation of gender can be based 
on the simulation of power.  That is, the simulation of gender is based on blending 
between gender and power, and that a stereotypic link (i.e., a higher congruency) 
between these concepts might involve more pronounced spatial simulations (that is, 
when seeing males as relatively powerful and females as relatively powerless).  As a 
result, reasoning about social categories such as gender in a power context, and thinking 
about hierarchies amongst social groups might involve representations employing 
spatial processing.  The analysis of processes underlying such representations can help 
to better understand the cognitive basis of socially-relevant categorisations and provide 
a deeper insight into cognitive integration and production of meaning. 
The suggestions on blending associated with stereotypical associations and 
physical space find indirect support in the research by Suitner et al. (2017) that was 
described earlier in the chapter.  They demonstrated spatial bases of associations 
between agency and gender on the horizontal dimension and rightward trajectory.  The 
rightward trajectory refers to performing an action from the left to the right direction 
(e.g., writing direction).  Training people to associate females with spatial features 
associated mainly with males (e.g., rightward facing faces) involved a reduction in 
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benevolent sexism.  These findings provide a hint that stereotypic categorisations 
involve spatial associations via a blend between gender and agency, and as such, 
potentially, spatial simulations of gender.  
In the context of gender, power, and physical space, my line of reasoning is as 
follows.  First, I argue that although many social groups might not a priori be strongly 
associated with power (different from the materials used in Schubert’s research), spatial 
simulations can still occur, due to conceptual blending.  This would most likely happen 
in situations when a) thinking about social categories is power-related, b) the stimuli per 
se do not carry a clear power connotation, but c) such a connotation arises when 
thinking about the stimuli in stereotypic ways.  In fact, during blending, power might 
act as the context in which spatial features of verticality are activated (Schubert, 2005).  
Consistent with this argument, as mentioned earlier, Lebois et al. (2015) claim that the 
spatial features of grounded concepts are not automatically activated in all contexts, but 
rather that spatial processing only takes place when the grounded features of mentally 
represented concepts are relevant to the conditions under which the processing occurs.  
That is, power would be more likely simulated in space when people think about 
concepts that are semantically related to power (e.g., judging which person - master or 
servant - is the powerful one, Schubert, 2005).  However, it is unlikely that social 
groups are spatially represented when the processing does not occur in the context of 
power (e.g., judging which word - master or servant - has more letters; see also Taylor 
et al., 2015).  Congruent with this perspective, I propose that the perception of social 
groups, such as gender, in terms of power (males-powerful/powerless; females-
powerful/powerless) acts as a context in which the processing of information about 
gender is likely to be linked to the spatial features of power.  In other words, I suggest 
that the vertical simulation of power, as demonstrated by Schubert (2005), will take 
place when people think about concepts in power-related terms.  This could be either 
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concepts that carry power implications by definition (e.g., Schubert’s master versus 
servant) or, alternatively, concepts that are per definition not tied to power levels (e.g., 
male versus female), but may be applied to power when people need to differentiate 
power levels between gender, such that these two concepts are likely to be blended due 
to stereotyping.  
Second, as gender-power associations are malleable and their blending is 
dependent on the context, I suggest that stereotype-consistent blending (males-
powerful; females-powerless) is associated with spatial simulations.  The socio-political 
structure within Western societies has been based primarily on patriarchy where males 
usually have higher social status and more economical/political power than females 
(Ellemers, 2018; Rudman & Phelan, 2010; Wood & Eagly, 2002).  People are more 
likely to attribute stronger, socially powerful characteristics to males and weaker, 
powerless characteristics to females (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Eagly & 
Steffens, 1984; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan & Nauts, 2012).  Further, females who 
contradict the stereotype of having low status (i.e., when there is low stereotype-fit) 
tend to be negatively evaluated by both females and males as a result of the male-
powerful link (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000).  Interestingly, this latter research found that 
participants’ attitudes towards high-authority females were more negative than attitudes 
towards low-authority females, and both low- and high-authority males.  As applied to 
the research in this thesis, I suggest that in the absence of any other diagnostic 
information except for gender, spatial simulation is more likely to take place when a 
stereotypic view of a person or group is being processed and the stereotypic attribute of 
that person or group is associated with a concept grounded in space – in this case, 
power. 
Also, because there are individual differences in gender-stereotypical beliefs 
(Miller & Saucier, 2018; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), I investigated whether the extent 
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to which a person links males with high power and females with low power is related to 
spatial simulations of males at the top and females at the bottom.  Individuals who tend 
to more strongly associate males with power might also exhibit more pronounced 
spatial simulation of powerful-males at top versus females.  A more accessible link 
between the simulated concepts, that is, gender and power, might provide more 
processing advantage leading to more pronounced simulations. 
Integrating work on cognitive blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998), the 
context-dependency of spatial congruency effects (e.g., Lebois et al., 2015), the 
stereotypic link between males and power (Ellemers, 2018; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) 
and connections between power and verticality (Schubert, 2005; von Hecker et al., 
2013), I suggest that blending between male and powerful as well as between female 
and powerless (i.e., stereotype-fit) should possess a processing advantage and be 
associated with pronounced power-related spatial simulations due to the stereotypic 
associations.  Subsequently, if stereotypic thinking and power context are essential in 
eliciting spatial simulations in experimental conditions, removing or reducing a 
possibility of making stereotypic judgments about gender in the context of power 
should not stimulate spatial processing.  To clarify, by stereotypic thinking I refer to a 
general tendency to think according to gender stereotypes.  When such tendency is 
applied to making judgements in the context of power, then people should be more 
likely to consider males as powerful and females as powerless. 
To summarise, I believe that integrating existing literature on grounded 
cognition with research on stereotyping and consequences of power is essential, as the 
knowledge we currently possess in this respect is limited (e.g., Giessner & Schubert, 
2007; Guinote, 2017; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, & 
Lakens, 2011; Schubert, 2005; Slepian, Weisbuch, Rule, and Ambady, 2011; Suitner et 
al. 2017).  Most of the reported studies provide evidence for spatial processes in social 
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thinking, however, they fail to explain the nature and significance of spatial thinking for 
social processes.  Similarly, research focusing on stereotyping mainly addressed its 
consequences for discrimination and attitudes rather the representational structure 
(Fiske & Glick, 2001; Logel, et al., 2009; Rudamn & Kilianksi, 2000; Rudman & 
Phelan, 2010).  Yet, understanding the representational structure of stereotypes is also 
essential in designing interventions against discrimination or prejudice.  This is 
especially important in the context of social power, as social power seems to be an 
important factor in maintaining social inequality and promoting prejudice (Guinote et 
al. 2010; Guinote, 2017).  Therefore, I attempted to address these issues in my thesis, in 
the hope of stimulating more research into the cognitive associations between space and 
abstract concepts in social thought.  Below, I present an overview of the studies that 
were designed to accomplish the above aims. 
Overview of studies 
Overall, I conducted 14 studies.  First, I designed six behavioural experiments 
using reaction-time methodology investigating the presence of spatial simulations of 
gender via power perception, which are described in Chapter 2.  Subsequently, in 
Chapter 3, I present a follow-up experiment that was designed to replicate the previous 
findings by using a physiological measure of pupil size (pupillometry).  This is because 
pupil dilation has been found to be a proxy of cognitive processing in terms of cognitive 
effort or load and expectancy violation (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Proulx, Sleegers, 
& Tritt, 2017; Smallwood et al., 2011). 
In the next two chapters, I present studies examining the context-dependency of 
spatial simulations whereby task presentation was manipulated in terms of stimuli and 
instructions (Chapter 4) and stereotypic associations with regard to accessibility 
(Chapter 5).  In my last empirical chapter (Chapter 6), I demonstrate the impact of 
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vertical presentations of gender for stereotypic judgements and perception of size.  
Finally, in the concluding Chapter 7, I integrate and discuss the findings across all 
studies and provide an overall conclusion. 
Spatial simulations and stereotypic thinking 
First, I tested my main aim of exploring spatial simulations via social power 
perception and gender stereotypes in a linked series of six experiments (Chapter 2).  In 
order to provide an overall picture of the investigated spatial effects, I conducted an 
overall analysis by integrating the data across all experiments and estimating a 
hierarchical linear model, in which I treated participants as random factors nested 
within a contextual variable - studies.  Such an integration was possible, as I used the 
same basic experimental paradigm in all six studies.  However, I slightly modified the 
procedure of individual experiments to assess the nature of the effects across different 
contexts.  To ensure that participants thought about social power in my experiments, I 
provided its definition.  Further, I tested whether stereotype-fit (males-powerful; 
females-powerless) would be associated with stronger spatial processing, such that 
powerful-males would be detected faster at the top in the visual field than powerful-
females.  Initially, I explored these ideas by asking British (Study 1) and Polish (Study 
2) participants to quickly categorise either the powerful (condition 1) or the powerless 
(condition 2) person on the basis of gendered names only (male or female) that were 
vertically displayed (top or bottom) on a computer screen.  Subsequently, in Study 3, I 
introduced more control over participants’ associations by pairing both male and female 
names with high-status and gender-neutral professions.  In this way, participants could 
rely not only on gendered names, but also on the additional information (i.e., 
professions) when making decisions about powerful/powerless persons.  In Study 4, I 
explored whether thinking about power and gender in terms of social status was 
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associated with more pronounced spatial representations of males at the top and females 
at the bottom.  I tested this idea by priming participants with either social status items 
(e.g., scientist, professor, and dentist) or neutral words (e.g., potato, carrot, and 
cucumber).  In the final two experiments of the chapter (Studies 5 and 6), I investigated 
the same assumptions as in Studies 1 and 2, but I aimed at directly comparing whether 
the response mode was associated with the extent to which spatial simulations occurred.  
That is, in Study 5 participants used vertical keys (arrows up-down) and in Study 6 
horizontal keys (A-L) to indicate their responses.  Finally, I examined potential 
correlates of the investigated spatial simulations by measuring participants’ stereotypic 
and concrete associations: male-high status (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4); male-rationality; 
top-rationality (Studies 5 and 6). 
Across all experiments, I expected that participants would be significantly 
quicker at detecting male names as powerful when they appeared at the top as opposed 
to female names as powerful at the top.  Similarly, I predicted faster responses to 
females as powerless when they appeared at the bottom as opposed to males as 
powerless in the same position.  Finally, because the power concept per se is grounded 
in space (Schubert, 2005), I explored whether participants would be quicker to detect 
both males and females as powerful at the top versus bottom, and males and females as 
powerless at the bottom.  This could be possible via an association between power and 
top positions and lack of power and bottom positions regardless of gender.  However, if 
conceptual blending between power and gender via stereotypic associations is essential 
for spatial simulations to occur, then only males considered as powerful should be 
simulated at the top versus bottom and vice versa for females as powerless. 
26 
 
Measuring power-gender spatial simulations with pupillometry 
 In a follow-up study, I assessed power-gender spatial simulations with a 
physiological method involving pupillometry (Chapter 3).  This was done to test the 
robustness of the findings obtained in my initial studies presented in Chapter 2.  Pupil 
size has been found to be associated with expectancy violations and cognitive effort, 
such that pupil dilations reflect higher surprise (i.e., when unexpected stimuli are 
encountered) and cognitive load associated with increased cognitive effort (Proulx et al., 
2017; van der Wel and van Steenbergen, 2018).  As pupillometry represents an 
alternative and complementary way of investigating cognitive processing to the 
reaction-time methodology, I applied this method to investigate spatial grounding of 
power in relation to gender stereotypes.  In Study 7, to test the validity and relevance of 
pupillometry to my project, first, I replicated Schubert’s (2005) spatial task.  I asked 
participants to quickly categorise powerful individuals on the screen while presenting 
them with vertically positioned (top versus bottom) power-related words (e.g., servant, 
master; adapted from Schubert, 2005) in one block.  Second, in another block, I 
replicated my own task used in Study 1 of the present thesis.  Specifically, I presented 
participants with vertically positioned gendered names and asked them to quickly 
categorise powerful persons.  I predicted increased pupil dilation on trials that 
represented stimuli in incongruent spatial locations (e.g., female names merely 
presented at the top or categorised as powerful at the top, and powerless groups, e.g., 
servants, presented at the top).  Pupil dilations on such trials would index surprise and 
higher cognitive load (see Proulx et al., 2017). 
Dependency of spatial simulations on task features 
Next, I present three further experiments that explored the context dependency 
of spatial simulations (Chapter 4).  As power has been found to be grounded in space 
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(Schubert, 2005), I further investigated whether any individual that is associated with 
power (regardless of gender) would be spatially simulated (at the top or bottom) due to 
verticality cues (i.e., presenting names at the top or bottom).  Therefore, in Studies 8 
and 9, I presented participants with pairs of gendered names, as in Studies 1 - 6, but this 
time the pairs were both males or both females.  That is, participants made judgements 
about the powerful or powerless person by distinguishing between two females or two 
males.  In Study 8, I paired each gendered name with a high-status and gender-neutral 
profession (adapted from Study 3), whilst in Study 9, I presented only names.  Given 
that power was always associated with space across contexts, I expected that whichever 
individual was associated with being powerful would be detected faster and simulated at 
the top, whilst any individual associated with being powerless would be identified 
quicker and simulated at the bottom.   
In Study 10, I tested whether gender is simulated spatially when people do not 
think about males and females in the context of power.  To do that, I presented 
participants with gendered names that were displayed vertically on the screen.  Only 
one name (either male or female) was presented in each trial either at the top or bottom.  
I asked participants to quickly categorise the presented names as male or female.  Given 
that gender per se was associated with spatial simulations, I predicted that male names 
would be categorised faster as male when presented at the top, whilst female names 
would be categorised faster when displayed at the bottom.  However, if gender itself 
was not grounded in space, I predicted no differences in participants’ response latencies 
to classify both genders at the top and bottom. 
Dependency of spatial simulations on stereotype accessibility  
To provide a complete picture of the contextual effects on spatial simulations, in 
Chapter 5, I present two studies in which I investigated whether manipulating stereotype 
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accessibility could involve the presence of spatial processing in mental representations 
of gender and power.  Therefore, in Study 11, I asked participants to categorise 
powerful individuals on the screen under restricted or relaxed task conditions to 
manipulate stereotype accessibility.  In one condition, participants had only 600ms to 
respond, whilst in the other one 2000ms.  The literature indicates that people attend to 
cues that are more immediately relevant and accessible to the task (Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997).  Therefore, under very restricted 
conditions (600ms) it is less likely that participants would be able to use the stereotype 
to make their judgements.  By contrast, it is likely that the verticality cues are easy to 
process (top versus bottom), because they do not require activating social knowledge 
(i.e., stereotypes).  Because of this, the time constraint of 600ms might be sufficient to 
process and use those cues in making power judgements.  In contrast, 2000ms should 
provide sufficient processing time to activate and apply stereotype-consistent 
knowledge in conjunction with the verticality cues.  At the same time, because 2000ms 
is still quite a short period of time, under such conditions it is unlikely that participants 
would be able to effectively inhibit stereotypic associations on most of the trials.  
Hence, I predicted that in the restricted-time condition, participants would be 
significantly more likely to rely on verticality cues when making a judgement about 
powerful individuals, as the cues would be more salient.  That is, participants would be 
more likely to pick powerful individuals at the top regardless of gender.  In the non-
restricted condition, I predicted the involvement of stereotypic thinking, as participants 
would be given more time to think about their judgements.  Specifically, stereotypic 
thinking might involve more processing time than verticality cues.  Therefore, 
participants should be more likely to rely on such biases rather than focus on more 
immediate spatial cues. 
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If stereotypic thinking was involved in spatial simulations (Rudman & Kilianski, 
2000), I further predicted that priming people with powerful females and powerless 
males should reduce the spatial simulation effects of males as powerful at the top and 
strengthen the representation of females as powerful at the top – given that such 
simulations were previously detected.  Therefore, in Study 12, I asked participants to 
complete the spatial task (the same as used in Studies 1 - 7), and quickly identify the 
powerful person on the screen on the basis of pairs of opposite gendered names (male - 
female).  However, one group of participants was primed with powerful-females and 
powerless-males before completing the spatial task.  I predicted that the spatial 
processing would be significantly reduced in the priming condition as opposed to the 
control condition. 
The impact of spatial presentation on gender perceptions 
Finally, in Chapter 6, my aim was to test whether simulations of gender on the 
vertical dimension in the context of power would bias participants’ subsequent 
stereotypic judgments about males and females.  In Study 13, I tested whether 
presenting male and female names at the top would be associated with a biased 
perception of their physical size.  The grounded cognition perspective suggests that 
mental representations of abstract concepts (e.g., power) can be associated with 
perceptual experiences of both verticality and size.  Metaphorically, physical size is 
associated with being on top, which then relates to greater power.  To test whether 
participants would associate gender with an enhanced physical size after being primed 
with a vertical spatial location of males/females, I asked participants to attend to a 
vertical presentation of gendered names (in one condition male names appeared at the 
top and female ones at the bottom, whilst in the other condition this was reversed – 
females at the top and males at the bottom; or no presentation at all in the control 
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condition).  In the two experimental conditions, participants were also informed that the 
presented individuals (male and female names) represented managers and subordinates.  
Then, after each priming trial, participants were asked to estimate font sizes of 
subsequently centrally shown male or female names.  I predicted that participants 
presented with male names at the top would judge subsequently presented male names 
on the computer screen as bigger in size (i.e., overestimate their actual sizes), whilst the 
female names would be underestimated. 
In Study 14, I wanted to test whether spatial vertical simulation of males as 
powerful and females as powerless would affect participants’ judgements about gender 
in terms of social dimensions associated with Stereotype Content Model, that is, 
competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  To investigate this issue, 
again I asked participants to complete a spatial task (as in Studies 1 – 6), but this time 
instead of names, I presented pictures of opposite gender pairs (one male; the other one 
female) that were matched in terms of age, masculinity/femininity, and attractiveness.  
Participants were asked to quickly categorise the powerful or the powerless person on 
the basis of the pictures.  After the spatial task, I asked them to rate the competence, 
warmth, gender typicality, and how much they liked each person presented in the spatial 
task.  I predicted that males as powerful simulated at the top would be judged as more 
competent and less warm in contrast to females as powerful or powerless presented in 
the same spatial location.   
Overview of the analytical strategy 
For each study that involved measurement of response latencies and pupil size, I 
estimated a linear mixed model.  Before conducting each analysis, I assessed the 
appropriate random structure that would best fit my data and then I estimated a final 
linear mixed model to evaluate my fixed effects, that is, gender choice (males versus 
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females) and trial type (males-top versus females-top; see Jaeger, 2008; Judd, Westfall, 
& Kenny, 2012).  The way of determining the best random structure for each study is 
presented in Appendix 1. 
To normalize the distribution of response times to the chosen categories, the 
reaction-times of each participant were first range restricted to 3000ms and 
subsequently trimmed using the Tukey criterion (response latencies that are larger or 
smaller than the upper or lower quartile, respectively, plus or minus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range for each participant are removed, see Clark-Carter, 2004).  In this 
thesis, effect sizes pertinent to the target hypotheses are reported as Cohen’s d for chi-
square tests and dz for linear mixed models analyses. 
The IAT scores were first computed by recoding values that were lower than 
300ms as 300ms, and those higher than 3000ms as 3000ms (Rudman & Kilianski, 
2000).  Subsequently, I subjected the scores to logarithmic transformations to normalise 
the distribution.  Finally, after this transformation, I computed mean response times for 
each category of interest (e.g., mean scores for participants’ responses to males-high-
status items and females-high-status items).  The same procedure was applied to every 
IAT reported in this thesis. 
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Implications 
 To summarise, in my thesis, I present a series of experiments that were designed 
to understand the representational and sensorimotor features of gender stereotypes.  
Although substantial research has already been conducted in the area of grounded 
cognition and stereotyping separately, not many studies focused on integrating these 
two areas of research.  I believe that combining knowledge about cognition and 
stereotyping might provide better understanding of both of these domains.  That is, 
investigating mechanisms involved in mental representation of stereotypes might 
provide knowledge about the nature of stereotypes per se, but also the functioning of 
human mental processes.  Accumulating such knowledge could provide more effective 
ways of dealing with socially undesirable cognitive biases. 
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Chapter 2: Spatial simulations in power-gender associations (Studies 1 – 6) 
Overview 
 
In this chapter, I present six studies that were designed to test whether spatial 
simulations are involved in mental representations of gender and power on the vertical 
dimension.  Overall, I used the same experimental paradigm across all studies, but each 
of the designs differed slightly to assess generalizability.  In the main paradigm, 
participants completed a spatial task and categorised as quickly as possible which 
person (one female name; one male name) of two vertically displayed on the screen (top 
and bottom) was powerful (condition 1) or powerless (condition 2).  Their choices of 
male and female names judged as powerful or powerless in each vertical position were 
recorded.  I also measured participants’ response latencies to their judgements.  Finally, 
participants were asked to complete a standardised Implicit Association Test measuring 
their attitudes towards social status of males and females.  In line with my hypothesis, 
power-gender stereotypic associations involved simulations of males as powerful at the 
top as opposed to (a) males as powerful at the bottom as well as (b) females as powerful 
at the top.  Contrary to expectations, no spatial effects were detected when participants 
selected females as powerful and both male and female names as powerless.  The 
effects were independent of implicit attitudes towards gender. 
 
In a series of six experiments presented in this chapter, I tested whether thinking 
about gender in terms of power was associated with spatial simulations (males and 
females as powerful simulated at the top; males and females as powerless simulated at 
the bottom) and especially pronounced simulations in the case of stereotypic-thinking 
(higher proportions of choices of and faster responses to stereotype-consistent stimuli, 
i.e., males as powerful at the top/females as powerless at the bottom). 
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In terms of the analytical strategy, I followed suggestions by Lakens and Etz 
(2017).  In their recent work regarding multiple study lines of research, the authors used 
likelihood ratios to demonstrate that when testing the same hypothesis in several 
experiments, there is a high probability of obtaining non-significant results in some of 
the experiments.  In order to assess whether a hypothesis is indeed supported across 
several studies, there is a need for conducting an integrative analysis.  Because of this, I 
present a combined analysis across the studies, but the results of each individual study 
are available in Appendix 6.  As some of the individual studies did not achieve standard 
levels of statistical significance, to test my hypotheses regarding spatial simulation of 
gender and power on the vertical dimension, I estimated a hierarchical linear model that 
integrated the data across all my experiments. Below, I present the design of each of the 
studies. 
Studies 1 & 2: Exploring spatial simulations in stereotypic thinking 
Studies 1 and 2 were exploratory.  Within both studies I used a similar reaction-
time spatial task as Schubert (2005), but instead of powerful/powerless groups, I 
presented participants with pairs of male and female names as stimuli (e.g., Emily-
Oliver) vertically displayed on a computer screen (one at the top; one at the bottom).  
Participants indicated as fast as possible which person was powerful (condition 1) or 
powerless (condition 2) on the basis of the names with horizontally arranged keys on 
the computer keyboard.  Half of the participants pressed A to choose powerful and L to 
choose powerless persons, or vice versa for the other half of participants.  In this task, I 
measured how often participants picked each name and I also recorded their response 
latencies to all the choices they made.  I would like to note that the experiments were 
exploratory and therefore I aimed at allowing participants to freely make their own 
choices about powerful and powerless individuals.  Specifically, contrary to Schubert’s 
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(2005) design, in my experiments participants could not make a correct or incorrect 
judgement.  As they were presented with gendered names only, rather than with generic 
powerful/powerless groups as in Schubert’s research, they needed to decide themselves 
which person was the powerful/powerless.  That is, I used a quasi-experimental design 
whereby the choice of the powerful/powerless person (either the male or female name) 
was the self-generated quasi-experimental variable. 
Subsequently, participants completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald et al., 1998) measuring their implicit attitudes towards gender with regards 
to status.  In a standardised IAT, participants are presented with items (one at a time in 
the middle of the screen) that belong to different categories (here, high or lower social 
status and male or female names).  Participants are asked to quickly sort items to 
different categories.  In the social-status IAT, high-status items and male names need to 
be categorised with one keyboard key and low-status ones and female names with 
another within one block.  The key arrangement is then reversed in another block (one 
key for high-status items and female names and another for low-status items and male 
names).  Then, participants’ reaction-times are measured across these blocks.  Faster 
response latencies to males-high-status items versus females-high-status ones indicate 
an implicit bias against females who have a high social status. 
In Study 1, I recruited a sample of English-speaking participants, and in Study 2, 
Polish-speaking participants, to assess generalizability  
Study 3: Controlled gender-power associations 
In Studies 1 and 2, participants made their judgments about power on the basis 
of gendered names only.  In the absence of any additional information, they were likely 
to use prior knowledge and freely accessible associations about social power of males 
and females.  In Study 3, I therefore introduced more control over the thought context, 
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in the hope to replicate the findings from Studies 1 and 2 with a small alteration to the 
method.  Specifically, I aimed at creating experimental conditions that would be less 
ambiguous and enhance participants’ representations of the processed concepts (i.e., 
power and gender).  Specifically, I constrained the context for making the decision 
about powerful/powerless individuals by pairing each gendered name with a high-status 
profession in the spatial task in order to stimulate thinking about power implications.  In 
addition, I asked participants to use vertical keys on the computer keyboard, to reduce 
potential cognitive load in relating the horizontal keys to the vertically presented stimuli 
on the screen.  I hypothesised that constraining the context would involve spatial 
simulations of both males as powerful and females at the top (as power should be 
associated with verticality in general, see Schubert 2005), but such simulations would 
be more pronounced in the case males as powerful rather than females, as a result of 
stereotype consistency.  I derived the predictions from Lebois et al.’s (2015) research, 
as it seems that introducing more constrained/relevant context to the thought processes 
would enhance the salience of the spatial features of grounded concepts (i.e., power) 
and vividness of the mental representation (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).   
Study 4: Priming social status 
 Study 4 tested whether thinking about social status interacts with thinking about 
power of males and females to produce even stronger spatial simulations.  In this study, 
I adapted the same design as in Study 1.  However, this time before each trial of the 
spatial task, participants were primed with either social status items or neutral words.  I 
expected that priming with social status would involve more pronounced spatial 
simulations when thinking about both males and females, especially in the case of 
thinking about males in stereotypic ways (males-powerful). To further examine if the 
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implicit associations between gender and high status are related to spatial simulation, I 
asked participants to complete a social-status and gender IAT (adapted from Study 1). 
Studies 5 and 6: Correlates of spatial simulation 
In Studies 5 and 6, the main aim was to conduct a replication of Study 1 and to 
explore whether individual differences in stereotypical beliefs about gender (other than 
associations between genders and social status) may relate to spatial simulations of 
males at the top and females at the bottom.  Therefore, I propose that there are 
additional conceptual associations that may support spatial simulation of the gender-
power hierarchy.  
Logically, a potential interacting domain would need to be metaphorically 
associated with vertical positioning and gender.  Interestingly, Cian, Krishna and 
Schwarz (2015) reported that people hold associations between rationality and top 
positions as well as emotionality and bottom positions.  Furthermore, it seems that 
females are stereotypically considered to express more emotions than males (e.g., see 
Glick & Fiske, 1996; Plant, Hyde, Keltner & Devine, 2006).  I therefore hypothesised 
that links between rationality/emotionality and gender as well as 
rationality/emotionality and vertical positions might moderate or be related to the spatial 
simulation of gender on the vertical dimension similarly. 
 The design of two final studies of this chapter was based on Study 1.  Across 
both experiments, I asked participants to complete the same spatial task as before, in 
which I presented vertically arranged gendered names.  The only exception in the 
methodology was that in Study 5, I facilitated participants’ responses by asking them to 
use arrows up/down to indicate the powerful/powerless individuals on the screen, as in 
Study 3.  In Study 6, participants responded in the usual way by using horizontally 
arranged keys, as in Study 1.  After the spatial task, I asked participants to complete two 
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IATs.  The first one measured associations between rationality/emotionality and gender 
in order to assess whether participants indeed held associations between females-
emotionality and males-rationality (Plant et al., 2006).  The second one was a 
replication of the IAT used by Cian et al. (2015) to support the assumption that people 
associate emotionality with bottom vertical positions and rationality with top ones.   
Overall predictions across six studies 
First, in terms of proportions of gendered names chosen as powerful and 
powerless, I predicted that participants would be more likely to pick males as powerful 
than females as powerful, due to stereotypic associations.  In terms of reaction times, I 
hypothesised that if stereotypic thinking about gender in terms of power involved 
spatial simulation (Giessner & Schubert, 2007; Lebois et al., 2015; Schubert, 2005), 
then responses should be faster to male names appearing at the top than female names 
appearing at the top, for trials in which participants were asked to select who was 
powerful.  Likewise, responses should be faster to female names appearing at the 
bottom than male names in the same location, for trials in which participants were asked 
to select who was powerless.  However, to consider such effects as associated with 
spatial simulations and particular spatial locations, I also predicted that overall, the so-
identified “powerful” name would be responded to quicker when at the top than at the 
bottom, and vice versa for the “powerless” name (see Schubert, 2005).  However, if 
stereotypic associations were crucial in blending among gender, power, and space, then 
when participants selected females as powerful, no response facilitation should occur 
when females appeared at the top versus bottom.  The same should be true for choices 
of males as powerless when their names appeared at the bottom versus top. 
Finally, I predicted that holding male-high status, male-rationality, and top-
rationality associations would likely involve quicker responses in selecting males as 
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powerful at the top and females as powerless at the bottom (Rudman & Kilianski, 
2000).  This was tested by asking participants to complete a series of IATs, in which 
they were instructed to quickly sort items that belonged to different categories, e.g., 
quicker responses to sorting male names and high status labels with one key rather than 
females and high status would indicate an association between males and high status. 
Method4 
Participants 
 Demographic information about participants is presented in Table 1.  The sample 
size of individual studies was informed by relevant previous research (e.g., Schubert, 
2005; von Hecker et al., 2013, for medium effect size, Cohen’s dz = .25).  Participants 
for five of the studies were recruited from a sample of Cardiff University students and 
received either course credit or payment for their participation.  Participants for the 
remaining study were recruited from Maria Curie-Sklodowska University of Lublin, 
Poland, and received course credit.  Across six experiments, I recruited 372 participants 
in total.5 
 Exclusions: One participant was excluded from Study 1 and Study 3 due to 
extreme response times, as determined by Tukey criterion (specifically, their response 
times were larger than the upper quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range).  In other 
words, their average response latencies were 2 standard deviations above the grand 
mean of all participants).  
  
  
                                                 
4 Method section of each individual study is available in Appendix 2. 
5 The high proportion of female participants in my studies is attributable to the demographic makeup of 
the participant panels. 
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Table 1.  Demographic information about participants. 
 
Materials 
 All Studies.  Spatial Task.  I selected 10 popular British (Studies 1, 3, 4, 5, and 
6) and Polish (Study 2) names (5 female and 5 male).7  Each name was randomly paired 
with a name of the opposite gender (e.g., Oliver – Emily, see Appendix 3 for all the 
pairs).  Across all studies, the matched pairs were then presented on the computer 
screen in white letters on a black screen (font size 15 – 21 across the studies).  In Study 
3, I additionally selected professions (derived from a pilot study)8 that were assigned to 
male and female names (adapted from Study 1; e.g., Oliver-Professor, Sophie-
Professor).  Each pair (profession and name) was assigned to a corresponding pair 
including a name of the opposite gender.  I created all combinations of professions and 
                                                 
6 26% of the sample were non-native English speakers, but were fluent in English. 
7 See the most popular names: Popular British baby names: Year by year. (n.d.). Retrieved February 9, 
2015, from http://www.babycentre.- co.uk/popular- baby-names (Study 1a); Academy of childbirth. 
(n.d.). Retrieved May 2, 2016, from: http://akademiaporodu.pl/top-news/najpopularniejsze-imiona-w-
2015-2016-mapy-ranking (Study 2). 
8 In a pilot study, 30 participants rated 30 professions on levels of power, agency, gender-typicality and 
social status (0: low; 10: high). The mean ratings revealed five professions (doctor, dentist, architect, 
scientist, professor) with high power (M = 6.92; SD = .85), social status (M = 8.20; SD = .83), being 
gender-neutral (M = 4.34; SD = .53) and agency-neutral (M = 4.68; SD = .83). 
Studies N Gender Mean Age Nationality 
Study 1 79 66 females 20.17 years British 
Study 2 73 58 females 20.19 years Polish 
Study 3 52 47 females 19.04 years British 
Study 4 58 51 females 18.97 years British 
Study 5 59 57 females 22.12 years British6 
Study 6 60 52 females 21.40 years British 
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gender (e.g., male scientist - female professor; female professor - male scientist) within 
four sets of pairings (see Appendix 4 for all combinations).  Participants were randomly 
assigned to receive one set of combinations.  In Study 4, I introduced another minor 
modification.  Before each trial, (in which they were required to indicated the 
powerful/powerless person at the top or at the bottom) participants were presented with 
a social status item (gender-neutral profession adapted from Study 3, i.e.: scientist, 
architect, doctor, professor, dentist) or neutral word (i.e., vegetables: carrot, potato, 
lettuce, broccoli, cabbage).  The prime was manipulated within-participants.  After 
making decisions about the powerful/powerless person in each trial, participants were 
asked to report whether the initially presented prime word belonged to the social status 
category (by pressing the arrow pointing left), or to the vegetable category (by pressing 
the arrow pointing right).9  In this way, the prime word was activated during 
participants’ decision about the powerful/powerless person. 
Design 
All Studies. Spatial Task.  The same overarching design was used in all 
studies.  Task or instructions (“find powerful” versus “find powerless”) was always 
manipulated between-participants while the trial type (males-top and females-bottom 
versus females-top and males-bottom) was always manipulated within-participants.  
There were four blocks of trials.  Each block included a presentation of five pairs shown 
twice (ten trials in total).  In half of the trials, a male name (e.g., Oliver) was displayed 
at the top of the screen with a female name (e.g., Emily) at the bottom (see Figure 1).  
Both names were centred and there was a 23cm vertical distance between the names.  In 
the remaining trials, this display was reversed (females at the top and males at the 
bottom).  There were 40 trials in total.  The order of trials within each block was 
                                                 
9 The responses were reversed for the other half of our participants: they pressed the arrow pointing right 
for social status items and the arrow pointing left for vegetables (participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the key arrangements). 
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randomised.  The same design was applied to Study 3, except that instead of presenting 
pairs of gendered names, I presented gendered names paired with professions (see 
Figure 2).  In Study 4, prior to presenting the first half of the trials (males-top; females-
bottom) participants were primed with a social status item, and prior to presenting the 
other half (males-top; females-bottom) they were shown a neutral word (the prime 
words were selected at random from a list of vegetables; see Figure 3).  The same was 
done for the trials where females were presented at the top and males at the bottom, so 
there were 20 trials within each block (80 trials in total).  The trials were also 
randomised within each block within-participants; there were four blocks in total.  I 
measured how quickly participants responded and which gender they picked as 
powerful/powerless on each trial type (see Table 2 for an overview of the manipulated 
variables). 
 
Table 2.  Overview of the manipulated factors. 
 
Factor Levels Design 
Task Powerful versus powerless Between-participants 
Trial type Males-top versus females-top Within-participants 
Gender choice Males versus females 
Within-participants/quasi-
experimental variable 
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Figure 1.  Spatial task procedure of a single trial (Studies 1, 2, 5 and 6).10 
 
Figure 2. Spatial task procedure of a single trial (Study 3).  
 
                                                 
10 In Study 5, participants used the arrow pointing up to indicate the powerful/powerless at the top and the 
arrow pointing up to indicate the target at the bottom. 
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Figure 3. Spatial task procedure of a single trial (Study 4).  
 
  
 Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4.  Status-gender IAT.  I adapted the standard IAT of 
implicit attitudes towards high- or low-status males and females from research by 
Rudman and Kilianski (2000; see Appendix 5 for all the stimuli used).  Within a single 
block, participants were asked to categorise items that belonged to either high status 
(boss, supervisor, expert, leader, executive, authority) and males (e.g., Paul, Brian, 
Kevin) or low status (secretary, helper, aide, clerk, subordinate, assistant) and females 
(e.g., Lauren, Kate, Zoe), or vice versa in another block.11  The order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants.  In Study 2, the instructions and categories were 
presented in Polish.  In Study 3, I reduced the number of blocks of a standard IAT from 
five to two (see Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).  Participants were asked to keep in mind 
two target categories within two blocks (male and high status in one block or female 
and high status in another) and respond as fast as possible by pressing a designated key 
when they saw an item that belonged to the target category on the screen.  When they 
                                                 
11 In the current thesis, I disregard conceptual independence between power and status, and I focus on the 
conceptual overlap (see von Hecker et al., 2013). 
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saw distractors (female and low status or males and low status) they were to press a 
second designated key.   
Studies 5 and 6.  Rationality/emotionality-gender IAT.  I asked participants 
to quickly and accurately sort items that belonged to the category of emotionality 
(feeling, mood, sentiment, sympathy) and females (e.g., Karen, Caitlin, Jasmine), as 
well as rationality (intelligent, logic, reason, thinking) and males (e.g., Brian, Kevin, 
Paul), and vice versa.  
Studies 5 and 6.  Rationality/emotionality-verticality IAT.  Participants 
categorised items that belonged to the category of up (above, top, over, upper) and 
rationality, and the category of down (below, under, bottom, lower) and emotionality, or 
up/emotionality and down/rationality (the items for emotionality/rationality categories 
were the same as in the rationality/emotionality and gender IAT).  Both IATs in Studies 
5 and 6 were designed in the same standard way. 
All Studies.  Procedure  
 All studies were presented using DirectRT (Jarvis, 2012).  Participants sat 
approximately 70cm away from the computer screen.  After providing consent, 
participants read the instructions and received verbal definitions of socially powerful 
and socially powerless individuals (adapted from Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).  
In the powerful condition, I provided the following definition: ‘By powerful, we mean a 
person that controls the ability of another person to get something they want, or is in a 
position to evaluate that person’, whilst in the powerless condition I stated: ‘By 
powerless, we mean a person whose ability to get something they want is controlled by 
another person, and the other person is in a position to evaluate them.’  In Study 2, as 
there are no direct semantic equivalents of the adjectives powerful and powerless in 
Polish, I used substitutes.  As social power can be defined in terms of social influence 
(Lewin, 1941), I asked Polish participants to find influential or not influential 
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individuals on the screen.  Then, participants completed the spatial task by pressing 
keys on the computer keyboard to indicate the powerful/powerless person on the screen.  
After the spatial task, all participants completed the IATs (the status-gender IAT in 
Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4; rationality/emotionality-gender and –verticality IATs in Studies 5 
and 6).  At the end of each session participants were debriefed.  Each experiment lasted 
approximately 20 minutes. 
Results 
Proportions of choices.  First, I analysed the proportions of participants’ 
choices.  As predicted, participants were more likely to choose males as powerful 
(59.5%) rather than females as powerful (40.5%), χ²(1) = 658.78, p < .001, d > 2.0, odds 
ratio choosing males as powerful versus females = 1.48 (95%CI[1.43, 1.53].  I also tested whether 
proportions of choices were correlated with reaction-times, but the analyses indicated 
that these two processes were independent, ps > .13. 
Response latencies.  In terms of reaction times of participants’ choices, my data 
were hierarchical, so I built a multilevel linear model in which intercepts varied across 
participants that were nested within studies.  Next, assessing the appropriate random 
structure that would best fit my data (see Appendix 1), I estimated the final model to 
evaluate the fixed effects, that is, gender choice (males versus females), trial type 
(males-top versus females-top), and task instructions (look for powerful versus 
powerless). 
Overall, I found that the fixed effect of trial type was marginally significant, 
F(1, 15825) = 3.15, p = .08, dz = .13.  Participants were marginally faster at responding 
when presented with males-top trials (M = 1060ms; SE = 17.52, 95% CI[1059, 1127]) 
than females-top (M = 1096ms; SE = 17.44, 95%CI[1068, 1137].  The fixed effect of 
gender choice (males: M = 1071ms; SE = 17.24, 95%CI[1057, 1125]; females: M = 
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1088ms; SE = 18.12, 95%CI[1069, 1140]) was also marginally significant, with quicker 
responses when choosing males versus females, F(1, 333) = 2.90, p = .09, dz =  .04.  
However, the main effect of task was not significant, F(1, 405) = 1.56, p = .21, dz = .06, 
such that participants were equally fast to respond within the powerful (M = 1065ms; 
SE = 24, 95% CI[1030, 1124]) and powerless condition (M = 1093ms; SE = 23.81, 95% 
CI[1072, 1165]). 
Next, I found that the trial type by gender choice interaction was significant, 
F(1, 16113) = 11.00, p < .001.  Overall, participants were significantly faster to select 
males when they were presented at the top (M = 1055ms; SE = 17.65, 95% CI[1043, 
1112]) than when they were presented at the bottom (M = 1088ms; SE = 17.64, 95% 
CI[1071, 1140), t(333) = -3.75, p < .001, dz = .14.  Participants were also marginally 
faster at selecting males than they were presented at the top compared to selecting 
females when they were presented at the top, (M = 1104ms; SE = 18.42, 95% CI[1064, 
1136), t(333) = -2.50, p = .06, dz = .12.  However, other comparisons (females selected 
when they appeared at the bottom in contrast to top as well as males at the bottom) were 
not significant, ps > .71.   
Further, the two-way interaction between gender choice and task was also 
significant, F(1, 340) = 15.74, p < .001.  Overall, participants responded faster when 
selecting males as powerful (M = 1044; SE = 10.91, 95% CI[1010, 1102) as opposed to 
selecting females as powerful (M = 1100ms; SE = 10.69, 95% CI[1049, 1149), t(341) = 
-3.97, p < .001, dz =.20.  Next, although participants were faster to select females as 
powerless (M = 1081ms; SE = 24.83, 95% CI[1061, 1159) compared to males (M = 
1111ms; SE = 24.05, 95% CI[1080, 1174), this difference was not significant, t(331) = 
1.61, p = .11, dz = .10.  
Finally, as predicted by the conceptual blending account, the three-way 
interaction among gender choice, trial type, and task was significant, F(1, 16113) = 
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5.81, p < .02 (see Figure 4).  Starting with the powerful condition, as hypothesised, I 
found that participants were significantly faster at selecting males as powerful when 
they were presented at the top of the screen (M = 1019ms; SE = 24.16, 95% CI[986, 
1081) compared to selecting females as powerful when they were at the top of the 
screen (M = 1107ms; SE = 25.78, 95% CI[1038, 1140]), t(597) = -4.38, p < .001, dz = 
.20.  Interestingly, in the powerless condition, participants did not differ in how quickly 
they selected males (M = 1108ms; SE = 24.66, 95% CI[1085, 1182]) versus females (M 
= 1057ms; SE = 25.51, 95% CI[1058, 1159]) as powerless when they appeared at the 
bottom, although the pattern of responses was consistent with my hypothesis, t(733) = 
.85, p = .59, dz =.13.  Importantly, the contextual variable, studies, did not moderate the 
three-way interaction, F(5, 16049) = 1.19, p = .31.  The above analyses indicate that 
when power (but not the lack of power) was conceptually combined with gender in a 
stereotype-consistent manner, participants spatially simulated gender on the top.  
However, this was not the case when a female was selected as powerful (i.e., in the 
context of a stereotype-inconsistent choice). 
Subsequently, to determine whether the above effects were specifically 
associated with spatial locations, I conducted additional post-hoc analyses.  These 
analyses revealed that indeed males were selected as powerful faster when they 
appeared at the top of the screen (M = 1019ms; SE = 9.34, 95% CI[991, 1088]) versus 
the bottom of the screen (M = 1072; SE = 24.65, 95% CI[1035, 1132]), t(9530) = -4.72, 
p < .001, dz = .32.  The reverse pattern of results was true for choices of females, they 
were selected as powerful slower when they appeared at the top of the screen (M = 
1107ms; SE = 27.04, 95% CI[1049, 1156]) versus the bottom of the screen (M = 
1088ms; SE = 27.63, 95% CI[1070, 1178]), though this effect was not significant, 
t(6329) = 1.66, p = .19, dz = .05.  
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In contrast to my hypothesis, in the powerless condition, female names were not 
selected significantly slower when they appeared at the top of the screen (M = 1102ms; 
SE = 24.48, 95% CI[1072, 1168]) versus the bottom, (M = 1057ms; SE = 24.77, 95% 
CI[1067, 1165]), t(9648) = -.41, p = .69, dz = .16.   This difference was also not 
significant when males were selected as powerless when they appeared at the top of the 
screen (M = 1114ms; SE = 27.11, 95% CI[1081, 1187]) versus the bottom (M = 
1108ms; SE = 26.98, 95% CI[1098, 1204]), t(6298) = -1.36, p = .19, dz = .02.  Overall, 
the three-way interaction suggests that the top-advantage in reaction times when 
choosing the powerful person is present in stereotype-consistent responding. 
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Figure 4.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom) across six experiments. 
The error bars show -/+1 standard error.12 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
 
                                                 
12 Note that “Males-top” refers to trials where male names were presented at the top and female names at 
the bottom, whilst “Females-top” represents trials where female names were presented at the top and male 
names at the bottom. 
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High status-gender IAT.  To test whether the above findings were associated 
with individual differences in implicit associations between gender and social status, I 
analysed participants’ IAT responses.  After controlling for the relevant studies (1- 4), I 
found that participants were significantly faster at categorising males and high status 
items (M = 794ms; SE = 12.54, 95% CI[769, 818]) compared to females and high status 
items (M = 882ms; SE = 10.52, 95% CI[799, 841), F(1, 256) = 5.25, p < .02, η2p = .02.  
The studies by IAT category (males-high status; females-high status) interaction was 
not significant, indicating that the direction of the effect of the category did not differ 
across studies, F(1, 256) = 2.54, p = .11, η2p = .01.  Second, I calculated a facilitation 
score for each participant.  This was done by subtracting RTs from blocks in which 
participants responded to the category combination of males/high status from blocks in 
which they responded to females/high status; positive scores indicated a tendency to 
associate males with high status.  Linking this index with my RT data, I also computed 
two separate difference scores subtracting the RTs for choices of males at the top from 
the RTs for choices of males at the bottom and, vice versa, the RTs for choices of 
females at the bottom from the RTs for choices of females at the top.  The more positive 
these scores are, the more impactful is the simulation of males as powerful at the top.  
Therefore, I term these scores “simulation scores”.  After controlling for studies, I found 
that the IAT facilitation scores (i.e., the tendency to associate males with high status)13 
did not correlate with the spatial simulation of males as powerful at the top, r(128) = -
.07, p = .43.  The same was true for the simulation of females as powerless at the 
bottom, r(104) = .06, p = .52.  Likewise, the correlation between facilitation score to 
males as powerful at the top versus females as powerful in the same spatial location and 
IAT facilitation score was not significant, r(120) = -.06, p = .50. 
                                                 
13 I also correlated the absolute scores, i.e., participants’ reaction times to choices of males as powerful on 
the top and females as powerless on the bottom, with the IATs facilitation scores, and I found similar 
results as when correlating the simulation scores. 
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Rationality/emotionality-gender IAT.  After controlling for Studies 5 and 6, I 
found that participants had a significantly higher tendency to associate males with 
rationality (M = 697ms; SE = 9.41, 95% CI[678, 865) compared to females (M = 
840ms; SE = 12.48, 95% CI[816, 865), F(1, 117) = 4.25, p < .05, η2p = .04.  The choice 
category by studies interaction was not significant, F(1, 117) = .56, p = .46, η2p = .01.  
Similarly to the status-gender IAT, I calculated facilitations scores – the higher the 
score, the higher the tendency to associated males with rationality.  Such associations 
did not significantly correlate with spatial simulations scores of males as powerful at the 
top, r(58) = .11, p = .43, or females as powerless at the bottom versus top, r(57) = .18, p 
= .18.  The same was true for the correlation between the facilitation score to males as 
powerful at the top versus females as powerful at the top and IAT facilitation score, 
r(51) = .21, p = .15. 
Rationality/emotionality-verticality IAT.  I found that participants did not 
associate top vertical positions more with rationality (M = 784ms; SE = 13.68, 95% 
CI[757, 812) than with emotionality (M = 842ms; SE = 15.48, 95% CI[811, 873), F(1, 
114) = 1.50, p = .22, η2p = .01 (after controlling for Studies 5 and 6).  The interaction 
between the IAT category and studies was also not significant, F(1, 114) = .97, p = .33, 
η2p = .01.  Subsequently, I calculated an IAT facilitation score – the higher the score the 
higher the tendency to associate rationality with top positions.  The associations did not 
correlate with the spatial simulation of males as powerful at the top versus bottom, r(56) 
= .11, p = .43, or of females as powerless at the bottom versus the top, r(51) = -.13, p = 
.35.  However, the facilitation score to males as powerful versus females as powerful at 
the top positively correlated with the IAT facilitation scores, r(49) = .33, p < .02, 
suggesting that participants who were more likely to associate rationality with top 
vertical position, were faster at detecting males as powerful at the top as opposed to 
females as powerful in the same position
 Table 3.  Summary of the aims and findings of each individual study. 
 
 
Study Aim Findings 
Study 1 
To explore whether people spatially represent males as 
powerful at the top and females as powerless at the 
bottom when making judgements about gendered names.  
1)  Powerful-males-top (969ms; 95% CI[848, 1090]) vs. powerful-males-bottom (1040ms; 95% CI[904, 1176]), p 
< .02. 
2)  Powerful-males-top vs. powerful-females-top (1086ms; 95% CI[948, 1225]), p < .01. 
3)  Powerless-females-bottom (998ms; 95% CI[879, 1116]) vs. powerless-females-top (998ms; 95% CI[866, 
1131]), p = 1. 
4)   Powerless-females-bottom vs. powerless-males-bottom (1017ms; 95% CI[883, 1151]), p = .88. 
Study 2 
To explore the same processes as in Study 1, however, by 
using a sample of Polish as opposed to British students. 
1)  Powerful-males-top (1143ms; 95% CI[1031, 1255]) vs. powerful-males-bottom (1194ms; 95% CI[1081, 
1307]), p = .13. 
2)  Powerful-males-top vs. powerful-females-top (1218ms; 95% CI[1106, 1330]), p < .01. 
3)  Powerless-females-bottom (1208ms; 95% CI[1087.021 1330.375]) vs. powerless-females-top (1192ms; 95% 
CI[1080, 1305]), p = .96. 
4)  Powerless-females-bottom vs. powerless-males-bottom (1224ms; 95% CI[1108, 1339]), p = .97. 
Study 3 
To determine whether the spatial representation of gender 
would be more pronounced when people think about 
gender in the context of social-status cues. 
1)  Powerful-males-top (1175ms; 95% CI[1055, 1256]), vs. powerful-males-bottom (1175ms; 95% CI[1055, 
1256]), p < .01. 
2)  Powerful-males-top vs. powerful-females-top (1108ms; 95% CI[996, 1221]), p = .71. 
3)  Powerless-females-bottom (1258ms; 95% CI[1143, 1373]) vs. powerless-females-top (1289ms; 95% CI[1175, 
1404]), p = .66. 
4)  Powerless-females-bottom vs. powerless-males-bottom (1288ms; 95% CI[1186, 1390]), p = .73. 
Study 4 
To experimentally determine whether social status cues 
affect the strength of spatial simulations by directly 
priming participants with social-status items on some of 
the spatial task trials. 
1)  Powerful-males-top (1010ms; 95% CI[895, 1126]) vs. powerful-males-bottom (1054ms; 95% CI[938, 1170]), 
p < .09. 
2)  Powerful-males-top vs. powerful-females-top (1079ms; 95% CI[957, 1201]), p < .06. 
3)  Powerless-females-bottom (1048ms; 95% CI[932, 1165]) vs. powerless-females-top (1033ms; 95% CI[916, 
1150]), p = .86. 
4)  Powerless-females-bottom vs. powerless-males-bottom (1047ms; 95% CI[934, 1160]), p = .99. 
Study 5 
To replicate the results of Study 1 when participants 
responded with vertically arranged keys on the keyboard. 
1)  Powerful-males-top (979ms; 95% CI[896, 1062]) vs. powerful-males-bottom (996ms; 95% CI[912, 1079]), p 
= .85. 
2)  Powerful-males-top vs. powerful-females-top (1040ms; 95% CI[931, 1150]), p = .45. 
3)  Powerless-females-bottom (1093ms; 95% CI[992, 1195]) vs. powerless-females-top (1112ms; 95% CI[1010, 
1214]), p = .83. 
4)  Powerless-females-bottom vs. powerless-males-bottom (1125ms; 95% CI[1033, 1216]), p = .86. 
Study 6 
To replicate the results of Study 1 when participants 
responded with horizontally arranged keys on the 
keyboard. 
1)  Powerful-males-top (1010ms; 95% CI[865, 1155]) vs. powerful-males-bottom (1012ms; 95% CI[866, 1157]), 
p = .99. 
2)  Powerful-males-top vs. powerful-females-top (1002ms; 95% CI[855, 1149]), p = .99. 
3)  Powerless-females-bottom (1043ms; 95% CI[898, 1188]) vs. powerless-females-top (1037ms; 95% CI[891, 
1183]), p = 1. 
4)  Powerless-females-bottom vs. powerless-males-bottom (1093ms; 95% CI[946, 1240]), p = .31. 
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Summary of results 
The results partially supported my hypotheses.  As predicted, I found spatial 
simulations of power when power was blended with the social category of gender.  
Specifically, attributing high power to the male gender involved spatial simulations (i.e., 
a stereotype-consistent choice), but that was not the case when high power was 
attributed to the female gender (i.e., stereotype-inconsistent choice).  This was 
demonstrated by significantly faster categorisations of males as powerful than females 
as powerful at the top.  My data further indicated that the above effects involved 
simulations on the vertical dimension, as males as powerful were chosen faster at the 
top than at the bottom of the screen.  This pattern was not true for females.  On the one 
hand, the findings are consistent with Schubert’s (2005) results showing that thinking 
about power involves spatial processing – powerful being simulated at the top as 
opposed to bottom.  On the other hand, this process did not occur when participants 
reasoned in counter-stereotypic ways.  The findings of Studies 1 - 6 suggest that spatial 
simulations are moderated by stereotypic associations.  Overall, I found that such 
simulations were independent of implicit attitudes towards gender and social status or 
rationality.  Except that spatial simulations of males as powerful at the top as opposed to 
females as powerful in the same location involved a stronger implicit link between 
rationality and top vertical positions. 
Overall, my initial studies indicated that people spatially simulated specific 
social categories on the vertical dimension when they thought about them as powerful.  
However, such simulations are moderated by stereotypic links, as I found that only 
powerful-males were spatially simulated at the top.  In the next chapter, I aimed at 
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replicating these findings with another research method to support the above 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 3: Measuring spatial simulations with pupillometry 
Overview 
 In Chapter 3, I present a replication study that tested the robustness of the spatial 
simulation effect of males at the top when they are judged as powerful.  To investigate 
this, I applied a physiological measure of pupillometry.  First, to validate whether the 
recording of pupil size could be used in investigating spatial simulations of power, in 
one block, I asked participants to complete the task designed by Schubert (2005).  In 
this task, pairs of powerful and powerless groups were presented on the screen.  
Participants were instructed to identify as quickly as possible which group was 
powerful.  Second, in another block, I conducted a replication of my previous design 
(Study 1).  That is, I presented participants with pairs of gendered names (one at the top, 
the other at the bottom).  The task was to select the powerful person as fast as possible.  
During both blocks, I recorded participants’ pupil size change across all trials.  
Consistent with my previous studies, I found that participants’ pupil size was 
significantly increased when they selected a powerful group at the bottom (an 
incongruent spatial location) as compared to the top.  The same was observed when 
participants indicated male names as powerful when they appeared at the bottom versus 
top.  Also, irrespective of participants’ judgement of a powerful person, increased pupil 
size was noted on trials when male names were presented at the bottom and female 
names at the top.  As pupil dilation is associated with surprise and higher cognitive 
load, in my experiment, participants seemed to exhibit more surprise and cognitive load 
on incongruent (powerful-bottom/powerful-males-bottom) as opposed to congruent 
trials (powerful-top/powerful-males-top).  These finding support my results from the 
previous studies indicating that spatial simulations occur when people reason about 
power and gender in stereotype-consistent ways. 
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 My initial experiments investigating spatial simulations in the mental 
representation of stereotypic associations between gender and power were based on 
reaction-time methodology.  Of course, this methodology is widely used in 
investigating social cognitive processes, as response times in cognitive tasks are a valid 
index of cognitive load or effort exerted, ease of processing, task demands or difficulty 
(see Fazio, 1990, for an overview).  My tasks were designed in a way that participants 
could self-generate their judgements and there were no objectively correct or incorrect 
questions.  The only constraint that participants needed to consider was their own 
subjective perceptions of power in the context of gender.  They could either rely on 
social stereotypes of males as powerful and females as powerless or contradict them.  
As to spatial hypotheses about the location of such stereotyped concepts within mental 
representations, shorter response latencies to certain categories would indicate 
consistency between participants’ representation of presented concepts and the 
presentation of stimuli on the screen.  For example, faster reactions to males as 
powerful when their names appeared at the top could indicate the ease of processing.  
Such processing advantage most likely resulted from participant’s internal 
representation of gender stereotypes – males are more powerful than females.   
I was motivated to further investigate spatial simulations with another research 
method to test whether the effects could be reliably captured by a non-behavioural 
research approach, namely physiological recording of pupil size.  Overall, I aimed to 
test whether another method could complement the reaction-time findings.  For this 
purpose I chose pupillometry.  Pupillometry is a study of pupil size change that can be 
used to investigate implicit cognitive processes when external factors influencing pupil 
activity are kept constant (i.e., luminance).  My use of this technique was motivated by 
two reasons.  First, there is evidence indicating that pupil size increases are associated 
with expectancy violation.  Research suggests that pupillary responses can indicate 
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surprise in response to an unexpected event in a social decision-making task (e.g., 
Sleegers, Proulx, and van Beest, 2015).  Second, pupil size measure can be used to 
precisely measure how much effort people exerted to process certain stimuli after 
making a social judgement (van der Wel and van Steenbergen, 2018)  Hence, in the 
current chapter, I present a study that attempted to address these issues by employing 
pupillometry.  Below, I review research studies that examined how pupil size is related 
to human mental processing. 
Pupillometry as a measure of cognitive effort 
Research investigating cognitive processes using pupillometry began in the 
1960s.  Initial studies on pupil dilation were conducted by Hess and Polt (1964), who 
studied cognitive effort.  They found that increasing difficulty of mathematical 
problems that people needed to solve was associated with increases in their pupil size.  
Building on those studies, Kahneman and Beatty (1966) provided further evidence 
indicating that cognitive load is associated with increased pupil dilation.  In their 
experiment, five participants completed a memory task that varied in difficulty.  The 
task involved memorising and immediately recalling a series of digits, nouns, as well as 
transforming digits (i.e., calculating a sum of digit strings).  Increased pupil size was 
noted as a function of task difficulty and amount of material presented.  Presenting more 
items for an immediate recall was also associated with higher pupil dilation.  Increased 
pupil size was found when participants processed digits for transformation and this 
effect was bigger than the effect noted in the simple recall tasks.  Overall, these studies 
demonstrate that pupil diameter increases with task difficulty and cognitive load. 
Many more recent studies reported in the literature support such conclusions.  In 
a recent review, van der Wel and van Steenbergen (2018) conclude that increases in 
pupil size are most likely tracking changes in cognitive effort that people exert while 
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performing cognitive tasks.  They note that pupil dilation is consistently detected across 
a number of different cognitive tasks and their level of difficulty, with easier tasks being 
associated with smaller pupil size.  These findings were based on studies using tasks 
involving working memory operations, attentional control, or inhibition of distractors: 
arithmetic problems (Ahern & Beatty, 1979), the Sternberg task concerning memory 
(van Gerven, Paas, van Merrienboer, & Schmidt, 2004), or go/no-go task (e.g., 
Reinhard & Lachnit, 2002).  Further, similar findings were obtained in the context of 
conflict paradigms involving incongruent trials, where the target needs to be detected by 
inhibiting the distractor stimulus, and congruent trials, where no such inhibition is 
required (e.g., Stroop, flanker, and Simon tasks).  The studies using these tasks 
indicated that pupil dilation is significantly increased when people complete 
incongruent trials as opposed to congruent ones. (e.g., Laeng, Orbo, Holmlund, & 
Miozzo, 2011; Cohen, Moyal, & Henik, 2015).  Overall, it appears that pupillometry is 
a valid measure of cognitive load. 
In terms of physiological underpinnings, changes in pupil size due to cognitive 
effort are associated with the activity of the two components of the autonomic nervous 
system that influence the functioning of the iris, which controls the pupil diameter 
(Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004).  The 
iris is controlled by the sphincter muscle, which is affected by parasympathetic activity, 
and the dilator muscle, which is associated with the sympathetic activity.  Increased 
inhibition of parasympathetic activity and enhanced sympathetic activity directly cause 
the pupil to dilate.  Specifically, enhanced sympathetic activity is directly related to 
pupil dilation by influencing the dilator muscle.  In turn, increased sympathetic activity 
is associated with attentional vigilance, alertness to salient stimuli, attentional focus, as 
well as cognitive effort (Fairclough & Mulder, 2011). 
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Such mechanisms are also correlated with brain activity.  A state of increased 
attentional arousal is linked with neural brain activity of the locus-coeruleus 
norepinephrine (LC-NE) system, which correlates with pupil dilation (see Aston-Jones 
& Cohen, 2005, for an overview).  The LC-NE system activates in response to 
presentation of salient stimuli, to facilitate their processing.  This happens because the 
task-evoked phasic activity of LC produces a rapid release of NE to the parietal and 
frontal areas involved in cognitive control, for example, the anterior cingulate which is 
involved in processing task demands (Murphy, Robertson, Balsters, & O’Connel, 
2011).  Such release increases neuronal gain in the relevant brain areas, aiding stimulus 
processing (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). 
 
Pupillometry in expectancy violation 
The reviewed studies suggest that pupil diameter is associated with task 
demands or cognitive effort needed to perform a cognitive task.  In relation to such 
findings, another line of research suggests that pupil dilation can reflect expectancy 
violation or surprise.  This is because unexpected events are related to heightened 
physiological arousal, the fight-or-flight response, and so elicit increased vigilance and 
attentional focus.  As one example, Sleegers et al. (2015) demonstrated that expectancy 
violation associated with the presentation of anomalous playing cards (e.g., king of 
hearts presented in black instead of red) evoked larger pupil size than the presentation 
of normal cards.  Moreover, this research also demonstrated that such effect was 
moderated by participants’ extremism in beliefs about societal issues, such that 
endorsing more extreme values involved reduced pupil dilation.  This is because 
extremism diminishes conflict arousal.  Not only do such findings support the previous 
literature in indicating that pupil size is associated with expectancy violation, but also 
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they indicate that social extremism might modulate physiological arousal.  Such arousal 
can be reliably measured with pupillometry.  This was also supported in a study where 
participants were asked to complete a gambling task and predict which playing card 
would be higher in order to receive a reward (Preuschoff, Hart, & Einhauser, 2011).  It 
was found that uncertainty or expectations of reward themselves were not predicted by 
pupil size.  Instead, increased pupil size was noted when participants committed an error 
in judging which cards were higher, signalling surprise (pupil dilation correlations with 
surprise were also demonstrated by Kloosterman et al., 2015 or Proulx et al., 2017).   
Present study: Pupil size in stereotyping 
 Overall, the previous literature indicates that presentation of unexpected events 
and cognitive effort can be reflected in increased pupil diameter.  There is also evidence 
that pupillary activity can be modulated by extremity of social beliefs suggesting that 
pupil size can be used to investigate social psychological processes.  Also, subtle cues 
that violated people’s expectations (e.g., anomalous playing cards), which were 
processed unconsciously, were sufficient to elicit increased pupil size.  If such subtle 
cues impact pupillary activity, it is possible that presenting concepts in their 
metaphorically “incongruent” spatial positions (powerful person presented at the bottom 
as opposed to the top) would also be associated with initial expectancy violation 
responses and hence increased pupil size.  Subsequently, selecting an inconsistent 
stimulus as powerful (e.g., female names) should be associated with increased cognitive 
effort (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). 
Therefore, in the present study, I investigated whether pupillometry can be used 
as a proxy of cognitive conflict and response-locked cognitive effort in research on 
sensorimotor processes involved in abstract thinking.  To do that, I designed an eye-
tracking experiment involving two stages.  In the first stage, I presented participants 
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with Schubert’s task (2005, Study 2) in order to test whether pupil size changes can 
indeed parallel the effects obtained using the reaction-time methodology applied by 
Schubert.  However, because Studies 1- 6 did not detect significant spatial effects in the 
powerless condition, I limited the task to selecting the powerful member of the pair.  
Participants were presented with manipulated vertical positions (top versus bottom) of 
generic powerful (master) and powerless groups (servant) and asked to detect as 
quickly as possible the powerful group on the screen. 
Given that mental representations of power involve spatial correlates, such that 
powerful individuals are simulated at the top and powerless at the bottom (Schubert, 
2005) and cognitive conflict and effort are indexed by pupil dilation (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Sleegers et al., 2015; van der Wel and van Steenbergen, 2018), I 
hypothesised that presenting participants with powerful groups at the bottom of the 
screen versus the top would be associated with an initial increase in pupil size due to 
surprise before the response would be made.  This would be observed in the pre-
response period of a trial, that is, before participants chose the powerful person.  
Likewise, having responded to an incongruent trial (powerless-bottom) in contrast to a 
congruent trial (powerful-top) would be associated with increased response-locked 
cognitive effort leading to continuous pupil dilation.  This would be observed in the 
post-response period. 
In the second stage of the experiment, I presented participants with the spatial 
task adapted from Study 1 (Chapter 2).  Again, I asked participants to select as quickly 
as possible the powerful person from a pair.  As in Study 1, in the present experiment, 
participants were presented with pairs of gendered names.  Again, I manipulated the 
trial type.  On males-top trials, participants were presented with male names presented 
at the top and female names at the bottom and vice versa on females-top trials (see 
Figure 5).  Participants’ categorisations of male and female names as powerful in each 
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vertical position were recorded and constituted a quasi-experimental variable (see 
Chapter 2).  On the basis of my previous studies presented in Chapter 2, I predicted that 
participants would exhibit increased initial arousal associated with cognitive conflict, 
and so increased pupil dilation associated with the presentation of female-top trials as 
opposed to males-top trials in the pre-response period.  They would then demonstrate 
further pupillary dilation associated with the response, only after indicating females as 
powerful at the top as opposed to males as powerful in the same location, i.e., in the 
post-response period.  I speculate that such higher cognitive effort, as reflected by 
increased pupil dilation, should be observed in response to potential inhibition of the 
automatically activated existing association between powerful-males.  Specifically, 
pupil dilation would indicate an attempt to control the spatial simulation involved in the 
mental representation of gender stereotypes.  I also predicted that the presentation and 
selection of male names when they appeared at bottom versus top would be associated 
with increased pupil dilation.  In my previous studies, I did not find differences in 
simulating females as powerful at the top versus the bottom, hence, I predicted no 
differences in cognitive conflict or effort in those cases. 
Both stages of the experiment, that is, the Schubert and gender blocks, were 
presented to all participants.  Their order was counterbalanced across participants.  
Within each block, I measured participants’ pupil size.  To acquire enough pupil size 
data in the post-response period, I presented each trial for 4000ms, however, I 
encouraged participants to respond as quickly as they could.  In the gender block, I also 
recorded how often participants picked each gender in each vertical position.  In both 
blocks, each trial lasted 4000ms.  Therefore, if participants did not respond within that 
period, their answers were not recorded (such responses constituted less than 1% of the 
data). 
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Method 
Participants 
 Sixteen Cardiff University undergraduate students participated in the experiment 
(13 females, one non-binary, mean age = 19.44; the approximate sample size for 
medium effect size was derived from Laeng et al., 2011).  They received course credit 
for their participation. 
Materials 
 For the gender block trials, I adapted the spatial task materials from my previous 
experiment (see materials of Study 1).  That is, I presented five pairs of gendered names 
as stimuli, such that on half of the trials male names were positioned at the top and 
female names at the bottom or vice-versa on the other half of the trials.  In turn, in the 
Schubert block, I presented five pairs of powerful and powerless groups – I randomly 
selected five powerful and five powerless groups from the list of items used by Schubert 
(2005, Study 2).  To standardise the conditions of both gender and Schubert blocks, I 
also randomly paired each powerful group with a powerless group and presented the 
same pairs across the experiment (master-servant, coach-athlete, employer-employee, 
officer-soldier, and boss-secretary).  The vertical position of the powerful-powerless 
pairs was also manipulated in the same ways as in the gender block.  Each block 
included 40 trials, therefore, there were 80 trials in total. 
 To measure participants’ eye movements and pupillary activity, I used a Tobii 
X3-120 screen-based and non-invasive eye tracker that samples data at the speed of 
120Hz (Tobii, Stockholm, Sweden).  The eye tracker was integrated in a 17’’ screen 
with a resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels.  The pupil size output is corrected by an in-
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built algorithm that compensates for eye movements and changes in the angle at which 
pupil size is recorded. 
Design 
 I used a within-participants design, so that each participant contributed to both 
the gender and Schubert blocks.  I asked participants to select the powerful person on 
the screen.  The order of blocks was counterbalanced between-participants and trials 
were randomly presented within each block.  The trial type in the gender block (males-
top/females-top) and the vertical position of powerful and powerless groups (powerful-
top/powerless-bottom) were manipulated within-participants.  In the Schubert block, I 
measured participants’ pupil size to the trials in which they made a correct response 
(i.e., they indicated a powerful group as powerful).  In the gender block, I also recorded 
pupil size on all types of trials (male/female names categorised as powerful at the top or 
bottom). 
I used E-Prime 2.0 software to present all stimuli, record responses, and measure 
pupillary activity registered by the eye tracker (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA).   
Procedure 
After signing the consent form, participants were instructed sit in front of the 
computer screen (approximately 67cm away) and were informed that first they would 
take part in an eye-tracking calibration procedure.  During this procedure, an eye tracker 
collects information about properties of participant’s eyes (e.g., light refraction, cornea, 
fovea position) in order to create an internal 3D eye-model that enables accurate 
measurement of the participant’s eye gaze and pupil size in the main experimental task 
(see Tobii Group, 2015).  In this procedure, participants are presented with a red dot 
against a grey background and instructed to follow the dot with their gaze.  The dot 
moves smoothly from one point to another and is presented at several different locations 
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on the screen (e.g., in the middle of the screen/middle right/left or top and bottom 
right/left).  If the calibration is unsuccessful (e.g., due to a failure to follow the dot), the 
procedure needs to be repeated.  The quality of calibration is calculated by E-Prime 
software and presented at the end of the calibration procedure. 
Subsequently, participants were instructed to complete the experimental task and 
quickly categorise the powerful person on the screen for both the Schubert and gender 
trials (see Figure 5).  The instructions were the same as for the previous studies reported 
in this thesis, that is, they included a definition of a socially powerful person.  
Participants were tested in a dark room.  The experiment lasted 45 minutes. 
 
Figure 5.  Spatial task procedure.
 
Results 
 Pupil size pre-processing.  First, all the gaze data that were missing due to 
blinks or incorrect recordings (as computed and indicated by E-Prime software) were 
coded as missing values.  These constituted 22% of the data in the Schubert block and 
18% in the gender block.  Second, I combined the pupil data from the left and right eye 
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into one pupil size score that represented the mean pupil size for both eyes.  Following 
the procedure used by Proulx et al. (2017), I subsequently filtered the pupil size signal 
with a repeated median regression filter14 (robfilter package by Fried, Schettlinger, & 
Borowski, 2014) in statistics software R (R Core Team, 2016) to smooth implausible 
pupil recordings.  Such invalid measurements might be due to participants’ head 
movements during the task, as no chin rest was used.  First, the filter determines the 
slope/trend of pupil size increases or decreases over time within a specified inner 
window width (determined by the samples taken to estimate the slope).  Once the slope 
is identified and estimated, the median is calculated for the slope estimations for the 
whole specified outer window.  The inner and outer widths should be specified on the 
basis of the visual inspection of the data for each participant and each trial.  The most 
appropriate filter for my data required the inner width of 15 and outer width of 25 
samples.   
Once the pupil size signal was smoothed, the missing signal that was not likely 
associated with eye blinks (as its duration was too short, i.e., fewer than four data 
entries, which equal to 33ms) was corrected by a linear interpolation.15 
Subsequently, I removed artifacts associated with blinks.  Blinks are recorded as 
missing data by the eye tracker, however, they also lead to incorrect measurements 
around 100ms before they occur (as participants’ eyelids close, the eye tracker fails to 
record the entire pupil).  Also, incorrect measurements are likely to be recorded 200ms 
post-blink.  This is caused by opening of eyelids as well as an initial constriction of the 
pupil that occurs immediately after each blink (Lin et al., 2018).  Therefore all pupil 
recordings 100ms pre-blink and 200ms post-blink were removed.  Finally, the missing 
                                                 
14 In general, median filters inspect time-series signal entry by entry within a pre-determined window (a 
window indicates a pattern of adjacent values) and replace the data points within that window with a 
median of entries adjacent to the window.    
15 The linear interpolation replaces missing signal with the mean of neighbouring valid signal 
measurements. 
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signal due to blinks was filled in by a linear interpolation.  The missing signal recorded 
for more than 500ms was not interpolated, as blinks do not last longer than this period.  
Overall, after pre-processing, the estimated data loss was reduced to 11% in the 
Schubert block and 9% in the gender block. 
Finally, to correct for baseline differences in pupil size between participants, I 
calculated the mean pupil diameter during 100ms of the fixation period that occurred 
just before the target trial period presentation following Mathot et al.’s (2018) 
suggestions (the target trial period refers to the trial event when pairs of powerful-
powerless groups and female-male names appeared on the screen).  This was done for 
each participant and each trial.  Then, I subtracted that mean score from each 
subsequent pupil size measurement during the target trial period.16  After the baseline 
corrections, all pupil size values that were closer to 0 represented a normal pupil size for 
participants before each trial began. 
Schubert block. General analysis.  To analyse participants’ pupil diameter 
across trials where they correctly detected powerful groups, I first removed incorrect or 
missing responses (participants were not allowed to respond after 4000ms).  The 
incorrect responses constituted the trials when participants indicated a powerless group 
(both at the top or bottom) as a powerful one.  The trials with missing or invalid 
responses accounted for 3% of all responses.17  Subsequently, as I collected 120 
samples of the pupil size data per second (480 samples in each trial), I computed the 
mean pupil size for each participant, trial, and trial type (powerful groups shown at the 
                                                 
16 As the literature does not report one valid way of pupil pre-processing techniques (e.g., Cavanagh, 
Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014; Lin et al., 2018; Mathot, Fabius, van Heusden, & van der Stigchel, 2018; 
Proulx et al., 2017), I combined different smoothing and filtering techniques described in the literature 
that best fit my data in terms of signal quality, signal loss, eye-tracker speed, and trial length.  I reported 
only one technique, however, using different window widths in median filters or not applying blinks 
corrections led to similar trends in the data analyses.   
17 As the error rate accounted only for 3% of trials, I did not analyse pupil size associated with them.  
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top and powerless at the bottom or vice versa).  I then calculated the grand mean of 
reaction time (M = 1379, SD = 429) across all participants and trials.  I used the mean 
response to determine a general pre-response and post-response period across trials.18  
Finally, to visually inspect the pattern of the mean pupil size change over the trial 
period, I calculated mean pupil size for time bins every 250ms (see Figure 6). 
Once the above steps were achieved, I estimated a linear mixed model (see 
Appendix 1, Study 7, for the method of modelling the effects) to test whether there was 
a difference in pupil size in the powerful-top and powerful-bottom trials.  First, I 
introduced the response period (pre-response and post-response) and position (powerful 
groups at the top or bottom) as factors.  Second, I analysed the whole trial period (500-
4000ms).  I excluded the first 500ms after the trial onset, as this period was associated 
with an initial constriction of pupil due to the light reflex response, that is, a 
presentation of a stimulus on the screen resulting in a change of luminance (Prehn et al., 
2008).   
As expected, I found that the fixed effect of position was significant across the 
whole trial period (500-4000ms), F(1, 1125) = 4.00, p < .05, dz = .12,19 indicating that 
the pupil dilation was higher in the case of the powerful-bottom trials, (M = .001mm; 
SE = .03, 95% CI[-.07, .07]), as opposed to the powerful-top trials, (M = -.030mm; SE = 
.03, 95% CI[-.10, .04]),  suggesting more arousal in the powerful-bottom trials.  The 
fixed effect of the response period was significant, F(1, 16) = 42.20, p < .001, dz = .87, 
with significantly larger pupil size in the post-response period (M = .110mm; SE = .04, 
95% CI[-.04, .18]), as opposed to the pre-response period, (M = -.14mm; SE = .03, 95% 
                                                 
18 Before splitting the data according to the response period, I trimmed RT data according to the Tukey 
criterion. No range restriction was applied because participants were allowed to respond within the period 
of 4000ms. This was done for both the Schubert and gender block. 
19 The p-value for the main effect of position varied from p <.001 to p <.05 depending on different filter 
parameters or when no blink correction was used.  It is possible that different pre-processing corrections, 
which led to different percentages of data loss, resulted in more or less underpowered results. 
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CI[-.24, .05]).  This effect indicates that the pupil was larger after participants made 
their responses.  However, the interaction between the response period and position was 
not significant, F(1, 1125) = .15, p = .70, suggesting that the pattern of differences in 
pupil size across powerful-top/powerful-bottom trials was stable across the whole trial 
period. 
Schubert block: Time-stamp analyses.  As can be seen in Figure 6, pupil size 
differences between trial types (powerful groups at the top and bottom) were the most 
pronounced in the case of time stamps at 750ms in the pre-response period and 1500ms, 
1750, and 2000ms in the post-response period.  Hence, I conducted additional analyses 
of pupil size differences at those time bins.  First, at 750ms, I found that participants’ 
pupil size was marginally more dilated in the powerful-bottom trials (M = -.20mm, SE 
= -.05, 95% CI[-.31, -.09]) than powerful-top trials (M = -.24mm, SE = -.05, 95% CI[-
.34, -.13), F(1, 556) = 3.35, p = .07, dz = .58.  In the post-response period, at time-stamp 
of 1500ms, participants’ pupil diameter was significantly increased in the powerful-
bottom (M = .05mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[-.02, .15]) than powerful-top trials, (M = 
.01mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[-.08, .09]), F(1, 501) = 6.27, p < .01, dz =.28.  The same 
pattern and the biggest difference in pupil size between powerful-top, (M = .02mm, SE 
= .04, 95% CI[-.06, .11]), and powerful-bottom trials, (M = .11mm, SE = .04, 95% 
CI[.03, .20]), was observed at 1750ms time-stamp, F(1,499) = 13.80, p < .001, dz = .57.  
The same was true for 2000ms time-stamp, F(1,499) = 12.36, p < .001, dz = .50 (for 
powerful-top: M = .05mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[-.03, .13], and powerful-bottom: M = 
.13mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[.05, .22]).  The significant differences between powerful-top 
and -bottom trials observed in the post-response period indicate that cognitive effort 
was higher on the powerful-bottom trials than -top trials after correctly categorising 
powerful groups.  It is possible that post-response cognitions are associated with 
reconciling one’s own response in the context of the inconsistent presentation.  Finally, 
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the differences in pupil size at other time stamps in the pre-response and post-response 
periods were not significant, ps > .14. 
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Figure 6.   Mean pupil size change as a function of presenting powerful groups at the top 
(powerless at the bottom) or vice versa over the trial period (4000ms). The 
vertical line indicates the mean response time across all participants and 
conditions (M = 1379ms, SD = 429) in the Schubert block.  Participants were 
instructed to look for the powerful person. 
 
 
 
Gender Block.  Next, I computed the mean pupil size for each participant, trial, 
trial type (males-top versus females-top), and gender that was indicated by participants 
to be powerful (gender choice: male versus female names).  Then, I calculated the mean 
response time (M = 1415, SD = 666) across all participants and trials to obtain a 
reference in order to analyse participants’ pupil size in the pre-response and post-
response periods. 
Gender block.  Pre-response period.  First, I tested whether just presentation 
of females-top trials versus males-top trials (regardless of participants’ gender choice 
later) would involve increased pupil size in the context of the task instructions (i.e., 
categorising the powerful person).  If the pupil size increases due to unexpected stimuli 
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presentation, such increased dilation should be present in the pre-response period 
regardless of participants’ choice.  However, if the whole pre-response period was 
associated with increased pupil dilation, then it is most likely that such differences are 
simply related to cognitive load associated with processing of information.  Figure 7 
suggests that the biggest difference in pupil size was observed in the case of 750ms time 
stamp.  As hypothesised, participants’ pupil dilation was significantly higher when they 
were presented with females-top trials (M = -.14mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[-.24, -.04]), as 
opposed to males-top trials, (M = -.19mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[-.28, -.08]), F(1,590) = 
4.81, p < .03, dz = .43, signalling more surprise on females-top trials.  Also, as 
expected, this effect was independent of participants’ later response within the trial, 
which is demonstrated by the lack of significant interaction between gender choice and 
trial type, F(1,593) = 1.76, p = .19.  As demonstrated by Figure 7, and confirmed by 
additional analyses, the differences in pupil sizes across the trial types within the whole 
pre-response period (500-1415ms) as well as individual time-stamps of 500ms and 
1000ms were not significant, ps > .10.  Such findings indicate that there was initial 
increase in pupil size at 750ms in the females-top trials, suggesting that presenting 
females at the top was likely to evoke cognitive conflict or surprise.  This is also 
supported by the results showing that such increase in pupil size was not associated with 
the response that participants made later within the trial.  After 750ms, pupil size within 
both conditions increased to the same extent most likely as a function of general 
cognitive load associated with decision-making. 
Furthermore, as indicated by Figure 8a, it seems that participants demonstrated 
increased pupil size when they were presented with males-top trials and subsequently 
indicated females as powerful.  The differences were most pronounced at 500ms and 
750ms and are still visible in the post-response period.  The same difference, however, 
is not demonstrated by Figure 8b, suggesting no differences in pupil size between 
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choices of females (at the top) or males (at the bottom) on females-top trials.  To test 
whether these differences were meaningful in the context of subsequent decision-
making, I conducted additional analyses.  Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the 
difference in pupil size between choices of males when they appeared at the top and 
females when they appeared at the bottom at 500ms was marginally significant, t(596) = 
-1.80, p = .07, dz = .98, such that pupil dilation at 500ms was increased when females 
were subsequently chosen at the bottom (M = -.12mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[-.28, -.06]),  
in contrast to choosing males at the top (M = -.25mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[-.32, -.11]).  
This is consistent with the previous literature suggesting that when people decide to 
control their initial tendencies, like in my task categorising females as powerful at the 
bottom (when a choice of males or top is available), they need to inhibit the powerful-
top association and/or the stereotype associated with males as powerful first (van der 
Wel & van Steenbergen, 2018).  This in turn involves higher pupil size.  The same, 
however, was not true at 750ms, as the interaction between gender choice and trial type 
at that time-stamp was not significant, F(1, 590) = 1.76, p = .19.  The same differences 
in pupil size later on within the trial were not significant at individual time stamps, ps > 
.19.  Finally, comparisons between choices of males at the bottom versus females at the 
top on females-top trials were not significant, ps > .33. 
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Figure 7.  Mean pupil size change as a function of presenting males-top and females-top 
trials in the pre-response period of the gender block.  The vertical line 
indicates the mean response time across all participants and conditions (M = 
1415ms, SD = 666). Participants were instructed to look for the powerful 
person. 
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Figure 8.  Mean pupil size change as a function of presenting (a) males-top trials and 
choices of male and female names on that trials (i.e., males at the top; females 
at the bottom; both chosen as powerful) and the same choices are presented 
for (b) females-top trials over 4000ms. The vertical line indicates the mean 
response time across all participants and conditions (M = 1415ms, SD = 666).  
(a) Males-top trials 
 
(b) Females-top trials 
 
 
Gender block.  Entire-trial period analysis.  Subsequently, I analysed 
participants’ pupil dilation across the entire trial period (500-4000ms).  I found that the 
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main effects of gender choice, F(1,13) = .76, p = .40, dz = .07, and trial type, F(1,1168) 
= .97, p = .32, dz = .07, were not significant.  As in the Schubert block, the main effect 
of response period was significant, F(1,15) = 37.01, p < .001, dz =.86, with increased 
pupil dilation in the post-response period, (M = .17mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[.07, .26]), 
than in the pre-response period, (M = -.09mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[-.17, -.01]).  As 
expected, the two-way interaction between trial type and gender choice was significant, 
F(1,15) = 37.01, p < .001.  On trials where participants selected males as powerful, their 
pupil size was significantly increased when the male name appeared at the bottom (M = 
.05mm, SE = .03, 95% CI[-.01, .13]) as compared to the top, (M = .01mm, SE = .03, 
95% CI[-.06, .07]), F(1,1190) = 3.15, p < .01, dz = .19 (see Figure 9).  However, the 
same was not true on trials where participants indicated females as powerful when they 
appeared at the bottom of the screen (M = .05mm, SE = .03, 95% CI[-.03, .17]) 
compared to top (M = .06mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[-.06, .14]), F(1,1199) = 1.20, p = .23, 
dz = .10 (see Figure 10). 
Finally, two-way interactions (trial type by response period; and gender choice 
by response period) and the three-way interaction (gender choice by trial type by 
response period) were not significant ps > .61. 
Further, as indicated by Figure 11, participants’ pupil dilation was increased 
when participants indicated females as powerful on females-top trials (M = .060mm, SE 
= .05, 95% CI[-.03, .17]) as opposed to males as powerful positions on males-top trials, 
(M = .006mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[-.06, .13]), t(1205) = -1.96, p = .05, dz = .18.  
Consistent with Figure 12, there was no significant difference between pupil dilation 
when participants indicated bottom positions on males-top trials (i.e., when females as 
powerful were chosen at the bottom; M = .05mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[-.01, .19]), and 
females-top trials (i.e., when males as powerful were chosen at the bottom; M = .05mm, 
SE = .05, 95% CI[-.03, .17]), t(1206) = -.17, p = .86, dz =.01.  Overall, the above results 
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imply that across the whole trial period, participants exhibited increased pupil size, and 
hence higher cognitive effort, when they selected a counter-stereotypic stimulus (i.e., 
females as powerful) at the top as opposed to a stereotypic stimulus (i.e., males as 
powerful) at the top.  Further, there were no differences in pupil size when selecting 
both counter-stereotypic stimuli and stereotypic stimuli at the bottom suggesting that 
cognitive load associated with those choices was comparable. 
Gender block.  Post-response period.  Finally, as in the gender block 
participants were allowed to make any type of choice (males and females as powerful at 
the top or bottom), I tested whether their responses were associated with higher 
cognitive effort.  Therefore, I conducted the same analysis as presented above, however, 
this time I analysed participants’ pupil size only after they made their response (i.e., in 
the period > 1415ms).  Similar to the analysis of the whole trial period, I found that the 
main effects of gender choice and trial type were not significant, ps > .72.  However, as 
expected, the gender choice by trial type interaction was significant, F(1, 595) = 5.23, p 
< .02.  The post-hoc comparisons replicated the results of the previous analysis, 
indicating increased pupil dilation when males were chosen as powerful when they 
appeared at the bottom of the screen (M = .18mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[.11, .27]) as 
compared to the top (M = .14mm, SE = .04, 95% CI[.05, .21]), F(1, 600) = -2.31, p < 
.02, dz =.16.  As expected, the same was not true for females chosen when they 
appeared at the bottom of the screen (M = .16mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[.08, .31]) versus 
the top, (M = .18mm, SE = .05, 95% CI[.05, .27]), F(1, 600) = 1.12, p = .26, dz =.07.  
Further analyses did not replicate the findings from the entire-period results, indicating 
that participants’ pupil size was not significantly different when participants indicated 
top or bottom stimuli across males-top and females-top trials, ps > .25. 
The reported results within both blocks were not associated with participants’ 
gender or counterbalancing of blocks, ps > .20. 
77 
 
Figure 9.  Mean pupil size change as a function of choosing males as powerful when their 
names appeared the top and bottom over the trial period (4000ms). The 
vertical line indicates the mean response time across all participants and 
conditions (M = 1415ms, SD = 666).  Participants were instructed to look for 
the powerful person. 
 
Figure 10.  Mean pupil size change as a function of choosing females as powerful when 
their names appeared at the top and bottom over the trial period (4000ms).  
The vertical line indicates the grand mean of response time. 
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Figure 11.  Mean pupil size change as a function of choices of males and females as 
powerful at the top (Males_top indicates males-top trial and the choice of 
males, whilst Females_top indicates females-top trials and the choice of 
females). 
 
Figure 12.  Mean pupil size change as a function choices of males and females as powerful 
when their names were selected at the bottom (Males_top indicates choices 
of females at the bottom, whilst Females_top indicates males chosen at the 
bottom). 
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Summary of results 
To summarise, it appears that pupillometry can be applied to the study of mental 
representation of stereotypes in the context of sensorimotor grounding as a 
complementary method to reaction-time methodology.  This is because pupillometry 
can indicate cognitive conflict and mental effort exerted while making judgements.  My 
findings indicate that there is an association between power and verticality, such that 
powerful groups are associated with top vertical positions, replicating Schubert’s 
results.  These findings apply in turn to specific social categories, given that those 
categories are associated with power via social beliefs.  Such findings were based on the 
measurement of participants’ pupil size while they were completing spatial tasks.  In 
those tasks, increased pupillary dilation was associated with the presentation of 
powerful groups at the bottom.  The same pattern was found when participants were 
presented with female names at the top of the screen compared to male names at the top, 
when they were asked to categorise the powerful person, suggesting increased cognitive 
conflict or surprise on females-top trials.  At the same time, I observed significantly 
increased pupil size on trials when participants categorised males as powerful at the 
bottom versus the top.  Such increased pupil size was most likely associated with 
response-locked cognitive effort.  It is important to note that the initial increased 
cognitive conflict that occurred in the pre-response period (due to the perception of the 
incongruent mappings of targets [e.g., males-bottom]) might have been associated with 
the increased response-locked effort that occurred in the post-response period.  This 
possibility should be further investigated in future research.  Examining how cognitive 
conflict and effort interact might provide us with a better understanding of the processes 
underlying spatial congruency effects in the context of pupillometry. 
In my previous studies (1 - 6), only males as powerful were simulated at the top 
(also in contrast to females) as opposed to the bottom, suggesting that a stereotypic link 
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between males and power involves spatial simulations, hence, more pronounced or 
concrete thinking.  Overall, the response latency findings, indicating faster reactions to 
males at the top versus bottom only when they are categorised as powerful, converge 
with the current study, that demonstrated increased cognitive effort on trials when 
participants selected males as powerful when their names appeared at the bottom of the 
screen versus the top, as indexed by increased pupil size.  Interestingly, I found that 
counter-stereotypic choices might have been based on the initial experience of 
unconscious conflict demonstrated at the beginning of the trials when females were 
presented at the top.  Furthermore, only the earliest experience of aversive arousal (at 
500ms, but not at 750ms) on females-top trials interacted with counter-stereotypic 
categorisations later on within the trial.   
Altogether, it appears that gender is indeed spatially simulated on the vertical 
dimension via associations with power.  As these results were based on reaction-time 
methodology and also pupillometry, it appears that such findings are robust.  In the 
subsequent chapter, I aimed at investigating specific mechanisms driving such 
simulations. 
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Chapter 4: Dependency of spatial simulations on task features 
Overview 
In the following chapter, I present three studies that investigated mechanisms of 
spatial simulations detected in my previous experiments.  Specifically, I was interested 
to examine the dependency of spatial simulations on verticality cues (top and bottom 
positions) as well as salience of the power context.  To examine this, in Studies 8 and 9, 
I aimed at creating conditions whereby the independent effect of spatial cues on spatial 
simulation of power could be investigated.  Therefore, across two studies, I assigned 
participants to either select a powerful or powerless person between pairs of names that 
had the same gender.  That is, participants were asked to select the powerful/powerless 
person between two female names or male names that were vertically displayed (one at 
the top, the other at the bottom).  To summarise, I manipulated gender of the names 
(female block versus male block) and task condition (powerful versus powerless).  I 
measured how often and how fast participants selected top and bottom positions of the 
presented targets.  In Study 10, I eliminated the power-context by asking participants to 
determine whether vertically presented (top versus bottom) gendered names (male 
versus female shown one at a time) were male or female.  This was done to test if 
gender per se was associated with vertical positions.  In Studies 8 and 9, I found that 
participants were equally fast at detecting male and female targets at the top versus the 
bottom in the powerful condition.  The same was true in the powerless condition.  In 
Study 10, participants were equally fast to categorise male and male names at the top 
and bottom.  These results imply that spatial simulations occur only in meaningful and 
power-relevant conditions. 
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In Chapters 2 and 3, I investigated the primary research question of the present 
thesis.  Specifically, in seven studies I explored whether abstract thinking about a 
specific social category would be associated with concrete spatial processing.  I 
provided evidence for the involvement of spatial simulations in abstract thoughts about 
power and gender in the context of stereotypic associations.  The findings from six 
initial behavioural experiments, as well as physiological results obtained in Study 7 
using pupillometry, clearly suggest that the mental representation of males as powerful 
uses spatial processing, whereby males as powerful are associated with the top vertical 
position via stereotype fit (males-power).  Males were categorised faster as powerful 
when they were presented at the top of the screen as opposed to the bottom.  Also, they 
were selected faster at the top in comparison to females in the same vertical position.  
Further, in Study 7, I found that participants demonstrated more surprise, as indicated 
by increased pupil size, when they were presented with female names at the top as 
opposed to males at the top.  They also showed increased cognitive effort when 
selecting males as powerful when their names appeared at the bottom versus the top.  
Across the first six studies, I did not obtain any evidence for spatial processing when 
participants selected females as powerful or powerless and males as the powerless. 
In the present chapter, I aimed at exploring the precise mechanisms driving 
spatial associations in stereotypic thinking about power and gender and whether such 
spatial associations can be detected across different task conditions.   
Studies 8 and 9: The role of vertical positions in spatial simulations 
 To explore the role of vertical positions in simulations of gender and power, I 
conducted Studies 8 and 9.  Specifically, I wanted to examine whether verticality cues 
per se might guide people’s choices of males and females as powerful or powerless.  To 
do that, I aimed at excluding the salience of gender by presenting participants with the 
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same gendered names in each trial, that is, two female names and two male names, each 
one of them in each vertical position (top and bottom).  To further investigate the 
impact of constraining the context of thinking about power and gender to social status, I 
matched gendered names with high-status and gender-neutral professions in Study 8, 
whilst in Study 9, I presented gendered names only.  Overall, I aimed at measuring how 
quickly participants would respond to choices of vertical positions when indicating 
powerful or powerless gendered names.  That is, in the current studies, the position 
choice was the quasi-experimental variable. 
 As Schubert (2005) showed that power is associated with verticality, and my 
previous experiments demonstrated that verticality indeed plays a role in facilitating 
people’s judgements about power and gender, I explored whether participants would be 
significantly quicker at categorising individuals as powerful at the top than bottom of 
the screen across both blocks.  That is, in blocks where pairs of male names (block 1) 
and female names (block 2) were presented.  It is likely that under ambiguous 
conditions whereby only names are presented, participants would mainly rely on spatial 
locations to make a judgement about power or lack of power of presented names.  Such 
results would indicate that power is associated with verticality even when no strong 
power judgements can be made about presented individuals.  It is important to note that 
such conditions are different to Schubert’s (2005) studies, as gendered names, as 
opposed to generic powerful and powerless groups (e.g., master versus servant), do not 
have strong power implications, unless they are thought about in stereotype-consistent 
ways (like in my previous studies).  Power is a relational concept (see Guinote, 2017, 
for an overview), therefore, it needs to be compared between individuals in a 
meaningful way.  It is therefore less plausible that people would reason about males as 
more powerful than females, when they do not directly compare them.  Hence, it might 
be easier to capture the effects of verticality cues in the representation of gender within 
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conditions whereby strong power differences are not present (i.e., comparing the same-
gender names).  To summarise, in Studies 8 and 9, I wanted to test whether power-
verticality association is detectable whenever people attribute power or lack thereof to a 
target individual in the absence of strong power differences between that target 
considered as powerful/powerless and another individual.  I predicted that if power-
verticality associations are stable across contexts, then participants should be quicker at 
indicating top vertical positions when selecting names as powerful due to the top-power 
association  (Schubert, 2005).  However, in the light of my previous studies, I did not 
predict any simulations of names as powerless.  
This pattern should be noticed across male- and female-names pairs, as gender 
should be less relevant in this context.  Because participants would not compare power 
between females and males directly, and power is a relative concept, I predicted smaller 
differences between categorisations of males as powerful when their names appeared at 
the top versus females as powerful when their names appeared at the top.  I further 
explored whether such effects would be especially pronounced in the case of Study 8, as 
additional cues about high social status (i.e., professions) could lead to higher salience 
of power and make the context more power-relevant.  Pairing high-social-status 
professions with gendered names could provide less ambiguity in the task and stimulate 
participants to think about more meaningful power differences than when presented 
with names only.  As detected in Study 3 – only high-status professions were judged to 
be gender-neutral, and so I used the same high-status professions in Study 8.  Therefore, 
I predicted that such stimuli would further be associated with a simulation at the top of 
targets in the powerful condition.  This is because high social status was also found to 
be associated with top vertical simulations (von Hecker et al., 2013). 
Overall, these studies might shed more light onto understanding whether 
verticality cues (i.e., top and bottom positions) themselves contribute to or inform 
85 
 
people’s judgements about social power independently of other processes (e.g., 
stereotypic associations).  On the one hand, it is possible that any abstract concept that 
becomes associated with power might be simulated spatially at the top.  As suggested 
by Barsalou (2008), spatial associations support abstract thinking to produce more 
concrete mental representations in order to assist cognitive processes, such as social 
judgement.  Specifically, space could provide a more vivid representation of an abstract 
concept (i.e., power) under ambiguous conditions.  This process is similar to another 
form of simulation, namely mental imagery, whereby people mentally represent multi-
sensory information.  It was found that when such mental imagery is used, it can 
facilitate problem-solving (Shaver, Pierson, & Lang, 1974; or see MacInnis & Price, 
1987, for a review).  However, the difference between spatial simulations as seen in the 
embodiment literature and mental imagery, is that mental imagery is a deliberate 
process.  Instead, embodied spatial simulations are activated automatically when a 
relevant concept is processed (Barsalou, 2008).  Therefore, it is possible that spatial 
features of power are automatically activated to facilitate judgements when no other 
diagnostic information is available.  On the other hand, spatial simulations might be 
used in circumstances that are more meaningful.  That is, only semantically valid mental 
representations based on consistent associations or blending of abstract concepts (such 
as representing a boss or males as powerful) could be linked with spatial features – as 
there could be no function to simulate abstract concepts that do not carry meaningful 
content.  I examined these issues in Studies 8 and 9.   
 
Method (Studies 8 and 9) 
Participants 
I recruited 65 Cardiff University undergraduates for Study 8 (the approximate 
sample sizes were derived from my previous studies, see Study 5 or 6, mean age = 
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18.68 years; 56 females).  Cardiff University undergraduates were also recruited to 
Study 9 (N = 64; mean age = 18.36 years; 57 females). 
Across both studies, I randomly assigned participants to either the powerful or 
powerless condition.  Each experiment lasted 10 minutes. 
 
Materials and design 
 
Spatial task.  I used the same basic design in both studies.  I manipulated two 
types of blocks.  In one type, I displayed a block of ten trials with only female names 
(see Appendix 7 for all the names used).  In each trial, there was one pair of female 
names.  One of the names was presented at the top of the screen, the other name 
appeared at the bottom.  In each block, participants saw five pairs of names.  First, the 
names were randomly paired with each other and then each name was always presented 
with the initially paired other name.  Each pair was presented twice in one block, such 
that the same names would appear once at the top and then at the bottom.  The order of 
trials was random.  Each block was repeated 4 times, so there were 40 trials within one 
type of block.   
In the second type of block, the design was the same, however, instead of female 
names, participants were presented with male names.20  I counterbalanced the order of 
the type of blocks across participants, such that some participants saw the female blocks 
first and then the male blocks, whilst the others saw the opposite order.  The type of 
blocks was manipulated within-participants, that is, each participant responded to 80 
trials in total.  Across these conditions, I asked participants to either quickly select the 
powerful or the powerless person on the screen – this was manipulated between-
participants.  In terms of stimuli, I presented the same matched pairs of names in both 
studies, however, in Study 8, I additionally matched the names with gender-neutral and 
                                                 
20 I selected the most popular British babies’ names (ten male and ten female names) from the same 
source as cited in Studies 1 - 6. 
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high-status professions (see Figure 13).  This was done by adapting the professions 
from Study 3.  Each name was combined with each profession across four different sets 
of combinations (see Appendix 7 for all the matched pairs of names and professions and 
their spatial positioning on the screen, Studies 8 and 9).  Across both studies I measured 
participants’ reaction times to their choices of top and bottom positions (i.e., the choices 
of position was a quasi-experimental variable) and also the frequency of these choices 
in each block and condition. 
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Figure 13. Spatial task procedure of a single trial 
(a) Study 8 
 
(b) Study 9 
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Procedure 
 First, participants were instructed to quickly categorise the powerful or the 
powerless person (depending on the task condition).  As the same gender names might 
be confusing as to which name was powerful or powerless, I told participants that they 
would be presented with fictitious people and they should try to spontaneously imagine 
that one of the individuals was powerful (or powerless) and only then make their 
responses.  I also provided a written and verbal definition of power (see Procedure of 
Studies 1 and 2 for details). 
Results: Study 8 
Proportion of choices.  First, I analysed how often participants picked powerful 
and powerless individuals at the top and bottom of the screen.  Overall, I found that 
across both blocks of trials (involving male and female names), participants were 
marginally more likely to pick names as powerful at the top of the screen (53.2%) than 
bottom (46.8%), and the same was true for names selected as powerless (top: 50.6% 
versus bottom: 49.4%), χ²(1, N = 65) = 3.55, p = .06, d = .48; odds ratio choosing powerful on 
top versus bottom = 1.11 (95%CI[1.00,1.24]) and odds ratio choosing powerless on bottom versus top = .95 
(95%CI[.90, 1.01.  Further, on trials with male name pairs, the top name (53.7%) was 
marginally chosen more often than the bottom name (46.3%) in the powerful condition; 
I observed the same pattern for male name pairs in the powerless condition (top name: 
50.3% versus bottom: 49.7%); χ²(1, N = 65) = 2.82, p = .09, d = .43; odds ratio choosing 
males as powerful on top versus bottom = 1.14 (95%CI[.98,1.34]) and odds ratio choosing males as powerless 
on bottom versus top = .93 (95%CI[.86, 1.01]).  In the case of female name pairs, participants 
were equally likely to pick the top  (52.8%) and bottom names (47.2%) in the powerful 
condition; the same was true for female pairs in the powerless condition, that is, the 
names that appeared at the top (50.8%) were chosen as often as the names presented at 
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the bottom (49.2%), χ²(1, N = 65) = .97, p = .33, d = .25; odds ratio choosing females as powerful 
on top versus bottom = 1.08 (95%CI[.93,1.27]) and odds ratio choosing females as powerless on bottom versus 
top = .96 (95%CI[.89, 1.04]).  The same results were observed when each condition 
(powerful and powerless) were analysed separately.  Also, the interaction among task, 
gender block, and position tested in a loglinear analysis was not significant, χ²(1, N = 
65) = 4.20, p = .65, d = .53, indicating equal distribution of position choices across all 
the conditions. 
Response latencies.  To analyse participants’ reaction times to their choices, I 
estimated a linear mixed model.  I found that the fixed effects of gender block, F(1, 57) 
= 1.98, p = .16, dz = .06, and position choice, F(1, 4657) = .01 p = .99, dz = .04, were 
not significant.  However, the fixed effect of task was significant, F(1, 63) = 13.31, p < 
.001, dz = .64, indicating that participants were significantly quicker at selecting 
powerful individuals (M = 1053, SE = 57.77, 95%CI[952, 1179]) than powerless ones 
(M = 1346ms, SE = 56.89, 95%CI[1250, 1473]).   
The two-way interactions between gender block and position choice, and gender 
block by task were not significant, ps > .81, and the three-way interaction among gender 
block, position choice, and task was also not significant, F(1, 4667) = .03, p = .87 (see 
Figure 14).  However, the position choice by task interaction was marginally significant, 
F(1, 59) = 3.31, p = .07.  I found that participants were significantly faster to categorise 
all names presented at the top in the powerful condition, (M = 1040ms, SE = 58.11, 
95%CI[943, 1171]) versus powerless, (M = 1344ms, SE = 57.27, 95%CI[1258, 1483]), 
t(65) = -3.84, p < .001,  dz = .68.  The same was pattern was true for the bottom 
positions – participants were significantly faster to select all names when they appeared 
at the bottom in the powerful condition, (M = 1068ms, SE = 58.22, 95%CI[961, 1189]), 
than the powerless one, (M = 1347ms, SE = 57.28, 95%CI[1241, 1466]), t(65) = -3.41, p 
< .01,  dz = .64.  In contrast to the hypotheses, in the powerful condition, the chosen 
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names were not selected faster when they appeared at the top than bottom, t(4666) = -
1.28, p = .57,  dz = .23, and in the powerless condition, the chosen names appearing at 
the bottom were not selected faster than the ones at the top, t(4656) = 1.29, p = .57,  dz 
= .02. 
Figure 14.  Response latencies to blocks with (a) male and female pairs in the powerful 
condition, and (b) male and female pairs in the powerless condition according 
to the choices of top versus bottom positions. The error bars show -/+1 
standard error. 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
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Results: Study 9 
Proportion of choices.  Overall, across both blocks involving the presentation 
of male and female pairs, I found that participants in the powerful condition were more 
likely to select names that appeared at the top of the screen (54.1%) versus the bottom 
(45.9%).  A complementary effect was found in the powerless condition, with the 
bottom names more likely to be selected (50.2%) than the top names (49.8), χ²(1, N = 
64) = 9.22, p < .01, d = .85; odds ratio choosing powerful on top versus bottom = 1.20 
(95%CI[1.07,1.34]) and odds ratio choosing powerless on top versus bottom = .91 (95%CI[.82, .97]).  
Interestingly, I observed the same pattern of results in the block involving male pairs.  
There was a higher a tendency to pick males as powerful at the top (53.3%) versus 
bottom (46.7%), and vice versa, however, with a smaller magnitude, for the males as 
powerless at the bottom (51.0%) versus top (49.0%), χ²(1, N = 64)  = 8.59, p < .01, d = 
.78; odds ratio choosing males as powerful on top versus bottom = 1.27, 95%CI[1.08,1.48]) and odds 
ratio choosing males as powerless on top versus bottom = .88, 95%CI[.81, .96]).  However, that was not 
the case when female targets were chosen, as participants picked them equally likely at 
the top and bottom across both conditions,21 χ²(1, N = 64)  = 2.30, p = .13, d = .38.22  
Such results may indicate that associations between power and verticality were more 
pronounced in the case of thinking about males as opposed to females, even in the 
stereotype-inconsistent choice (powerless-males). 
Response latencies.  In terms of reaction times, I estimated a linear mixed 
model and I found that the fixed effect of gender block was significant, F(1, 62) = 7.37, 
p < .01, dz = .20, which indicated that participants were faster in the blocks involving 
female targets (M = 1002ms, SE = 24.61, 95%CI[951,1047]), as opposed to male targets 
                                                 
21 Females as powerful at the top (53.3%) versus bottom (46.7%) and females as powerless at the top 
(49.4%) versus bottom (50.6%). Odds ratio choosing females as powerful on top versus bottom = 1.05, 95%CI[.95,1.31]) 
and odds ratio choosing females as powerless on top versus bottom = .94, 95%CI[.87, 1.03]).   
22 These results were also confirmed by a loglinear analysis that indicated a significant interaction among 
task, gender block, and position, χ²(1, N = 64)  = 10.50, p < .03, d = .89. 
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(M = 1041ms, SE = 29.76, 95%CI[984, 1101]).  The fixed effect of position choice, F(1, 
4811) = 2.71, p = .10, dz = .05, and task, F(1, 62) = .26, p = .61, dz = .03, were not 
significant. 
In terms of two-way interactions, I found that gender block by position choice as 
well as position choice by task interactions were not significant, ps > .11.  The task by 
gender block interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 62) = 3.35, p = .07.  The post-
hoc comparisons indicated that participants were faster to categorise female targets as 
powerless, (M = 994ms, SE = 34.78, 95%CI[928, 1067]), than male targets as 
powerless, (M = 1019ms, SE = 42.09, 95%CI[986, 1154]), t(62) = 3.22, p < .01, dz = 
.14., but there were no differences in the speed of choices of males as powerful (M = 
1015ms, SE = 42.10, 95%CI[930, 1098]) versus females as powerful, (M = 1010ms, SE 
= 34.81, 95%CI[931, 1070]), t(62) = .63, p = .92, dz =.03.  Other comparisons were not 
significant, ps > .58.  As in Study 8, the predicted three-way interaction (gender block 
by position choice by task) was not significant (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15.  Response latencies to blocks with (a) male and female pairs in the powerful 
condition, and (b) male and female pairs in the powerless condition according 
to the choices of top versus bottom positions. The error bars show -/+1 
standard error. 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
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Summary of results: Studies 8 & 9 
The aim of these studies were to test whether verticality cues (top and bottom 
positions) were used when thinking about power differences between two targets that 
did not carry strong power implications (i.e., pairs of male or female names).  The 
results of the studies imply that this was not the case, as selecting target names as 
powerful at the top did not facilitate participants’ responses.  To summarise, spatial cues 
do not seem to contribute to spatial simulations, when they are not presented in a 
meaningful power-related context.  My results further indicated that participants were 
quicker to detect powerful versus powerless individuals at the top, but this was also true 
for the bottom positions.  This happened only when the subtle power context was 
activated, i.e., when gendered stimuli were presented with high-status professions in 
Study 8.  The same was not true in Study 9, where the main finding was that 
participants tended to be quicker in categorising female targets as powerless than male 
targets as powerless.  However, I found no complementary findings in the powerful 
condition.   
In terms of frequency of top and bottom choices, in Study 8, participants were 
marginally more likely to select top positions within both conditions, that is, when 
choosing targets as powerful and powerless.  In Study 9, however, in the powerful 
condition, top positions were selected more often when indicating male targets as 
opposed to the bottom.  Also, in the powerless condition, male targets were selected 
more often at the bottom as opposed to the top.  Although when collapsing across 
gender blocks, this was true for both targets, the separate analyses indicated that 
associations between powerful-top and powerless-bottom were only true for male pairs.  
This was also supported by a significant interaction among position, gender block, and 
task.  These findings, however, are only confined to the frequency of choices, and not 
the spatial simulations as investigated by measuring response latencies of those choices. 
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This suggests that participants used spatial cues only to decide who was 
powerful/powerless when choosing males.  That is, spatial cues were only associated 
with the outcome, but not the duration with which participants processed the cues. 
Overall, it is possible that spatial simulations do not occur when the task 
conditions are too ambiguous and not meaningful to participants.  To investigate the 
role of spatial cues in gender categorisations under unambiguous conditions, but in the 
absence of thinking about power, I conducted Study 10. 
Study 10: Gender simulation 
 Across seven studies (Studies 1 - 7), I have established that stereotypical 
thinking about power and gender involves a pronounced spatial simulation of males as 
powerful at the top.  So far, I investigated such effects when both gender and power 
concepts were made salient to participants.  In the current study, I first aimed at testing 
whether thinking about gender per se can be associated with verticality without a salient 
power context.  It is plausible that not only does thinking about power as well as 
stereotypic associations involve mapping of social concepts onto the vertical spatial 
dimension, but also gender itself might contribute to such representations.  In this study, 
my first aim was to explore whether the previously detected spatial effects (i.e., males 
simulated at the top as powerful) were also linked to an independent association 
between gender and space.  Specifically, I wanted to examine whether the concept of 
gender per se is also grounded in space.  
Second, it is important to consider the potential relevance of polarity 
correspondence theory.  Polarity correspondence theory, suggested by Proctor and Cho 
(2006), postulates that linguistic unmarked ends of a dimension (e.g., up or right) are 
+polar (i.e., they have positive polarities), whilst marked ends (e.g., down or bottom) 
are –polar (i.e., they have negative polarities).  Then, matching polarities between 
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response modes and vertical positions of stimuli produces faster responses in reaction-
time tests.  Specifically, if polarities of spatial locations of stimuli (e.g., top or bottom) 
are matched with the polarities of the response mode (right or left, respectively), then a 
facilitation in reaction-times to such stimuli would occur (see Proctor & Xiong, 2015; 
Weeks & Proctor, 1990).  Further, such faster responses are associated only with the 
structural overlap of polarities, rather than semantics of the concepts.  Therefore, in the 
current study, I also wanted to explore whether response mode (i.e., categorising 
gendered names at the top with a right key on the keyboard versus left key) would be 
associated with faster responses in line with the polarity correspondence theory. 
Overall, in the present study, I explored whether (a) gender per se is 
semantically associated with the spatial vertical dimension without a power relevant 
context, and (b) the structural overlap between locations of stimuli and response modes 
contributes to the speed of participants’ reaction times in spatial tasks used in my 
previous studies.  To test such possibilities, I asked participants to quickly categorise 
gendered names as either female or male.  The names were presented vertically on the 
screen (top or bottom).  Participants saw one name at the time.  I measured their 
response latencies when they categorised the names in each vertical position.  I also 
manipulated the response mode.  Half of the participants responded with a left key (A) 
to indicate male names and a right key (L) to indicate female names, whilst the other 
half responded with L to male names and A to female names on the computer keyboard.   
First, if gender is associated with the spatial vertical dimension and does not 
require power judgements to be spatially simulated, then I predicted that participants 
would be quicker at categorising male names as male when they appeared at the top of 
the screen versus bottom.  Second, if the structural overlap between response modes and 
locations per se is responsible for processing facilitation, then participants should be 
faster at categorising both male and female names when they appeared at the top of the 
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screen when using the right key.  They should also be faster at responding to male and 
female names when they appeared at the bottom and when using the left key.  Finally, 
based on the previous literature indicating the role of top-down reading habits (e.g., 
Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schubert 2005; von Hecker et al., 2013; von Hecker et al. 
2016), I predicted that regardless of gender and response modes, participants should be 
faster at sorting the names when they appeared at the top as opposed to the bottom.  
Faster responses to top stimuli would suggest that participants scanned the screen from 
the top to the bottom, and therefore were more likely to attend to the top stimuli first 
and bottom stimuli as second.  
Method 
Participants 
 I recruited 60 participants (I derived the sample size from my previous 
experiments: Study 2 for Cohen’s dz = .25-.35; mean age = 18.25, 52 females), but I 
excluded one participant, as their data were missing, whilst a second was too slow at 
responding according to the Tukey criterion.  I randomly assigned participants to press 
either the letter A on the computer keyboard to categorise male names and letter L to 
categorise female ones, or A to categorise females and L to categorise males.  They 
received course credits for their participation. 
Materials 
I selected ten of the most popular British babies’ names in 2015,23 five of which 
were female (Amelia, Olivia, Jessica, Daisy, and Phoebe) and five were male (George, 
Oscar, Alexander, William, and Joseph).  
                                                 
23 See: The most popular baby names. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2016, from: 
http://www.mumsnet.com/baby-names/most-popular-baby-names-england-wales. 
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Design  
 I used a mixed design.  The response key condition (A-male or A-female) was 
manipulated between-participants, whilst gender of the stimuli presented (male or 
female names) and their position on the screen (top or bottom) were manipulated 
within-participants.  There were four blocks of trials in total and in each block 
participants saw each male and female name (one at a time) presented twice, once at the 
top and once at the bottom of the computer screen.  That is, there were 20 trials in total 
in each block.  The order of trials was randomised. 
Procedure 
 Participants were informed that they would see a single name on the screen in 
each trial, either at the top or at the bottom of the screen and that their task would be to 
quickly and accurately categorise the displayed name as male or female.  They were 
instructed to use index fingers.  Each trial began with a display of a blank screen for 
1000ms, which was followed by a fixation mark X in the middle of the screen presented 
for 1000ms as well (participants were instructed to look at the fixation).  Then a 
stimulus name was presented.  The names were centred horizontally and displayed at 
the top or at the bottom of the screen.  Before the main task, participants were given five 
practice trials.  In each trial, a name appeared for 2000ms, if participants did not make a 
response, the name would be cleared from the screen.  A response was required to 
proceed to the next trial, even if the stimulus disappeared.  If they made a mistake, the 
word INCORRECT appeared on the screen (in red colour).  To proceed to a next trial, 
participants needed to correct their responses.  The names were presented in white 
letters on a black screen (font size 17).  After each block participants could take a break.  
The experiment lasted approximately 10 minutes.  
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Study 10:  Results and discussion 
First, I removed the incorrect responses (this happened when participants 
categorised male names as female or vice versa; these trials accounted for 3% of all 
responses).  Subsequently, as in my previously reported studies, I estimated a linear 
mixed model to analyse response latencies.  The fixed effect of gender was not 
significant, F(1, 56) = .08, p = .78, dz = .03, but I found that the effect of position was 
significant, F(1, 330) = 11.36, p < .001. dz = .30.  Participants were significantly faster 
at categorising names when they appeared at the top of the screen (M = 693ms, SE = 
11.60, 95%CI[672, 719]) as opposed to the bottom (M = 710ms, SE = 11.74, 
95%CI[687, 736]).  The fixed effect of response mode was also significant, F(1, 350) = 
10.43, p < .001, dz = .30, such that participants were significantly faster to respond in 
the condition where they categorised males with L and females with A (M = 694ms, SE 
= 13.87, 95%CI[651, 707]), as opposed to the condition where they responded to males 
with A and females with L (M = 710ms, SE = 13.44, 95%CI[700, 756]). 
Further, the two-way interactions (gender choice x vertical position, see Figure 
16; gender choice x response mode; and vertical position x response mode), were not 
significant, ps > .18, as was the three-way interaction between response mode, gender 
choice, and vertical position, F(1, 3961) = 2.57, p = .11 (see Figure 17).  These results 
indicate that gender per se is not associated with verticality.  When participants sort 
gendered names as male or female without the power context they do not use spatial 
cues to facilitate their judgment.  This is true, even though participants exhibited 
facilitation to stimuli presented at the top, as this is likely associated with reading habits 
(see von Hecker et al., 2016). 
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Figure 16.  Response latencies as a function of presented gendered names and their 
vertical position.  The error bars show -/+1 standard error.  
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Figure 17.  Response latencies as a function of gendered names, their position, and 
response mode.  The error bars show -/+1 standard error. 
(a) Categorisations of males  
 
(b) Categorisations of females  
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Summary of results 
To summarise, in this chapter, I aimed at investigating whether spatial 
simulations occur when task conditions are modified such that power or gender cues 
become less salient.  The results from Studies 8, 9, and 10 indicate that in general 
spatial simulations do not occur in the absence of meaningful power differences 
between targets presented or when the power-context is not salient.  Only in Study 9 
were spatial cues associated with responding in the male gender block and both 
powerful and powerless conditions (top choices were associated with categorisations of 
targets as powerful and bottom choices with categorisations of targets as powerless), but 
not in the female block.  However, this was not observed in Study 8.  Also, verticality 
cues did not involve response facilitation across both studies (8 and 9).  Similarly, in 
Study 10, I found that spatial cues did not facilitate participants’ categorisations of 
gendered names.  Specifically, gender per se was not associated with verticality, as the 
two-way interaction between gender (males versus females) and position was not 
significant.  Participants were equally fast at categorising female and male names at the 
bottom and top of the screen.  Further, participants were faster to categorise both male 
and female names at the top of the screen versus bottom, possibly suggesting that the 
reading habit (i.e., scanning the screen from the top to the bottom) was responsible for 
such a processing advantage (von Hecker et al., 2016).  Also, there was a processing 
advantage in the condition where participants responded with L to male names and A to 
female names in contrast to the condition where male names were categorised with A 
and females names with L.  This is inconsistent with polarity correspondence theory 
that I discuss in more detail in Chapter 7.  However, it is important to note that these 
results could be related to handedness of participants – which I did not control for in the 
present study.   
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To conclude, in the light of my previous studies, it appears that stereotype 
accessibility in the power context is one of the contextual factors that is required for 
spatial simulations to emerge.  Therefore, in the next chapter, I investigated to what 
extent such stereotype activation is important for people to simulate power and gender 
on the vertical dimension. 
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Chapter 5: Dependency of spatial simulations on stereotype accessibility 
Overview 
 In the present chapter, I investigated to what extent spatial simulations in the 
abstract concept of power are associated with stereotype accessibility.  In two studies, I 
asked participants to complete a spatial task where they were instructed to categorise as 
quickly as possible which person (between two vertically presented on the screen, one 
male, one female) was powerful.  However, in Study 11, I manipulated stereotype 
accessibility by restricting the time to complete the task in each trial.  In one condition, 
participants received just 600ms to select the powerful person (short condition), whilst 
in the other they had 2000ms (long condition).  I measured how often participants 
selected each gendered name in each vertical position (top versus bottom) across the 
time-constrained conditions.  In Study 12, I attempted to reduce stereotypic associations 
by adapting the evaluative conditioning task (Olson & Fazio; 2001, 2006).  In this task, 
participants were implicitly primed with pictures of females paired with powerful 
concepts and males paired with powerless concepts.  Then, they completed the spatial 
task and categorised powerful persons.  In study 11, I found that participants relied on 
the gender stereotype (males-powerful) more in the long versus short condition, but 
across both conditions they were more likely to associate both male and female names 
with top positions versus bottom positions.  These results imply that when people make 
power judgements, they base their decisions on verticality cues regardless of the 
activated stereotype.  As I did not measure the duration of participants’ decisions (RTs), 
these results can only suggest that the outcome of decision was based on verticality 
cues.  That is, these results cannot indicate whether spatial simulations occurred.  In 
Study 12, I did not detect any evidence of spatial processing across both groups of 
participants, possibly to a significant data loss. 
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In the previous chapters, I found that mental representations of gender and 
power involve spatial features associated with vertical positions.  Males as powerful 
seem to be simulated at the top of the vertical dimension as opposed to females as 
powerful.  I found that such spatial features can be detected only in certain contexts.  
Spatial simulations take place when people reason about gender and power in a 
stereotype-consistent manner and only when they think about powerful as opposed to 
powerless individuals.  However, spatial simulations do not occur when the concepts of 
power and gender are not simultaneously salient in the experimental conditions.  
Therefore, to date, I explored the nature of spatial simulations under different 
experimental conditions by investigating the role of gender in power-relevant context.  
In the current chapter, I present two studies that directly explored the role of stereotype 
activation in the spatial simulation of gender and power on the vertical dimension.  As it 
appears that spatial simulations occur when stereotype-fit is present, it is possible that 
manipulating the accessibility of a stereotype can also affect the degree to which spatial 
simulations would be present.  I addressed these issues below. 
Study 11: Stereotype activation under restricted time conditions24 
First, in Study 11, I tested whether gender has power implications and under 
what circumstances such power implications might emerge.  I adapted Schubert’s 
(2005) paradigm and presented participants with vertically arranged pairs of gendered 
names.  On some trials, a male name appeared at the top of the screen and a female 
name at the bottom, or vice versa.  I instructed participants to identify the powerful 
person of the pair.  I predicted that participants would be more likely to pick males as 
powerful in contrast to females.  This association was expected to be moderated by the 
vertical position of stimuli – both males and females should be seen as powerful more 
                                                 
24 The report of Study 11 is partly based on a manuscript in preparation (Zarzeczna et al., 2018b) 
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often at the top as opposed to the bottom due to the link between power and verticality 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Schubert, 2005).  Yet, if males-
top associations are stronger than females-top via stereotype-fit, participants should 
select more males at the top relative to females.  Second, I investigated whether the 
identification of males and females as powerful would be associated with time 
constraints.  The empirical literature indicates that stereotype activation is dependent on 
the thought context (Fiske & Taylor, 2010).  When categorising individuals, people 
attend to and rely on information that is more immediately relevant and accessible to the 
task (Macrae et al., 1997).  Therefore, in this study I varied the amount of time in which 
the stimuli were presented.  I hypothesised that in shorter trials (stimuli presented for 
600ms), participants would rely more on salient verticality cues (top/bottom positions) 
that are more immediately linked with power than gender (Schubert, 2005) and pick 
more individuals at the top regardless of gender.  With longer presentation intervals, I 
expected that participants would make more stereotype-consistent choices, selecting 
more males as powerful than females.  
Method 
 
Participants 
 I recruited 62 Cardiff University Psychology students (56 females, mean age = 
19.94 years).  The sample size in both studies was derived from von Hecker et al. (2013, 
2016) for Cohen’s dz = .25.  They were randomly allocated to the short or long 
condition and gained course credits for their participation.   
Materials 
 
I selected 20 popular British names (10 female, 10 male).  I subsequently paired 
each name with a name of the opposite gender (e.g., Ethan – Zoe, see Appendix 8 for all 
the pairs).  The pairs were then presented on a computer screen with presentation 
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software DirectRT (Jarvis, 2012) in white letters on a black screen (font size 15 – 21 
pixels).   
Design  
 I manipulated the vertical position of the paired names within-participants, such 
that on half of the trials, a male name (e.g., Ethan) was displayed at the top of the screen 
with a female name (e.g., Zoe) displayed the bottom.  On the other half of the trials, this 
display was reversed (see Figure 18).  The time restriction for participants’ judgements 
about the powerful person was manipulated between-participants.  In the long condition, 
the stimuli were presented for 2000ms, as in my previous experiments; in the short 
condition the stimuli were presented for 600ms, which allows for only a quick 
judgement.  I measured the frequency of participants’ choices of each gender as 
powerful in each vertical position.  There were four blocks of trials in both conditions.  
Each block involved a presentation of 10 gendered pairs shown twice, with each name 
presented in each vertical position (20 trials in total).   
 Both names were centred and there was a 23cm vertical distance between them. 
There were 80 trials in total.  The order of trials within each block was randomized.  
Participants sat approximately 70cm away from the computer screen. 
Procedure 
 First, I presented participants with task instructions on a computer screen.  They 
were informed that they would be presented with names of fictitious people and in each 
trial they would see two names.  They were then informed that these names would be 
presented for 2000ms/600ms (depending on experimental group) and that they could 
respond even after the stimuli disappeared from the screen.  Thus, the response interval 
was open-ended, and participants were not instructed to respond as quickly as possible. 
Second, I instructed participants that their task would be to detect the powerful 
person of the pair displayed on the screen.  I emphasised that they should try to 
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spontaneously imagine that one of the people was the powerful one.  Third, to ensure 
that participants made judgements about social power, I presented a definition of a 
socially powerful individual, adapted from Galinsky, et al. (2003), as in previous 
studies.  Finally, participants used the arrow keys on the computer keyboard to indicate 
the powerful person (arrow up to choose top stimuli and arrow down to pick bottom 
stimuli; see Figure 18).  The task took approximately 15 minutes. 
Figure 18.  Spatial task procedure of a single trial. 
 
Results and discussion 
To analyse the proportions of participants’ choices of males and females as 
powerful in each vertical position, I conducted a loglinear analysis.25  First, I found a 
main effect of gender.  Participants were more likely to select male names as powerful 
than female names, χ²(1, N = 62) = 457.27, p < .001, d > 2.0 (odds choosing males over females = 
1.87).26  
                                                 
25 Due to the underrepresentation of males in my sample, I weighted cells within the loglinear analysis by 
participants’ gender. Subsequently, I ran the same analysis without male participants. I obtained the same 
results across both analyses when excluding and including male participants. 
26 This effect size was too large to obtain the exact value of Cohen’s d.  
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Second, as predicted, I found the main effect of condition in relation to gender.27  
Participants were more likely to select male names as powerful in the long condition 
(68.8%) than in the short condition (61.6%), χ²(1, N = 62) = 27.83, p < .001, d = 1.80 
(odds ratio choosing males in the long versus short = 1.37 95%CI[1.22,1.54]). 
However, contrary to predictions, the main effect of condition on power 
allocation to the top vertical position was not significant, χ²(1, N = 62) = 2.27, p = .13, d 
= .40.  This demonstrates that participants were not differentially relying on top vertical 
positions of stimuli in the short (53.2%) versus long condition (51.1%; odds ratio choosing 
top in short versus long = 1.04, 95% CI[.99, 1.10]) 
Finally, I found a significant main effect of position on power allocation, χ²(1, N 
= 62) = 10.17, p < .001, d = .89 (odds ratio choosing top versus bottom  = 1.21, 
95%CI[1.08,1.36]).  However, this effect was not moderated by gender.  Participants 
were marginally more likely to select the male name as powerful when the male name 
appeared at the top (67.3%) of the screen compared to the bottom (63%), χ²(1, N = 62) 
= 3.54, p = .06, d = .49.  The same pattern was true for selections of the female as more 
powerful.  Participants were more likely to select the female name as more powerful 
when the female name appeared at the top (37%) of the screen compared to the bottom 
(32.7%), χ²(1, N = 62) = 6.63, p < .01, d = .69. 
As hypothesised, in Study 11, I demonstrated that gender has social power 
implications, such that while thinking about power people conform to gender 
stereotypes, perceiving males as more likely to be powerful than females (Rudman & 
Kilianski, 2000).  Consistent with my hypothesis, I also found that participants relied on 
such a stereotype more in the long condition than in the short one.  Specifically, more 
processing time enables people to use stereotypes to guide their responses while picking 
                                                 
27 I present the results in terms of main effects for clarity, however, chi-square tests indicate associations 
between variables. 
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powerful individuals (Fiske & Taylor, 2010).  However, in the short condition, 
participants did not rely more on verticality cues.  Also, I found that whenever people 
considered both males and females as powerful, they were more likely to associate them 
with top vertical positions (Schubert, 2005).  These findings diverge from my initial 
studies (1-7), which suggested that only males as powerful are simulated at the top.  At 
the same time, in the present study, I measured only associations in terms of the 
frequency of participants’ choices, which represents a different methodology to 
reaction-times or pupillometry.  It is likely that the frequency of choices measures 
mainly the outcomes of thought processes, while the reaction-time/pupillometry 
methodologies focus more on the duration of the thought process itself and the 
cognitive effort associated with that process.  For example, participants might try to 
control their stereotype by deliberately choosing more females as powerful at the top, 
but their choices would be much slower than choices of males as powerful at the top 
(Studies 1 - 7).  This is because the cognitive effort associated with processing of 
females as powerful at the top would be higher than in the case of males due to 
stereotype misfit.  This process, however, would not be noticeable in the case of 
proportions of choices, as observed in the present study.  I explored this issue further in 
Study 12. 
Study 12: Reducing stereotypic thinking 
Overall, Study 11 provides evidence that associations between power and spatial 
location are present for both genders and are not moderated by stereotypic associations.  
Such findings are not in line with my previous studies.  However, note that the previous 
results were based on reaction-time methodology and pupillometry.  Therefore, to 
explore whether stereotypic thinking moderates spatial simulations, but not spatial 
associations, of gender, I conducted a follow-up study.  In this study, I attempted to 
112 
 
experimentally reduce stereotypic-associations.  If associating power and gender 
involves spatial simulations that rely on consistency between concepts (stereotype-fit 
between males-power), then reducing that consistency or disrupting the blending 
between males and power should also involve a disruption of spatial simulations of 
males at the top and possibly lead to more pronounced simulations of females at the top 
instead. 
In order to reduce the stereotype link between males-powerful and females-
powerless, I used a priming task.  The task was based on the evaluative conditioning 
technique validated by Olson and Fazio (2001, 2006), which they found reduced 
implicit prejudice against African Americans (see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010, for a review).  In the standard evaluative conditioning task, 
participants view a number of pictures of Black human faces paired with positive 
stimuli and White faces paired with negative stimuli on a computer screen.  The priming 
stimuli are randomly presented with a number of filler and distractor items, such as 
pictures of objects or humans, to make participants unaware of the priming pairings.  To 
keep participants attentive throughout the procedure, their task is to press a key 
whenever they see a pre-specified target item (e.g., a woman jogging).   The aim of the 
task is to implicitly condition participants to associate positive valence with Black 
people and negative with White people.   
In my study, I used the same priming procedure, however, my priming pairings 
consisted of pictures of female faces paired with powerful concepts and pictures of male 
faces paired with powerless concepts.  I included filler pictures of different items and 
asked participants to press a keyboard key every time they saw a neutral stimulus (e.g., 
a male or female face paired with a neutral adjective).  I also designed a control 
condition, where participants were presented with the same stimuli as in the priming 
condition, but the gendered pictures and the powerful/powerless concepts were 
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unpaired, but appeared on the screen separately.  Then, I asked participants to complete 
a spatial task adapted from Study 3, but I only used the powerful condition, as I did not 
detect spatial simulation effects in the powerless condition in my previous studies.   
On the basis of my previous studies, I hypothesised that in the control condition, 
participants would simulate males at the top, that is, respond faster when selecting male 
names as powerful when they appeared at the top as opposed to either selecting female 
names as powerful when they appeared the top, or male names when they appeared at 
the bottom.  This effect was expected to be reduced in the priming condition.  I suggest 
that priming participants with females as powerful and males as powerless might create 
a new thought context, where the powerful-females link is no longer considered as 
inconsistent or incorrect within the task.  Under such circumstances, thinking about 
males would not be blended with power and supported by stereotype-fit resulting in 
weaker spatial simulations at the top. 
Method 
Participants 
 I recruited 49 Cardiff University psychology students (the approximate sample 
size was derived from von Hecker et al., 2013 for Cohen’s d = .25-.35), but I excluded 7 
participants.  One participant guessed the purpose of the study, 5 were aware of the 
pairings in the priming task (females-powerful; males-powerless), and another 
participant was too slow in responding in the spatial task according to the Tukey 
criterion.  Therefore, the final sample size consisted of 42 participants (mean age = 
19.65, 32 females).  I randomly allocated them to either the priming or control 
condition.  They received payment or course credit for their participation.  
 
Materials 
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 Priming Task.  First, I randomly selected a set of 10 pictures of females and 10 
pictures of males from the database of 70 pictures created by Lundqvist, Flykt, and 
Ohman (1998).  Each picture represented a person with a neutral facial expression (aged 
from 20 – 30 years).  The pictures were standardised such that each individual was 
presented in the same manner, including the background of the picture, clothes, and 
distance from the camera.28  I adjusted the size of the pictures (368 x 500 pixels) to the 
computer screen (1280 x 1024 pixels).  Second, I randomly selected 20 pictures of 
filler/distractor objects (e.g., cactus, cd, pavement, chain; size: 500 x 500 pixels), such 
that each object belonged to a different category (e.g., plants, tools), from a set of 
standardised stimuli developed by Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, and Lepage 
(2010).  Subsequently, I randomly paired five pictures of female faces with five 
concepts associated with power (i.e., power, powerful, control, commanding, 
influential) and five pictures of male faces with five concepts associated with lack of 
power (i.e., powerless, submissive, passive, vulnerable, subordinate).29  Then, I paired 
the rest of the selected gendered pictures (five females, five males) with five neutral 
adjectives adapted from Rocklage and Fazio (2015), which were rated by their 
participants to be neutrally valenced and associated with low emotionality (i.e., average, 
neutral, adequate, okay, and satisfactory).  The pictures and the neutral adjectives were 
paired such that there was always one picture of a male and female matched with the 
same adjective.  Four pairings out of 10 (two female pictures and the paired adjective; 
two male pictures and the paired adjective) were randomly selected to be the target 
items that participants needed to categorise during the priming task.  Both the pictures 
of females and males as well as the adjectives constituted targets and were presented in 
three different ways.  Sometimes each adjective and picture appeared on the screen on 
                                                 
28 More information about the pictures can be found at: http://www.emotionlab.se/resources/kdef 
29 The concepts were adapted from a dictionary of synonyms at: http://www.thesaurus.com 
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their own and sometimes they were paired together.  This was done to make sure that 
participants paid equal attention to all the labels and pictures.  In terms of the filler 
objects, a set of 15 items was used in the main experimental phase (some pictures were 
paired with a consistent label, e.g., a picture of a cactus paired with the word cactus, and 
some with an inconsistent one, e.g., a coconut picture paired with the word bicycle).  
Some items were only represented by their labels and some only by pictures, whilst five 
pictures of items were used in the practice phase.  The labels of the pictures and the 
adjectives were presented in black colour (font size 18).  All the stimuli were presented 
on a white background.  
 Spatial Task.  I adapted the spatial task materials from Study 3 (see method 
section).  Specifically, I used gendered names paired with high-status and gender-
neutral professions.  As there were four sets of combinations between names and 
professions, participants were randomly allocated to receive one set, as it was done in 
Studies 3 and 8. 
Design 
 I used a mixed design.  I manipulated the priming task (priming vs. control) 
between-participants.  In the priming condition, I presented four blocks of trials.  Each 
block started with a presentation of the target items that participants needed to 
categorise during the task (i.e., the picture of a single individual who was either male or 
female and the label of a neutral adjective) chosen from the set of ten pictures of 
males/females paired with neutral adjectives.  The rest of the pictures (i.e., nine) were 
presented as filler items and participants were not supposed to categorise them.  The 
selected target items within each block were presented six times (two trials presented 
just the picture, two others presented just the adjective, and the final two presented the 
picture paired with the adjective).  To further obscure the purpose of the task, I also 
presented 15 filler items (pictures, labels, and pictures paired with labels) and four blank 
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screens to eliminate a possible sense of rhythm of the presentation of stimuli, as 
recommended by Olson and Fazio (2006).  On ten other trials, participants were 
exposed to the priming pairings, out of which five represented pictures of females 
paired with power concepts and five pictures of males paired with powerless concepts.  
Overall, there were 44 trials in total in each block.  The order of the trials was random.  
The same items were presented across all blocks, except for the target items, which 
represented different individuals.30  The order of blocks was counterbalanced within 
participants.  Before the main task, I included 24 practice trials that presented only filler 
objects and targets.  Each stimulus appeared in the centre of the computer screen for 
1500ms and was preceded by a blank screen presented for 1000ms.  In the control 
condition, participants completed a similar task, except that the priming gendered 
pictures and power/powerless concepts were presented separately, which prolonged the 
task for 15 seconds in comparison to the priming task. 
 In the next stage of the experiment, participants completed my standard spatial 
task (designed in the same way as in Study 3).  I presented vertically positioned 
gendered names (one at the top; the other at the bottom), that is, the trial-type was 
manipulated (males-top versus females-top) within-participants.  This time, however, I 
                                                 
30 The design was pre-tested in a pilot study.  I created two versions of the priming task and manipulated 
the occurrence frequency of the priming pairings (females-powerful; males-powerless).  In the higher 
frequency condition, I presented four blocks of trials.  Within each block, 10 priming pairings were 
presented, out of which five pictures of females paired with powerful concepts and five pictures of males 
paired with powerless concepts were presented.  The filler items were also randomly dispersed 
throughout the procedure.  Overall, there were 40 trials in total including the filler trials.  In the lower 
frequency condition, I presented 10 priming pairings twice within two blocks of trials.  Each block 
involved 80 trials in total.  Participants’ task was the same as in the main experiment, but at the end I 
asked them to estimate the proportion of trials within the task that presented genders paired with power 
concepts.  Participants in the higher frequency condition estimated a slightly higher number of such trials 
than those in the lower frequency one, but the difference was not significant, t(24) = 1.18, p = .25, d = .03 
(I recruited 29 participants, but 4 participants misunderstood the question and were excluded from this 
analysis).  I also asked whether they were aware that females were paired with powerful concepts/males 
with powerless.  I found that in the higher frequency condition, a higher proportion of participants was 
unaware of the gendered pictures paired with power concepts than in the lower frequency, but the 
relationship between the condition and awareness was not significant, χ²(1, N = 25) = .20, p = .27, d = .19 
Because the awareness was lower in the higher frequency condition, I used that version in the main 
experiment. 
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asked participants to categorise just the powerful person, as I was interested mainly in 
reducing the effects of simulations of males at the top.  I measured participants’ choices 
of the powerful individuals (quasi-experimental variable) and also response latencies to 
all possible choices. 
Procedure 
First, participants completed either the priming or control task.  They were 
instructed to press the spacebar as fast as possible every time they saw a pre-specified 
target item on the screen.  I also informed them that I was interested in attention and 
rapid responding and encouraged them to carefully attend to all the stimuli on the 
screen.  Second, they completed the spatial task.  At the end, I asked participants 
whether they noticed anything unusual about the way the words and pictures were 
presented in the first phase of the experiment.  The subsequent question was more 
specific and asked whether they noticed anything unusual about the presentation of 
words and pictures of people of different genders.  Finally, I asked whether they knew 
the purpose of the study, and if yes, I asked for a brief summary.  The tasks were 
programmed using DirectRT (Jarvis, 2012).  The experiment took 20 minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
 Proportions of choices.  First, I analysed the proportions of participants’ 
choices of males and females as powerful.  As in Study 3, where I also paired gendered 
names with high-status professions, in both conditions (priming vs. control) participants 
were equally likely to select both males (52%) and females (48%) as powerful, χ²(1, N = 
43) = .08, p = .78, d = .11; odds ratio choosing powerful in the primed versus control condition = .97 
(95%CI[.80,1.18]). 
Responses latencies.  To analyse the response latencies, I estimated a linear 
mixed model.  The fixed effects of prime, F(1, 1599) = .02, p = .89, dz = .01, trial type, 
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F(1, 1600) = 1.46, p = .23, dz = .04, and gender choice, F(1,1599) = 1.61, p = .20, dz = 
.03 were not significant.  The same was true for two-way interactions (prime x trial 
type; prime x gender choice; trial type x gender choice), ps = .31.  Also, contrary to my 
hypothesis, the three-way interaction, prime by trial type by gender, was not significant, 
F(1, 1599) = .03, p = .86 (see Figure 19).  It is possible that as a result of the high drop-
out rate and also a small sample size, the present study is likely to be underpowered.  A 
replication of the present study would be essential in order to deal with high variability 
found in participants’ responses (see standard errors in Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19.  Response latencies as a function of the interaction among gender choice, 
trial type, and task for the control and prime condition.  The error bars show 
standard errors (+/-1 SE). 
(a) Control    (b) Prime 
 
Summary of results 
In Study 11, I found that spatial associations between top and bottom positions 
were not moderated by stereotypic associations, as both males and females (when 
categorised as powerful) were associated with top and bottom positions to the same 
extent.  Participants also selected more stereotype-consistent choices (powerful-males) 
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in the long condition when they had more processing time available (Fiske & Taylor, 
2010).  In the short condition, however, the verticality cues were not associated with 
participants’ responses.  These findings are inconsistent with my initial studies (1 - 7), 
which suggested that only males as powerful were simulated at the top.  At the same 
time, as mentioned earlier in Study 11, I measured only associations in terms of the 
frequency of participants’ choices, which represent a different measure to reaction 
latency or pupil dilation.  The data based on associations cannot reveal the effects due to 
processing effort.  Therefore, a priming technique that would directly affect stereotype 
accessibility could be more useful in determining the role of stereotyping in spatial 
simulations precisely. 
Nevertheless, the priming technique used to experimentally reduce stereotype-
consistent thinking was not effective in Study 12.  The results from Study 12 did not 
support any of the stated hypotheses.  Also, I did not replicate my previous findings in 
the control condition.  One possibility is that my priming method was not sufficient to 
stimulate formation of new associations between power and females and therefore the 
spatial effect was not stronger for female names than for male names in the priming 
condition.  However, another probable explanation of my findings is that my sample 
size was not large enough.  A replication of the above study with a larger sample size as 
well as a longer priming task (e.g., the same task that I used, but repeated twice) could 
potentially provide more reliable findings. 
So far, I explored the context dependency of spatial simulations on task 
conditions and stereotype activation.  In the next chapter, I aimed at investigating the 
consequences of spatial correlates of abstract thinking for gender perceptions. 
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Chapter 6: The impact of spatial vertical presentation on gender perceptions 
Overview 
In the final empirical chapter, I present two studies that investigated the 
consequences of vertical presentation on perceptions of males and females in terms of 
physical size and stereotypic traits.  In Study 13, I explored whether the vertical 
presentation of stereotypically powerful persons at the top might bias a subsequent 
perception regarding size.  Participants were primed with males-top trials (male names 
presented at the top and female names at the bottom), females-top trials (female names 
at the top and male names at the bottom), or no priming.  Subsequently, participants 
were asked to estimate font sizes of target words which represented male and female 
names.  I found that participants tended to overestimate the male names over female 
names regardless of condition.  Moreover, they were more likely to overestimate both 
male and female target names after being primed with males-top versus (a) females-top 
(although this association was marginal) and (b) control trials.  In Study 14, I explored 
whether the spatial simulation of stereotypically powerful persons (males) at the top 
might predict biased or stereotypically-consistent judgements about such persons.  In 
this study, participants completed a standard spatial task (adapted form Study 1), in 
which they were asked to quickly select a powerful or powerless person on the screen 
on the basis of vertically presented pictures of male and female faces.  Subsequently, 
participants rated the pictures presented in the spatial task on a range of stereotypical 
traits.  The results indicated that participants simulated both males and females as 
powerful at the top versus bottom in the spatial task.  These simulations were 
independent of participants’ ratings of the faces traits.  However, the higher the 
likelihood to select female faces as powerful at the top, the lower the femininity 
judgements of those faces, whilst a higher tendency to pick male faces as powerless at 
the bottom was associated with less competence and masculinity attributed to those 
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faces.  Overall, the studies indicate that verticality is associated with biased perception 
of size and stereotypic judgements. 
Study 13: Space and size in the power-gender representation 
My previous studies demonstrated that gender can be mapped onto the vertical 
dimension via another related concept, e.g., power.  At the same time, the embodiment 
literature suggests that gender is likely to be directly mapped onto dimensions 
associated with bodily experiences.  For example, Slepian et al. (2011) found that the 
proprioceptive experience of toughness is associated with males, whereas the 
proprioceptive experience of tenderness is associated with females.  Such associations 
were present during an online thinking about gender when participants were squeezing a 
hard (symbolising toughness) or soft ball (symbolising tenderness).  The findings by 
Slepian et al. (2011) indicate that bodily experiences might bias abstract judgments 
about gender.  Similarly, a cognitive experience of being powerful or powerless was 
found to be related to judgments about other people’s physical sizes.  In one piece of 
research, Yap, Mason, and Ames (2013) manipulated participants to feel either 
powerful or powerless and asked them to judge the physical size of a target person with 
whom they interacted.  The results indicated that participants who felt powerful tended 
to underestimate the physical size of the target person, whilst those who felt powerless 
were more likely to overestimate the size of that person.  That is, perceptions of 
physical sizes were biased by abstract cognitive correlates of power. 
Most studies of congruency effects focus on mappings of a single abstract 
concept onto a specific dimension of space (e.g., Boroditsky Ramscar, 2002; Meier & 
Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 2005).  Such studies indicate that different abstract concepts, 
such as valence, time, or power, use the same spatial mappings.  However, not many 
studies have investigated whether multiple mental metaphors can be activated at the 
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same time and whether they interact with each other to produce a coherent mental 
representation.  Spatola et al. (2018) examined these issues in the context of metaphors 
in which negativity is associated with past events, whilst past events are also associated 
with the left side on the horizontal dimension.  In their studies, participants made either 
temporal (past vs. future) or valence (positive vs. negative) judgements about verbs 
presented in the past or future forms.  Laterality of responding was also manipulated, 
such that participants made their responses with keyboard keys positioned either on the 
left or right.  The authors measured how accurate and fast participants were when 
making such judgements in order to measure congruency effects between the spatial 
dimensions and the abstract concepts (see also Chapter 1).   They found that participants 
showed a facilitation while responding to past-negative/future-positive verbs, past-
left/future-right verbs, and left-negative/right-positive verbs.  Although these three 
mappings (valence-time, time-space, and space-valence) were activated simultaneously 
such representations were independent of each other.  These findings suggest that 
people process multiple mental metaphors globally.  Within a mental model, people 
activate attributes associated with each of the metaphors (left-negative, past-left, past-
negative) and keep them active throughout the task, creating a coherent mental 
representation.  Under such circumstances, the information about mappings is available 
in advance.  However, it is important to note that in this research multiple metaphors 
needed to be activated simultaneously, due to the nature of the task.  Activating 
metaphors in a sequential manner might yield different results, because one mental 
representation would be formed in advance of the other.  I addressed this issue in the 
current study. 
Integrating the findings by Slepian et al. (2011) and Yap et al. (2013) on the 
association between gender, embodied experience, and physical size with the studies on 
spatial mental representation of abstract concepts (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004; 
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Schubert, 2005; von Hecker et al., 2013),  and the lack of interaction among 
simultaneously activated metaphors (Spatola et al., 2018), I investigated whether two 
aspects of space, i.e., vertical location and size, might correlate to bias people’s 
perception of a social category.  Given that power is associated with both spatial 
location and size, it is possible that these two aspects of space interact in mental 
representations of power – perceptions of individuals in higher vertical locations might 
also lead individuals to perceive other stimuli as physically bigger.  Given the findings 
of Spatola et al. (2018), such an interaction between metaphors should only be possible 
when the mental representation of one metaphor (power-space) is activated before the 
other one (power-size). 
My research questions were motivated by two overarching issues.  First, if 
location and size are tied to the concept of power (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Schubert, 
2005; von Hecker et al., 2013), then when power is attributed to social categories like 
gender, the mental representation of gender would also involve associations with both 
location and size.  Further, as socially constructed beliefs about power indicate that 
males are usually considered as socially more powerful than females within Western 
societies, males should be more readily associated with power than females (Rudman & 
Kilianski, 2000; Rudman et al., 2012).  This was demonstrated in my initial studies (1 - 
7), which indicated that concrete spatial thinking is pronounced only when people think 
in stereotype-consistent ways.  Second, if bigger sizes are associated with greater 
power, then seeing males as more powerful should be also associated with making 
members of the same category appear bigger than they are in reality.  Finally, if spatial 
location and size are correlated in mental representations of power-gender associations, 
male names (rather than female) presented in upper locations should affect size 
perceptions such that subsequent stimuli should appear to be bigger than they are in 
reality.  
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Therefore, in Study 13, I investigated whether the vertical associations in power-
gender representations would also be associated with size.  This was tested by having 
participants complete a computer task where they estimated the font sizes of gendered 
names.  Before each font judgement, some participants were primed with vertically 
positioned male and female names.  In the males-top condition, the male name appeared 
at the top, whereas in the females-top condition, the female name appeared at the top.  
Participants were informed that those names represented managers and subordinates (to 
activate power-relevant associations).  I also included a control condition that did not 
involve any priming (see Figure 19).  As gender has power implications,  I predicted 
that male names should be overestimated to a higher extent than female names.  Also, I 
tested whether male names would be overestimated more in the males-top condition 
compared to the females-top and control conditions; the same was tested for female 
names in the females-top condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 I recruited 87 Cardiff University undergraduate students (67 females; mean age 
= 20.33) and randomly assigned them to one of the three between-subjects conditions: 
males-top condition, females-top, and control.  The sample size was derived from von 
Hecker et al. (2013, 2016) for Cohen’s d = .25-.35.  They received course credit for 
their participation. 
Materials 
 Participants completed the estimation task on a computer screen using DirectRT 
(Jarvis, 2012).  Within all conditions, I presented a practice phase, where participants 
estimated the font size of neutral words.  In each of four blocks participants estimated 
the font size of six neutral words (e.g., tree, mushroom, fruit).  Next, they completed the 
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main task, in which they estimated the font size of gendered names across six blocks.  
These consisted of six popular male British names (Matthew, Ryan, Daniel, Henry, 
Nathan, Gabriel) and six popular female British names (Zoey, Joanna, Olivia, Natalie, 
Victoria, Ann). There were 12 trials per block (72 trials in total).  Each stimulus within 
the practice and experimental phase was presented in six different font sizes (12, 14, 16, 
18, 20, and 22 points).  Participants were given two font estimation choices.  The first 
choice referred to a font size that was two points smaller than the actual size of the 
presented word, whilst the second choice was two points larger than the actual font size 
of the word (for the word displayed in font size 12, participants could choose font 10 or 
14).  Therefore, participants could not provide the correct answer, but were forced to 
either underestimate or overestimate the word’s font size.   
In the two experimental conditions (males-top and females-top), before the 
estimation task, participants were primed with vertically arranged gendered names.  
These names were also selected from a list of the most popular British names (the 
names were selected from the same sources as the names presented in Studies 1 - 7).  
Subsequently, I paired a female name with a male name and always presented the same 
pairs throughout the experiment (see Appendix 3: Studies 1 and 3).  Each trial of the 
main estimation task began with a display of a male-female pair, where either the male 
name appeared at the top and female name at the bottom (e.g., Oliver-top; Emily-
bottom; males-top condition), or the female name appeared at the top and the male 
name at the bottom (e.g., Emily-top; Oliver-bottom; females-top condition).  To control 
for participants’ awareness of the link between the vertical presentation of the names 
and the subsequent estimation task, I informed them that I was interested in their 
memory performance and they should try to memorise the vertically presented names.  
At the end of the study, they were asked to list all the memorised names.  The 
instructions and the answers that participants could select were always displayed in the 
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same font size (15 points).  All the stimuli and instructions were presented in white 
letters on a black screen. 
Design 
 I used a mixed-design.  I manipulated the vertical position of the gendered name 
pairs between-participants; there was also a no-prime control condition (see Figure 20). 
The target names were manipulated within-participants and were male or female.  
Across all conditions, I measured the proportions of participants’ underestimated and 
overestimated font sizes.  The trials within each block were randomised. 
 
Figure 20.  The procedure of a single trial in the estimation task. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants within all conditions completed the practice phase followed by the 
main task.  In the practice phase, each trial began with information that the trial was 
about to start (for 2000ms) which was followed by a blank screen (displayed for 
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1000ms).  Afterwards, the target word was displayed.  Below each word, I presented 
two possible font size estimates (e.g., font size 10 and 14) that participants could select, 
one on the left, and the other on the right.  Participants pressed the arrow pointing left to 
pick the number on the left and the arrow pointing right to pick the answer on the right.  
When they had made their response, the next trial began.  Each trial in the main task 
started in the same way as in the practice phase, however, before the estimation task 
began, participants within the experimental conditions were informed that their task 
would involve memorising pairs of names displayed on the computer screen and that 
these pairs would be presented before the estimation task within each trial.  To activate 
the context of thinking about power, I informed participants that the pairs of names 
would represent people who were managers and subordinates.  First, in each trial, 
participants were asked to fixate on mark X in the middle of the screen for 1000ms.  
Second, a pair of gendered names (with one name displayed at the top and the other at 
the bottom) appeared for 3000ms.  Then the estimation task followed and participants 
had unlimited time to estimate the size of the displayed target name.  In the final stage, 
participants were asked to write down all the memorised gendered pairs on a sheet of 
paper.  The experiment lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
Results and discussion 
I analysed the proportions of participants’ font size estimations (i.e., the 
frequency of overestimated and underestimated sizes) across three conditions using 
loglinear analysis.31  I subjected three variables to the analysis: Condition (three levels: 
males-top, females-top, and control), gender name (male or female), and estimation 
(overestimated and underestimated of size).  First, I found a main effect of estimation, 
χ²(1, N = 87) = 102.68, p < .001, d > 2.0.  The analysis revealed that participants were 
                                                 
31 I conducted the same analysis excluding male participants in the sample.  I obtained the same results as 
in the analysis that included both female and male participants. 
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more likely to underestimate (56.0%) rather than overestimate (44.0%) all names (odds 
underestimation versus overestimation =  1.29, SE proportion = .06).   
Next, as hypothesised, I found a significant main effect of names on estimation, 
χ²(1, N = 87) = 14.07, p < .001, d = .88, such that participants were more likely to 
overestimate male names (45.9%) compared to female names (41.3%; odds ratio males 
versus females overestimation = 1.21, 95%CI[1.10,1.34]).  Further, as expected, I found that the 
main effect of condition on estimation was significant, χ²(1, N = 87) = 16.24, p < .001, 
d = .96.  Although participants were more likely to underestimate the font size, they did 
this more frequently in the control condition as compared to the experimental 
conditions.  Follow-up tests revealed that the lowest percentage of underestimated 
names was observed in the males-top condition (46.6%) as opposed to the control 
condition (40.5%), χ²(1, N = 58) = 16.13, p < .001, d = 1.24 (odds ratio males-top versus control 
overestimation = 1.29, 95%CI[1.14,1.45]).  Likewise, participants underestimated the names 
less in the females-top condition (43.9%) than in the control condition, χ²(1, N = 59) = 
5.20, p < .02, d = .63 (odds ratio females-top versus control overestimation = 1.15 
(95%CI[1.02,1.30]).  There was also a marginal tendency to underestimate the names 
less frequently in the males-top condition compared to the females-top condition, χ²(1, 
N = 57) = 3.04, p = .08, d = .47 (odds ratio males- versus females-top overestimation = 1.12, 
95%CI[.99,1.26]).  This pattern of results was true for both types of analysis: collapsing 
across gender names and testing for their association with condition as well as when 
each gender name was analysed separately.  Finally, the three-way interaction among 
gender name, condition, and estimation was not significant, χ²(1, N = 87) = .20, p = .91, 
d = .10. 
To summarise, in the present study, I showed that spatial implications of power 
have consequences for the perception of physical sizes, such that a presentation of 
stereotypically powerful individuals at the top increases the perceived size of 
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subsequently presented male and female names.  Given that the vertical positioning 
biases people’s perception of another aspect of space (i.e., size), in the subsequent study 
I explored whether such spatial arrangement can be also involved in biased abstract and 
social perception of the presented persons. 
Study 14: Consequences of spatial simulations for other stereotypic judgements 
I designed Study 14 with two aims.  First, I wanted to investigate whether the 
spatial simulation of gender might impact participants’ stereotypic judgements about the 
simulated individuals.  According to the Stereotype Content Model (SCM, Fiske et al., 
2002), stereotypes of social groups are best described using two dimensions: warmth 
and competence.  This model suggests that socially undesirable consequences of 
stereotyping, such as justification of prejudice, might stem from both negative and 
ostensibly positive views of social groups.  For example, females or Black people are 
perceived as being incompetent, which is a negative trait that could lead to 
discrimination of such individuals at the workplace (Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Katz & 
Hass, 1986).  At the same time, these groups are also considered to be high on warmth 
and therefore they are treated in a paternalistic way (deserving pity and being in need 
for protection or help; Glick & Fiske, 1996).  The SCM suggests that such mixed 
stereotypes can be predicted from the social structure variables associated with social 
status and competition.  Perceived competence is correlated with high social status 
while low warmth is associated with high social competition.  As a result, groups that 
hold a high social status and are powerful are also perceived as being competent.  In 
turn, subordinate groups that are less likely to compete are considered to be warm.  This 
serves a social function of maintaining the social structure – as long as the subordinate 
groups are treated in paternalistic way and are considered as “nice,” they would be less 
likely to attempt to change their status and compete with powerful groups (Glick & 
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Fiske, 2001).  Similar processes can be observed in terms of sexism.  Glick and Fiske 
(1996) provided evidence for a mixed nature of prejudice against women.  In general, in 
their study, women were perceived as incompetent in a professional context.  At the 
same time, participants considered them to have many positive traits, which conformed 
to female traditional gender roles, that is, being nice and warm, but dependent on men.  
Again, such mixed stereotype content justifies and maintains social inequality.  Overall, 
it appears that stereotype content is predicted by social competition and status.  
Therefore, in the present study, I explored whether spatial location interacting with 
perceived power differences between male and female targets might bias participants’ 
judgements about the target’s perceived warmth and competence. 
As warmth and competence are two basic dimensions that capture stereotype 
content, and groups stereotyped as powerful (e.g., males) are represented at the top of 
the vertical dimension (see Chapters 2 - 3 in this thesis), I predicted that simulations of 
males as powerful at the top (i.e., faster response to males at the top versus bottom) 
would be associated with judgements of more competence and less warmth of those 
males in contrast to males simulated at the bottom.  This is because the stereotype 
associated with each gender should be reinforced or weakened depending upon the 
spatial position.  The upper vertical position would reinforce the stereotype of being 
competent when stereotype-fit between males and power would be present.  In contrast, 
the lower position would reinforce the stereotype of being warm, when stereotype-fit 
between females and lack of power would be activated.  That is, the simulated powerful 
or powerless females at the bottom versus top would be associated with higher warmth 
and lower competence judgements.  
Second, in my previous studies, I used gendered names or gendered names 
paired with professions as stimuli to test whether people mentally simulate 
males/females as powerful/powerless on the vertical dimension.  Also, in Study 12, 
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which used names as stimuli, I did not find any evidence for reduced spatial simulation 
effects when participants were primed with females as powerful and males as powerless 
relative to the condition where no priming took place.  It is likely that stimuli 
demonstrating a more vivid or salient representation of gender (e.g., pictures) might be 
more easily mapped onto people’s internal spatial representations (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980).  Subsequently, if a presentation of more vivid stimuli results in more pronounced 
spatial representations, then it would be also possible that such representations would 
have more impact on people’s cognition and affect their subsequent judgements to a 
higher extent.  Therefore, in Study 14, I used pictures of neutral male and female faces.  
If presenting pictures is associated with more pronounced spatial simulations than 
names, I also predicted a simulation of females as powerful at the top versus bottom, but 
I expected this effect to be weaker than the effect for males as powerful at the top.  I 
also expected to find simulations of females as powerless at the bottom as opposed to 
the top, which should be more pronounced for females judged as powerless as opposed 
to males judged as powerless.  I hypothesised that faster reaction time to choices of 
females as powerless when their names appeared at the bottom as opposed to the top 
would be associated with perceptions of lower competence and higher warmth of the 
simulated females.  Specifically, I expected that stereotypic thinking that involves 
spatial simulations would enhance stereotypic associations among power, gender, 
warmth and competence.  Additionally, I also explored whether such simulations would 
be associated with participants’ liking of the simulated individuals and their perceived 
masculinity or femininity. 
Method 
Participants 
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 I recruited 71 Cardiff University undergraduate students (mean age = 19.60; 50 
females, 5 males, one non-binary, and 15 did not report their gender).  The sample size 
was derived from von Hecker et al.’s study (2016) for Cohen’s d = .25-.35.  Four 
participants misunderstood the instructions, whilst the data of four other participants 
were missing, so the final sample consisted of 63 participants.  They were randomly 
allocated to either the powerful or powerless condition and received course credits for 
their participation.  
Materials 
Spatial task.  I selected pictures of female and male faces from Radboud Faces 
Database (Langner et al., 2010).  To avoid any potential effects of facial expressions, 
attractiveness, or age, I chose pictures that represented neutral faces of individuals of 
roughly the same age (range: 23-28) and who were matched on attractiveness (rated as 
neutral).  After pre-selecting the pictures, I randomly chose five pictures of females and 
five pictures of males.  Subsequently, I matched the pictures of females with picture of 
males in any possible combination within four sets of pairings (as it was done for 
gendered names and professions, see Study 3).  The size of each picture was 400 x 280 
pixels.  The pictures were presented against a white background. 
 Judgement task.  The same pictures, as presented in the spatial task, were used 
in the judgement task.  Participants were told to assess each individual in terms of 
warmth, competence, likability, and femininity or masculinity, on a scale from 1 (not 
warm/competent/likable/feminine or masculine at all) to 7 (very 
warm/competent/likable/feminine or masculine).  The presentation order of pictures and 
questions was randomised, however, participants always answered four questions in a 
row about the same picture.  The questions were presented in black letters against a 
white background (font 20 points) with presentation software MediaLab (Jarvis, 2012).  
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Participants selected their responses by indicating a number on a scale with a mouse.  
They saw one question at a time.  They had unlimited time to provide a response. 
Design 
 In the spatial task, I randomly allocated participants to one set of four 
combinations of matched pictures (one was always representing a female face, whilst 
the other one a male face) and also to the powerful of powerless condition.  I presented 
four blocks of trials that included 10 trials each.  In each block, five trials presented five 
pictures of males at the top, whilst their paired pictures of females were presented at the 
bottom.  On the other five trials, male pictures were at the bottom, whilst female ones at 
the top.  That is, trial type was manipulated (males-top versus females-top).  The trials 
were randomised within each block.  I measured how often participants indicated 
males/females as powerful/powerless in each vertical position and also their reaction 
times to those choices (gender choice was the quasi-experimental variable like in my 
previous studies presented in Chapter 2).  Before each trial, participants saw a fixation 
mark in the middle of the screen.  The timing was the same as in the previous studies 
(see Figure 1). 
Procedure 
 First, participants were asked to either quickly find the powerful or powerless 
person on the screen.  The definition of a socially powerful/powerless person was 
provided (as it was done in the previous studies, e.g., in Chapter 2).  Participants were 
encouraged to imagine that one of the presented persons on the screen was powerful or 
powerless and think strongly about the power differences between them.  Subsequently, 
they completed the spatial task and after that answered questions about the pictures 
presented in the spatial task.  The experiment took 20 minutes. 
134 
 
Results 
Spatial task. Proportions of choices.  Similarly to the previous studies, I found 
that participants were more likely to pick males as powerful (55.4%) versus females as 
powerful (44.6%), χ²(1, N = 63) = 18.35, p < .001, d = 1.28, odds ratio choosing males over 
females as powerful = 1.42 (95%CI[1.21, 1.66]).  
Spatial task.  Response latencies.  As in previous studies, I estimated a linear 
mixed model to analyse participants’ reaction times to their choices of males and 
females as powerful or powerless.  I found that the fixed effects of gender choice, F(1, 
61) = .02, p = .89, dz  = .01, trial type, F(1, 2337) = 1.11, p = .29, dz = .07, as well as 
task, F(1, 61) = 2.54, p = .12, dz = .07, were not significant.  The same was true for the 
two-way interactions (gender choice x trial type; gender choice x task; trial type x task), 
ps > .24.   
Further, as predicted, the three-way interaction (gender choice, trial type, and 
task was significant, F(1, 2309) = 8.41, p < .01 (see Figure 21).  However, post-hoc 
comparisons indicated that participants were equally fast to categorise males as 
powerful, (M = 1034, SE = 63.75, 95%CI[915, 1170]), and females as powerful at the 
top, (M = 1042ms, SE = 66.20, 95%CI[898, 1137]), ]), t(2319) = -1.96, p < .05,  dz = 
.08, in contrast to the findings in Studies 1 – 6.  I also did not find any spatial effects in 
terms of females as powerless at the bottom (M = 1168ms, SE = 60.29, 95%CI[1083, 
1323]) versus the top, (M = 1170ms, SE = 61.32, 95%CI[1082, 1327]), t(2342) = -.06, p 
= .95,  dz = .03. 
Subsequently, I found that participants were faster at detecting males as 
powerful at the top (M = 1034, SE = 63.75, 95%CI[915, 1170]) versus bottom, (M = 
1056ms, SE = 64.35, 95%CI[961, 1218]), t(2319) = -1.96, p < .05,  dz = .28.  The same 
was true for females as powerful, they were chosen significantly faster at the top, (M = 
1042ms, SE = 66.20, 95%CI[898, 1137]), versus bottom, (M = 1085, SE = 71.29, 
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95%CI[956, 1199]), t(2319) = 2.19, p < .03,  dz = .31.  Other comparisons were not 
significant, ps > .20. 
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Figure 21.  Response latencies as a function of the interaction among gender choice, 
trial type, and task.  The error bars show standard errors (+/-1 SE). 
 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
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Judgement task.  Due to programme failure, the questionnaire data of 13 
participants were missing.  Therefore, I analysed the data from 50 participants.  To test 
whether spatial simulations predicted participants’ judgments about perceived warmth 
and competence of the simulated individuals, first, I computed spatial simulation-
facilitation scores.  As I did not find any spatial effects for choices of powerless 
individuals at the bottom versus top, as it was the case in the previous studies, I 
computed the facilitation scores for males (FTM) and females (FTF) chosen as powerful 
when their name appeared the top.  To do that, I calculated mean reaction times for each 
participant to the choices of males as powerful and females as powerful at the top and 
subtracted these means from the mean reaction times to the choices of males as 
powerful and females as powerful at the bottom, respectively.  That is, higher 
facilitation scores indicated faster responses to males/females as powerful at the top 
versus bottom.  Subsequently, as participants rated each picture of female and male face 
in the judgement task, I calculated the mean rating for each questionnaire item (warmth, 
competence, likability, and femininity/masculinity) for all female faces and separately 
for all male faces giving an overall rating of each item for each gender (see Appendix 9: 
Table 4 for correlations between all items).   
I found that FTM did not predict warmth, = -.34, t(26) = -1.57, p = .13, 
competence, = -.10, t(26) = -.49, p = .63, and masculinity = -.03, t(26) = .14, p = 
.89, judgements of males.  However, the facilitation score significantly predicted 
likability ratings, such that the faster the response to males as powerful when their name 
appeared at the top, the less likable the male faces appeared to participants, = -.44, 
t(47) = -3.56, p < .01.  The facilitation to females as powerful when their name appeared 
at the top (FTF) did not predict any of the judgements: warmth, = -.11, t(47) = -.11, p 
= .47, competence, = -.44, t(26) = -2.47, p = .02, femininity,= -.17, t(45) = -1.12, p 
= .27, and likability,= -.17, t(47) = -1.19, p = .24.  
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Exploratory analysis.  Although the simulation scores did not seem to predict 
participants’ judgements of the simulated individuals, I also explored whether the 
proportion of choices (males-top/bottom; females-top/bottom) in two conditions 
(powerful versus powerless) would be related to such responses.  As mentioned before, 
in Study 11, I found that the mental representation of power involved spatial features 
whenever participants indicated males or females as powerful.  Therefore, for each 
participant, I calculated how likely they were to pick each possibility (males at the 
top/bottom and females at the top/bottom) out of four possible choices within the 
powerful/powerless condition.  Therefore, if they were equally likely to pick each one 
of them, the likelihood of their choice would be 25% for each category.  
First, in the powerful condition, I found that the higher likelihood of choosing 
females as powerful at the top was negatively associated with femininity judgements, 
specifically, participants considered them as less feminine, r(28) = -.45, p < .02.  This 
negative correlation was specific to the top position, as no such relationship was found 
between the femininity judgements and the likelihood of categorising females as 
powerful at the bottom, r(26) = -.22, p < .29. 
 Second, in the powerless condition, I found that higher likelihood of choosing 
females as powerless at the bottom was positively associated with warmth judgements, 
r(22) = .54, p < .01.  This was not specific to the position, as the same applied to 
females as powerless chosen at the top, r(21) = .49, p < .03. 
 Third, in the case of male targets selected as powerless, there was a negative 
association between the likelihood of choosing them at the bottom and their perceived 
competence, r(22) = -.45, p < .04, and masculinity, r(22) = -51, p < .02. Specifically, 
the higher the tendency to select males as powerless at the bottom, the lower their rated 
competence and masculinity.  These findings were also specific to the bottom position, 
as other correlations were not significant, ps > .14. 
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Summary of results 
In the present chapter, I aimed at investigating whether vertical presentation of 
gendered names would have an impact on people’s stereotypic perceptions of gender.  
In Study 13, I supported my hypothesis by indicating that in general males are 
considered to be bigger than they are in reality in comparison to females.  Importantly, I 
found that males presented at the top primed less size underestimation of both male and 
female names than when no priming occurred.  Also, males-top primed marginally 
higher overestimations of both types of names than females-top priming.  Overall, I 
demonstrate that presenting a stereotypically-consistent person at the top biases 
people’s perception of physical size, such that top position correlates with perceptions 
of larger size.    
As Study 13 demonstrated that verticality biases concrete perceptions of 
gendered individuals in terms of their physical size, I designed Study 14 to see whether 
verticality can also bias abstract stereotypic judgements.  First, I explored whether 
spatial simulations might bias participants’ judgements about the simulated individuals 
in terms of two basic dimensions of stereotypes, warmth and competence, as well as 
likability and femininity for female individuals and masculinity for male ones.  I also 
tested whether presenting pictures instead of gendered names would be associated with 
stronger spatial simulations due to enhanced vividness of pictures.  My predictions were 
partly supported.  As hypothesised, I detected spatial simulations of male and female 
faces as powerful at the top versus bottom.  However, participants were not faster at 
categorising male faces as powerful when they appeared at the top, as opposed to 
categorising female faces as powerful in the same location.  Again, no spatial 
associations emerged when participants categorised individuals as powerless when their 
faces appeared at the top and at the bottom.   
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In terms of participants’ stereotypic judgements, overall, the simulation scores to 
males and females as powerless at the top did not predict competence and warmth 
judgements.  The same was true for femininity and masculinity.  However, participants 
who were quicker to detect the males as powerful at the top versus bottom, disliked 
those males more.  This may imply that participants might not accept the concrete 
spatial association of males as powerful at the top.   This could be attributed to a 
sample-specific effect – mainly female participants contributed to these results 
suggesting that they might have disliked considering males as powerful.  Subsequently, 
in my exploratory analysis, I found that participants’ ratings in the judgement task were 
associated with the likelihood of their choices of males/females in each location within 
the spatial task.  That is, the higher likelihood of indicating females as powerful at the 
top was associated with their lower femininity ratings.  Also, indicating them as 
powerless at the bottom or the top was associated with their higher perceived warmth.  
Finally, males as powerless indicated at the bottom, but not at the top, were judged as 
less competent and masculine.  In general, higher proportions of choosing females as 
powerless were associated with higher scores of warmth, which is consistent with SCM 
(Fiske et al., 2002). 
Overall, when people perceive a power difference between genders, spatial 
location indeed interacts with gender stereotypes.  The interaction involves reinforcing 
stereotype-consistent beliefs about warmth and competence.  However, it is essential to 
note that the association between spatial locations and stereotype-consistent thinking is 
only observed between the choices that participants make regarding the 
powerful/powerless individual in a specific location, but not the simulation of those 
individuals.  That is, the speed with which people process stereotype-consistent person 
in a specific location does not predict subsequent stereotypic judgements.  It is rather 
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the outcome of the processing, i.e., the judgement, that people make about power and 
location that correlates with warmth and competence judgements. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
Overview 
 In the last chapter of my thesis, I integrate and discuss the findings obtained in 
14 experiments.  First, I outline the main aims of the present thesis that involved 
investigating (a) the presence of spatial simulations in the mental representation of 
gender stereotypes in the context of social power; (b) whether spatial simulations 
depend on the power-context and stereotype accessibility, and (c) consequences of 
spatial simulations for gender perceptions.  Then, I summarise my results and discuss 
the findings of each set of studies presented in empirical chapters.  I subsequently 
present limitations and alternative theoretical perspectives.  Finally, in the concluding 
section, I integrate my main findings suggesting that sensorimotor spatial simulations 
are present in the mental representation of gender via perceptions of power. 
 
 The main aim of my thesis was to investigate whether abstract reasoning about 
social categories involved sensorimotor spatial simulations, moderated by stereotypic 
thinking.  Specifically, I wanted to examine the precise representational features 
associated with gender stereotypes in relation to two theoretical perspectives on 
cognitive processing - grounded cognition and conceptual blending.  Overall, across 14 
experiments, I show that the mental representation of gender-power stereotypes is 
associated with sensorimotor simulations only when people select stereotype-consistent 
stimuli (males as powerful).  Participants spatially simulated male names opposed to 
female names when the names appeared at the top versus the bottom only when they 
categorised them as powerful.  When stereotype-inconsistent categorisations were made 
(females-powerful), no such effects occurred, except for when participants were making 
judgements about pictures of male and female faces rather than names (Study 14).  The 
effects were not present in the case of thinking about powerless individuals.  These 
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findings were based on reaction-time methodology, but were further replicated using 
pupillometry.  This method revealed that making judgements about metaphorically 
incongruent as compared to congruent concepts (powerful-males-bottom; powerful-
bottom) involved increased cognitive conflict and effort as indexed by increased pupil 
size. 
Subsequently, I found that spatial congruency effects are dependent on task 
features.  Spatial simulations only occurred in semantically meaningful contexts, and 
gender was only spatially simulated when males and females were compared against 
each other.  Also, gender per se, when categorised without the power context, was not 
simulated vertically, suggesting that verticality cues are not enough to elicit power-
related spatial simulations (Study 10).  Interestingly, however, I found that overall 
spatial cues were in fact associated with the type of response participants made.  This 
happened only in Study 9, where participants categorised just gendered names (i.e., not 
paired with professions as in Study 8).  This was because participants tended to select 
all names (both male and female) as powerful more often at the top versus bottom and 
vice versa when choosing them as powerless.  This was most pronounced in the case of 
categorising males, but not females.  These choices were not associated with faster 
reaction times. 
Furthermore, I found that both the spatial simulations (associated with the time 
of responding) and the type of power categorisations people make (associated with the 
outcome of processing) do not depend on the level of stereotype activation.  Priming 
participants with powerful-females/powerless-males did not involve spatial simulations 
of females at the top or reduced simulations of males at the top.  That said, these results 
were based on an underpowered study that also failed to replicate the general powerful-
males-top effects.  Therefore, these results should be treated with caution.  Moreover, 
restricting decision-making time was associated with fewer stereotype-consistent 
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choices.  However, such restriction did not moderate space-power associations in the 
type of categorisations.  Taken together, these findings suggest that the type of decisions 
people make about power involves stable space power associations.  It is more likely 
that stereotype activation impacts spatial simulations, which are associated with the 
duration of processing.  This is because in Studies 1 – 7, simulation was observed when 
a stereotype-consistent judgement was made (i.e., males as powerful).  Such findings 
are in line with the conceptual blending framework as they suggest that combining a 
concept that has sensorimotor features (i.e., power and verticality associations) with a 
conceptually consistent stimulus (gender linked with power via stereotypes), should 
lead to a spatial simulation of that stimulus (powerful-males-top bias). 
Finally, having knowledge about the reliability of spatial simulations in the 
context of gender-power associations, I investigated whether such simulations might 
influence perceptions of simulated individuals.  I observed that presenting a 
stereotypically fitting person at the top (i.e., powerful-males) was associated with less 
size underestimations of subsequently presented male and female names.  The extent of 
this effect was the highest when people were primed with male names positioned at the 
top of the screen, as opposed to female names at the top or when no priming occurred.  
Next, categorising female faces as powerful when they appeared at the top was 
associated with perceiving these faces as less feminine.  Similarly, when male names 
presented at the bottom were judged as powerless, the target was associated with lower 
perceived masculinity and competence.  These findings show that the type of response 
people make involves sensorimotor spatial features that seems to reinforce stereotype-
consistent judgements about represented individuals.  Below, I provide a detailed 
discussion of the studies presented in each empirical chapter.  The final conclusions of 
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each empirical chapter and an overall interpretation of my findings is presented at the 
end of the chapter.   
Stereotypic thinking involves spatial simulations - Chapter 2 
The studies presented in Chapter 2 were designed to test whether cognitive 
blending between power and gender is associated with spatial simulations, given that 
power can be applied to gender via socially-constructed stereotypic beliefs.  I explored 
whether the perception of gender in stereotypic ways would employ cognitive blending 
and therefore be associated with spatial simulations.  Overall, I found that conceptual 
integration of power and gender is present when participants perceive stereotype-fit 
between gender and the individual judged as powerful (i.e., males versus females).  I 
present evidence for spatial simulations when power level is judged in each trial by 
participants themselves, with respect to target concepts that are malleable in terms of 
power association (gendered names).  Thus, power is applied (and spatially simulated) 
for gender in a malleable and situation-dependent fashion that depends on whether 
stereotypic thinking takes place or not in a given context, that is, for a given stimulus 
combination in my task.  
My results indicate that participants were marginally faster to make decisions 
about the socially powerful or powerless person when the male name appeared on the 
top of the screen compared to when the female name appeared on the top of the screen.  
Further, there was a marginal effect of gender choice, as participants were marginally 
quicker to categorise male than female names.  Also, male names were chosen 
significantly faster on males-top trials versus females-top trials.  These findings indicate 
a general tendency to respond faster when being presented with a male name located 
above a female name.  These tendencies were then moderated by task, as demonstrated 
by the three-way interaction.  Consistent with expectations, I found that participants 
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were significantly quicker at detecting males as powerful when their names appeared at 
the top as opposed to females as powerful at the top.  Further, this effect was associated 
specifically with vertical location, as males were categorised as powerful significantly 
faster when they appeared at the top than bottom.  The same pattern of results was not 
true for female names.  They were categorised as powerful equally fast at top and 
bottom.  No effects emerged in the case of selecting male and female names in the 
powerless condition.  
Additional support for the involvement of stereotypic processes in spatial 
simulations was found in relation to the proportion of stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent choices.  Participants were more likely to indicate stereotype-
consistent choices (e.g., males as powerful; females as powerless) than stereotype-
inconsistent ones.  They were also faster at doing so – participants were faster to detect 
males as opposed females as powerful.  However, the same was not observed for the 
powerless condition – participants were equally fast to categorise male and female 
names as powerless.  Overall, these findings suggest that when people think about 
power in the context of specific social categories such as gender, they are more likely to 
apply the concept of power in stereotype-consistent ways, which is then associated with 
spatial simulations.  However, this is pronounced only in the case of thinking about 
gender in terms of power, but not the lack thereof. 
However, the tendency to make stereotype-consistent choices does not preclude 
the fact that sometimes participants also made stereotype-inconsistent choices.  I argue 
that such choices would be affected by contextual processes such as vertical cues (top 
stimuli would receive an advantage over bottom stimuli) and participants’ knowledge 
concerning power associated with individual gendered names.  Wilder (1981) suggested 
that stereotyping is more likely to take place when people make judgements about entire 
groups rather than an individual.  That is, individuation should reduce stereotypic 
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thinking (see Ambady, Paik, Steele, Owne-Smith, & Mitchell, 2004, for empirical 
evidence).  Hence, it is possible that perceiving specific gendered names might act as an 
individuation.  Further, the literature indicates that the stereotype activation and 
application might depend on specific goals or the motivation to avoid prejudice (Kunda 
& Spencer, 2003).  It is possible that some participants might have been motivated to 
avoid prejudice, which reduced the accessibility and application of a gender stereotype 
to their power judgement. 
I did not find spatial simulations in the case of thinking about males as 
powerless, and females as powerful and powerless.  This suggests that the simulation of 
a specific social category takes place only when participants think about it as being 
powerful, but not powerless.  Although the pattern of participants’ response latencies 
was consistent with my predictions (when the name at the bottom of the screen was 
selected as powerless, the response time was faster when it was a female name 
compared to a male name), the post hoc comparisons showed that the differences in RTs 
between responses as a function of verticality were not significant.  These findings do 
not converge with Schubert’s (2005) results, who found spatial simulations of powerless 
groups at the bottom.  However, it is worth noting that Schubert’s data were obtained in 
the context of highly-defined social groups in terms of power (master versus servant), 
whereas I used more malleable social categories, which might, per se, not be as clearly 
associated with high or low levels of power. 
There are a number of plausible explanations for the lack of spatial simulations 
of females as powerless.  First, extant research has demonstrated that spatial effects are 
usually more pronounced for linguistically unmarked concepts (e.g., powerful) than for 
marked ones (e.g., powerless).  This is in line with the idea that unmarked concepts are 
processed faster than marked concepts due to familiarity, evaluative implications, and 
higher linguistic frequency (Hamilton & Deese, 1971; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Meier, 
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Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007; Proctor & Cho, 2006; Schubert, 2005; 
von Hecker et al., 2016).32  Second, it is worth noting that Schubert (2005) also found 
weaker effects in spatial simulations of powerless individuals relative to powerful 
individuals (see also Meier & Robinson, 2004; von Hecker et al. 2016).   
In addition, research suggests that people are significantly slower when they 
make lexical decisions about negative words than positive words (see Estes & Adelman, 
2008, for an overview).  On the one hand, the effects found in my studies could be 
attributed partially to the valence, given that in general powerless groups were 
considered more negative.  Although I did not test whether presentation of 
powerful/powerless genders (e.g., presenting gendered names paired with high/low 
status professions) would result in differently valenced ratings, Schubert (2005) found 
that his participants considered powerful/powerless groups as equally positive.  
Therefore, it is unlikely that thinking about powerless involved negative valence that 
affected decision times.  Taken together, it seems that the powerless-bottom association 
may be less salient or accessible in cognition than the powerful-top association, but 
such differences are independent of valence. 
Spatial simulations and implicit attitudes 
In terms of the attitudes towards high-status males/females, participants had a 
tendency to associate males with high status and these associations were not related to 
spatial simulations of either males or females.  Turning to the rationality/emotionality 
and gender IAT, consistent with my hypothesis participants held associations between 
males and rationality, but not between females and rationality.  Such associations were 
not related to spatial simulations of either males or females.  In contrast, the same was 
not true for top-rationality associations (inconsistent with Cian et al., 2015).  Although 
                                                 
32 Linguistically marked concepts refer only to themselves (i.e., sad), whilst unmarked concepts refer to 
the dimension as a whole (e.g., happy; Proctor & Cho, 2006) 
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on average, participants did not exhibit response latency facilitation to top-rationality 
items as opposed to top-emotionality items, I found that those who had a tendency to 
associate top locations with rationality were also faster to categorise males as powerful 
at the top in contrast to females as powerful in the same location.  These findings 
suggest that having a more pronounced concrete representation of abstract categories (in 
this case rationality), involved facilitation to simulate males as powerful when they 
appeared at the top.  However, as these results did not replicate in terms of social-status-
males and rationality-males associations, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about 
these findings.  
The independence of spatial simulations and implicit attitudes might be 
attributed to the nature of the tasks I used to assess them.  The spatial task required a 
certain degree of control in making a judgement – participants needed to explicitly think 
about powerful/powerless individuals when making a response in each trial.  On the 
other hand, the IATs do not rely on any form of explicit thought, as in these tests, 
participants are required to quickly sort words into categories without engaging into a 
more deliberative thought.  Hence, the differences in automaticity needed in performing 
each task could have obscured any potential associations between attitudes and spatial 
simulations.   
Overall, it appears that spatial simulations of gender and power are independent 
of implicit attitudes. Yet, top-rationality association seemed to be related to response 
facilitation to males as powerful at the top as opposed to females, suggesting that more 
concrete associations between abstract thinking and verticality are associated with more 
pronounced spatial simulations of stereotype-consistent individuals. 
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Spatial simulations are moderated by context 
I detected spatial simulations only in the context of thinking about males as 
powerful, but not females as powerless.  Indeed, previous literature indicates that spatial 
simulations are not consistently detected across all contexts (e.g., Borghi, Glenberg, & 
Kaschak, 2004; Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Lebois et al., 2015).  My findings extend 
this perspective in a novel and important way by suggesting that an application of the 
power concept to social groups, and especially stereotypic associations about those 
groups (males-powerful), enhances the activation of spatial features of the grounded 
concept of power.  This is based on the extent to which individuals hold an association 
between male and power which, as a general tendency, is implied by my finding that 
participants selected males as powerful more often than females.  That is, the male-
power link tends to be salient and guides participants’ responses in the context of the 
choice task (see also Rudman & Kilianski, 2000).  At the same time, the stereotypic 
associations do not always trigger spatial simulations, as participants did not simulate 
females as powerless at the bottom – even though their response pattern indicated a 
slight advantage (however, not significant one) at choosing females as powerless at the 
bottom as compared to males as powerless at bottom. 
In relation to my previous arguments, I would like to note that my spatial 
reaction-time test was a forced-choice task in which participants were required to 
provide a response, even in situations when they might not have found either of the two 
individuals particularly powerful/powerless.  Hence, random fluctuations in the salience 
of the stereotype might have taken place during the experiment across trials.  The 
random fluctuations argument finds support in a recent review article on temporal 
instability of implicit biases.  Payne, Vuletich, and Lundberg (2017) argue that 
situational factors rather than stable individual attitudes are more likely to determine the 
accessibility of stereotype-consistent content in people’s minds that lead to stereotype-
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consistent responses (see Müller & Rothermund, 2004, for empirical evidence).  Such 
reasoning seems logical in the context of research showing low test-retest correlations 
in individual levels of implicit prejudice in longitudinal studies (see Gawronski, 
Morrison, Phills, & Galdi, 2017).  Also, social categories in cognition are typically 
abstract and may subsume variable sets of exemplars.  Therefore, the context of 
thinking might affect accessibility of concepts and exemplars, and might be more 
important in determining which associations will be retrieved when making a particular 
judgment (Medin, 1989).  Under such conditions, the context of my task possibly 
stimulated participants, in some trials, to activate the power concept in a counter-
stereotypic situation (i.e., considering females as powerful), such that the spatial 
features of power, in such trials, may then have suggested a top-position for the female. 
These suggestions are also consistent with research on multiple categorisations 
and goals activation during stereotypic judgements.  The use of the gender stereotype 
might not be always consistent with participants’ goals in a particular situation (e.g., 
comprehension of the situation has been achieved and participants are motivated to 
avoid prejudice; Kunda & Spencer, 2003).  Also, when an alternative categorisation is 
available, participants would be more likely to inhibit the stereotype and therefore make 
a stereotype-inconsistent judgement (Hall and Crisp, 2005).  The choice of the 
alternative categorisations could be further dependent on self-enhancement goals.  
Because the majority of my participants were female, it is possible that such counter-
stereotypic responses were also associated with a motivation to demonstrate that 
females can also be powerful.  Overall, I speculate that the mapping of abstract concepts 
onto the concrete dimension of space is particularly likely under situational factors that 
engender a high (stereotypical) consistency between the concepts involved.   
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However, because context was not directly manipulated in the presented studies 
(1 - 6), it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about contextual effects on spatial 
simulations.  I address these issues in the next sections of the present chapter. 
Also, it is worth noting that all of my studies are based mainly on samples of 
female participants.  As noted earlier, the samples were representative of their 
participant panels.  Previous research has indicated that females have equally negative 
implicit attitudes towards powerful women as males, but they are less explicitly 
prejudiced against females as powerful than males (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; 
Rudman et al., 2012; Rudman, & Phelan, 2010).  Although I strongly believe that 
spatial simulation in cognitive blending is likely to be a general phenomenon across 
gender (and it appears that it is independent of people’s implicit attitudes, as found in 
my studies), it would be important to experimentally test whether males and females 
exhibit differential spatial simulations of males as powerful and females at the top 
directly. 
Finally, I would like to note that the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2 are based 
on an integrative analysis across six experiments.  As not all individual studies (see 
Appendix 6) achieved standard significance levels, it is important to acknowledge that 
while testing the same hypothesis across several studies, it is unlikely that each of the 
studies would support that prediction (see Lakens & Etz, 2017).  Therefore, an 
integrative analysis provides more reliable results (Lakens & Etz, 2017).  At the same 
time, the results obtained across six experiments were associated with small effect sizes.  
The indirect nature of the methodology used to identify spatial processes could be 
responsible for such small effect sizes, which were also found in other studies 
investigating spatial congruency effects (Schubert, 2005; von Hecker et al. 2013, 2016).  
Therefore, it is important to conduct more research on spatial congruency effects to 
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establish that despite the small effect sizes, sensorimotor involvement in abstract 
thinking is a reliable process. 
An eye-opening measure of stereotyping - Chapter 3 
 In Chapter 3, I sought to replicate my previous findings by incorporating a 
pupillometry measure.  My main motivation to use such method was to replicate 
previous findings with a physiological technique.  This can be achieved with pupil size 
measure that can be used as a proxy of experiencing surprise and also cognitive load.  
First, I wanted to examine whether the mere presentation of gender in incongruent 
spatial positions (males-bottom; females-top) would be associated with initially 
increased arousal due to experience of surprise.  Second, I wanted to test whether such 
cognitive conflict and a subsequent attempt to control the automatically activated 
stereotype of males as powerful would also involve increased cognitive effort after 
people had made the response. To address the above issues, I first investigated whether 
differences in pupil size can be used to detect the basic associations between groups 
with clear power implications and spatial positions by replicating Schubert’s (2005) 
work.  Second, I investigated whether this method could be also applied to an 
investigation of the mental representation of gender stereotypes. 
Schubert block 
Overall, consistent with my hypothesis, I found that across the whole trial 
period, participants exhibited increased pupil size on trials where they were presented 
with powerful groups at the bottom as opposed to the top.  Such findings suggest that 
participants experienced a higher cognitive conflict when they needed to process 
powerful groups at the bottom.  In the post-response period, I found that this difference 
was significant immediately after participants made their responses (i.e., in the period 
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from 1379ms to 2000ms).  The differences most likely reflect increased cognitive effort 
(see Kahneman & Beatty, 1966).   
The response-locked pupil dilation is consistently observed in studies employing 
cognitive-conflict paradigms such as Stroop task or flanker task (Geva et al., 2013; 
Laeng et al., 2011) demonstrating the pupil dilation peaks on incongruent trials.  It is 
proposed that such peak dilations reflect inhibition of distractors or attempts to control 
the spontaneous response tendencies, background noise, and response evaluation 
(Laeng, et al., 2011; van Steenbergen & Band, 2013).  In general, such dilations can be 
attributed to increased cognitive effort on incongruent versus congruent trials (van der 
Wel & Steenbergen, 2018).  Therefore, as demonstrated in my study, the power-bottom 
incongruence also involves increased pupil dilation that occurs after participants 
decided that the powerful group was presented at the bottom.   
 Further, the literature on pupillary correlates of cognitive effort (Geva et al., 
2013, Laeng et al., 2011; van der Wel & Steenbergen, 2018) suggests that the 
differences in pupil sizes across congruent and incongruent trials are mostly observed 
after participants make responses.  This is because when the decision is executed, the 
LC-NE system is activated in the phasic mode, which is one of the firing modes of LC 
neurons associated with behavioural exploitation (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005).  The 
phasic LC firing is involved in task engagement (as opposed to the tonic mode 
associated with exploration or seeking alternatives).  Further, task-engagement 
associated with LC-NE phasic activity is proposed to facilitate decision-making and 
ensure that the chances of completing the task successfully are optimised.  However, my 
results also indicate that there was a significant difference in participants’ pupil size 
between trials where powerful groups were presented at the bottom versus top in the 
pre-response period.  Similarly, I observed increased pupil size on trials where 
participants were presented with powerful groups at the bottom versus top at 750ms 
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time stamp.  Therefore, it is likely that these differences can be attributed to initial 
perception of inconsistent information and cognitive conflict.  Such an explanation of 
my findings is in line with research indicating that early surprise evoked by error 
prediction, unconscious perception of anomalous playing cards or modified faces (i.e., 
Thatcherised faces), correlates with increased pupil dilation (Preuschoff et al., 2011; 
Proulx et al., 2017; Sleegers et al., 2015).  In addition, Smallwood et al. (2011) reported 
that pupil dilation is higher in the pre-response period on trials where participants give 
an incorrect response to a working-memory task.  In their task, participants were 
presented with numbers and were supposed to indicate whether the numbers were even 
or odd.  In contrast, in the Schubert block, I observed such differences when participants 
answered correctly, that is, when they indicated powerful groups at the bottom.  Such 
findings suggest that the incongruent spatial location was involved in the increased 
pupil dilation in my study.  Yet, when Laeng et al. (2011) investigated pupillary 
responses in Stroop task trials, they noted that pupil size was increased at pre-response 
periods, however, this dilation occurred to the same extent across congruent and 
incongruent trials.  The only differences in pupil dilation were observed later in the 
post-response period.  In principle, both Stroop and Schubert blocks should reflect 
initial cognitive conflict reflected in pupil dilation, but it is essential to note that the 
tasks are qualitatively different from each other and might employ different cognitive 
processes.  Schubert block responses are based on social knowledge rather than 
inherently true or false answers like naming colours. 
 To conclude, the most likely explanation for increased pupil size in the pre- and 
post-response period in my replication of Schubert’s task is that cognitive conflict and 
load, respectively, were higher when participants needed to make a judgement about 
powerful groups presented in the incongruent spatial positions.  It is also plausible that 
in general, the initial increase in pupil size on incongruent trials (powerful-bottom) was 
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associated with cognitive conflict that in turn involved higher cognitive effort in 
decision-making. 
Gender block   
Consistent with my hypotheses, I found that participants’ pupil size was 
associated with an interaction between gender choice and trial type.  Within the whole 
response period, I observed increased pupil size on trials when males were selected as 
powerful at the bottom as opposed to the top - supporting my findings from my 
previous studies and the Schubert block.  The same results were obtained when the post-
response period was analysed separately. 
Second, as hypothesised, participants did not experience higher cognitive effort 
when selecting females as powerful when their names appeared at the top or bottom.  
Overall, such findings corroborate my reaction-time data obtained in Studies 1 – 6.  
These studies demonstrated spatial simulations of males as powerful only.  In particular, 
in the present study, the pupil size data indicate higher cognitive effort associated with 
processing of and choosing males names at the bottom while selecting the powerful 
person between two gendered names available.  These findings therefore suggest that 
attributing the concept of power to stereotype-consistent stimuli is associated with 
spatial simulations.  That is, the mental representation associated with stereotypic 
thinking is more concrete.   
Third, when analysing the entire-trial period, I found that participants exhibited 
marginally higher pupil dilation when they selected female names when they appeared 
at the top as opposed to male names at the top.  Again, this difference supports my 
hypotheses and previous findings from Studies 1 – 6, suggesting higher cognitive effort 
when processing stereotype-inconsistent stimuli at the top (i.e., powerful-females).  
These findings are interesting, as it appears that choices of stereotype-consistent 
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(powerful-males) and –inconsistent (powerful-females) targets per se do not involve 
higher pupil dilation.  Instead, mental effort observed in my study was specifically 
associated with spatial location interacting with stereotypic thinking. 
My analyses of the pre-response period suggest that participants experienced 
surprise when they were presented with trials on which female names appeared at the 
top and male names at the bottom.  This is because they demonstrated increased pupil 
size when presented with trials where female names appeared at the top as opposed to 
male names in the same location and such pupil size dilation was independent of 
participants’ response later on within the trial.  The results are in line with the findings 
obtained in the Schubert block showing that participants also experienced increased 
pupil size in the pre-response period on trials presenting powerful groups at the bottom 
as opposed to the top.  Interestingly, such differences were noticed at 750ms in both 
blocks.  Because the differences were independent of participants’ later decisions about 
males as powerful or females in the gender block, it appears that higher arousal 
associated with observing female names presented at the top (in the context of looking 
for a powerful person) was associated with increased cognitive conflict.  Such cognitive 
conflict seemed to be then responsible for the increased pupil size in the early period of 
the trial (Lin et al., 2018; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Proulx et al., 2017; Sleegers et al., 
2015). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the findings of the marginal difference 
observed in pupil size between choices of females as powerful at the top as opposed to 
males as powerful at the top were not replicated when post-response period was 
analysed separately.  This is surprising because processing of inconsistent information 
that requires inhibition of the interfering distractor should be associated with LC-NE 
phasic activity and therefore especially increased pupil size (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005; Geva et al., 2013; Laeng et al., 2011).  It is possible that the general increase in 
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arousal in the entire trial within my study was primarily driven by the initial cognitive 
conflict of perceiving females at the top while tasked with selecting the powerful 
person.  Such results could be also attributed to the fact that participants could not 
compare both males and females at the top within the same trial.  Therefore, processing 
of females at the top would be mainly associated with distinguishing them from males 
at the bottom. 
In fact, my additional analyses of differences between choices of males and 
females in different trial types indicated that participants exhibited marginally higher 
cognitive load on trials when they picked female names as powerful at the top as 
opposed to male names at the bottom.  Interestingly, the increased pupil size to the 
presentation of female names at the top at 500ms, but not 750ms, was marginally 
associated with later categorisations of those females as powerful.  Further, it can be 
speculated that the increased pupil size at this early stage, which was most likely 
associated with aversive unconscious arousal to an inconsistent stimulus (females at the 
top), stimulated participants to engage in compensatory behaviours and hence counter-
stereotypic choice.   Such findings are in line with suggestions by Proulx, Inzlicht, and 
Harmon-Jones (2012), who argue that aversive arousal associated with unexpected 
stimuli is compensated by either accommodation or assimilation of counter-attitudinal 
or stereotypic information.  However, these results are marginal and they do not imply 
any causal link between increased pupil size and later categorisations of female names 
as powerful at the top.  Therefore, these suggestions should be treated with caution. 
Dependency of spatial simulations on task features - Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I considered the precise mechanisms that were likely driving 
spatial simulations detected in Chapters 2 and 3.  First, I designed Studies 8 and 9 in 
order to test whether verticality cues per se, that is, the spatial location (top or bottom) 
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of stimuli, would lead to a response facilitation when people make a judgement about 
power differences, regardless of the semantics of the stimuli presented.  Specifically, I 
investigated whether verticality-power associations are always present within spatial 
simulations.  That is, I examined whether any concept could be associated or blended 
with power and whether such blending would involve spatial simulations (see Schubert, 
2005).  To achieve this, I asked participants to quickly detect either the powerful or 
powerless person on the screen between two female or two male names.  In this way, 
males and females were not directly compared in each judgement.  
Second, while in Studies 8 and 9, I explored the independent role of verticality 
cues when participants did not directly compare power differences between males and 
females, in Study 10, I aimed at investigating if gender per se can be spatially simulated 
when the power context is not salient.  To test that, I asked participants to quickly 
identify whether a vertically presented name (top versus bottom) was either male or 
female. 
The findings from Study 8 indicate that spatial locations, power, and gender 
stereotypes are not associated when participants compare either pairs of female or male 
names, even when they are matched with high social-status professions.  This indicates 
that verticality cues per se do not play a role in facilitating participants’ judgements.  
Therefore, verticality cues are not sufficient to evoke spatial simulations of power in the 
absence of strong power differences between compared individuals.  Further, I found a 
facilitation to the powerful condition.  Participants were faster at categorising male and 
female names as powerful versus powerless.  Such findings are in line with Schubert’s 
(2005) results that also indicated a processing advantage to the powerful condition.  
Therefore, these findings might suggest that in the absence of salient stereotypic 
associations, the linguistic markedness of the word powerful results in a significant 
processing advantage (Hamilton & Deese, 1971).   
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Finally, I found that there was a higher marginal tendency to select top positions 
than bottom ones when presented with both male and female name pairs.  However, 
such results were true for participants selecting powerful and powerless names.  It is 
likely that the reading habit (from the top to the bottom) was responsible for such 
effects. 
Further, in contrast to Study 8, where I presented just gendered names, in Study 
9, I found a facilitation of response times to female targets versus male targets.  This 
was unexpected, as across all previous studies, I did not detect consistent effects of 
gender per se on response times.  However, it is likely that such findings are associated 
with in-group effects – most participants were female, so it is possible that they 
responded faster to the names associated with their own gender.  In addition, I also 
found that participants were significantly faster to select female names as powerless as 
opposed to male names as powerless.  It is difficult to draw strong conclusions on the 
basis of these findings, as no complementary effects were detected in the powerful 
condition.  In terms of proportions of choices, participants were more likely to pick 
names as powerful at the top and as powerless at the bottom, which is in line with the 
majority of my previous studies.  Yet, this effect was moderated by gender block.  
Powerful-top and powerless-bottom associations were only present in the case of male 
targets and not the female ones.  Therefore, it appears that verticality cues guided 
participants’ types of responses. 
To summarise, across Studies 8 and 9, I found that when a power context is not 
made salient, spatial cues do not have an effect on response latencies when participants 
make judgements about power.  Similarly, in Study 8, I found that both male and female 
targets were categorised faster in the powerful condition compared to the powerless one 
in both spatial locations.  Therefore, there was a general processing advantage when 
participants selected powerful individuals as opposed to powerless one, and so this 
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seems to be independent of spatial locations.  Furthermore, such findings were not 
replicated in Study 9 and this is probably because participants were presented just with 
gendered names and without high-status professions.  This is because high-status 
professions provided more a power-relevant context in contrast to a sole presentation of 
names.   Overall, the results point to the idea that attributing social power in a power-
relevant context is associated with spatial correlates.  Yet, when the context is 
ambiguous (social status or gender stereotype are not made salient), people do not 
experience a processing advantage while selecting individuals at the top or at the 
bottom. 
Nevertheless, across two studies, I found consistent evidence for spatial 
correlates in the gender-power mental representation in terms of the frequency with 
which participants selected males/females at the top/bottom as powerful or powerless.  
Although there was an overall tendency to pick the top names as powerful and the 
bottom name as powerless, when gendered blocks were analysed separately, 
participants were more likely to pick male targets as powerful at the top versus bottom 
(and vice versa for the powerless), however, this was not the case for female targets.  
Such results are partially consistent with my previous studies (1 - 7), suggesting that 
spatial features of power are activated only in stereotype-consistent categorisations, 
specifically, males as powerful.  However, I also observed a higher tendency to pick 
males as powerless at the bottom versus the top, suggesting that concrete thinking about 
both powerful and powerless individuals is associated more with representing male, but 
not female targets. 
Altogether, it seems that comparing power differences between the same gender 
names (females-females/males-males) does not involve spatial simulations, as reflected 
in the lack of response facilitation.  However, the likelihood with which people 
categorise male, but not female, names as powerful and powerless involves verticality 
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cues regardless of stereotype-fit.  This occurs even when participants do not directly 
compare power differences between male and female individuals. 
Turning to Study 10, I found that semantics of gender are not directly associated 
with the vertical spatial dimension.  The results suggest that mapping of gender onto the 
vertical dimension involves complex associations between semantics of gender, spatial 
locations, and finally stereotypic associations.  Therefore, to be simulated in space, 
gender requires a meaningful power context that could facilitate its spatial mapping.  
That is, only when power is blended with gender in the power-relevant context, spatial 
features of power are activated.  It is likely that such process is then associated with 
simulating gender on the vertical dimension.   
The results from Study 10 also showed that the interaction between vertical 
position and response mode was not significant contradicting the polarity 
correspondence theory (see Proctor and Cho, 2015, for an overview).  Weeks and 
Proctor (1990) demonstrated that people respond faster to a stimulus presented at the 
top with a right key, such as L, and a stimulus presented at the bottom with a left key, 
such as A.  This is because up and right spatial locations linguistically represent an 
unmarked end of the dimension, so they are +coded (i.e., they have a positive polarity) 
in contrast to bottom and left locations that are -coded (i.e., they represent a negative 
polarity).  Finally, if polarities of spatial locations of stimuli are matched with the 
polarities of the response mode, then a facilitation in reaction-times to such stimuli 
would occur.  This was not supported by my data. 
Spatial simulations and stereotype accessibility - Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5, across two studies, I explored the role of stereotype activation in 
the mental representation of power and gender on the vertical dimension.  Consistent 
with my hypotheses, in Study 11, I found that gender has power implications and these 
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implications are more pronounced when people are given more processing time.  When 
determining the powerful person between opposite gender names, participants picked 
males as powerful more often than females.  This effect was especially prominent in the 
long condition (2000ms to respond) compared to the short one (600ms).  I also 
demonstrate that both male and female names were selected as powerful more often at 
the top than at the bottom and this effect was equal for both genders, even though males 
are more associated with power than females.  Such findings show that stereotypes do 
not moderate top-power associations. 
Integrating the presented findings with the results from my previous studies, it 
appears that stereotype-consistent thinking is only essential in spatial simulations.  That 
is, stereotype activation seems to be associated with the duration with each people 
process or think about certain concepts.  At the same time, stereotype activation 
becomes irrelevant when it comes to the outcomes of participants’ judgements.  That is, 
in the current study, in which participants did not give speeded judgements, verticality 
cues guided their responses regardless of whether the chosen individuals conformed to 
the gender stereotype or not.  It is likely that spatial simulations interact with stereotype 
activation only when people need to decide as fast as possible which person was 
powerful, but not in other circumstances. 
Finally, in Study 12, I did not detect any of the hypothesised effects.  The study 
was underpowered (only .10 of power was achieved) due to a small sample size – also 
some participants needed to be removed from the analysis, as they knew the purpose of 
the study or were aware of the powerful-females/powerless-males pairings.  Therefore, 
it is difficult to draw strong conclusions on the basis of that study.  So far, the results 
indicate that priming powerful-females and powerless-males does not have implications 
for how often people select male and female names as powerful.  In this study, I also did 
not replicate spatial simulation effects (a facilitation to selecting male, as opposed to 
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female names as powerful when they appeared at the top; and selecting males as 
powerful faster when they were presented at the top versus bottom). 
According to grounded cognition theory, abstract concepts like power are 
grounded in sensorimotor experiences, and their cognitive representations involve 
properties derived from these experiences (Barsalou, 1999).  The literature clearly 
indicates that power is associated with the vertical spatial dimension (Schubert, 2005).  
In Study 11, I extended this line of inquiry by demonstrating that the spatial features of 
power are activated in the mental representation of gender, such that males and females 
considered as powerful are associated with the top vertical position.  These findings are 
in line with Schubert’s (2005) results, further indicating that in the meaningful power-
context, spatial features of power (top and bottom vertical positions) play a role in the 
mental representation of the concept that is attributed to power.  However, it is 
important to note that these findings are based on the frequency with which participants 
indicated each gender in each vertical position.  That is, participants’ choices, or in 
other words, the outcome of the decision-making was associated with upper positions.  I 
consider this process (associating verticality with power as demonstrated by the 
frequency of choices) as being not directly linked with spatial simulation.  This is 
because spatial simulation is an active process that could be captured by measuring the 
speed of processing, but not the outcome of the thought process.    
Further, I found that even though participants selected males as powerful more 
often than females (especially in the long condition), stereotype-fit (considering males 
as powerful) per se did not moderate the power-space associations – any name (male or 
female) picked as powerful involved a similar (and greater) tendency to choose them at 
the top versus bottom.  Hence, making a judgment about gender (which carries latent 
power implications) in an explicit power-related context activates spatial correlates of 
power leading to representations of that concept on the vertical dimension.    
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The impact of spatial vertical presentation on gender perceptions - Chapter 6 
In the last empirical chapter of my thesis, I aimed at investigating whether the 
previously detected spatial correlates in the mental representation of gender stereotypes 
might bias people’s perception of gender in stereotype-consistent ways.  Specifically, I 
wanted to examine whether the concrete spatial representation associated with mental 
representation of gender stereotypes might involve reinforcement of stereotype-
consistent judgements.  In two studies, I demonstrated that the vertical presentation of 
male and female targets can bias people’s subsequent perceptions of gender.  Study 13 
shows that vertical presentation in the context of gender stereotypes produces biased 
perception of size.  Study 14 further demonstrates that such biasing effect is not only 
confined to concrete judgements, but this effect extends to abstract judgements about 
warmth and competence. 
Overall, in Study 13, I found that people have a biased perception of gender in 
terms of physical size.  Participants tended to overestimate the size of male names as 
opposed to female names regardless of the condition.  I also found that when 
participants were primed with stereotypically-consistent persons (i.e., males) at the top 
(when a subtle power context was activated), they overestimated (underestimated less) 
the sizes of subsequently presented both male and female names.  This effect was the 
most pronounced in the case of males-top as opposed to females-top priming or control 
conditions.  In general, my findings indicate that the mental representation of power 
involves spatial features in the context of gender representations and such spatial 
features bias perceptions of physical size.  This effect is the most pronounced when 
priming people with the concept of males positioned at the top.  Therefore, it seems that 
the presentation of males on top has a spillover effect to the gender other than the most 
relevant one (i.e., males).  Future research should investigate whether such effects 
would be also extended to other social/non-social categories.  It is also worth noting that 
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the stimuli presented (i.e., males-top and females-top trials) in my task might not act as 
prime per se.  It is more likely that congruence between a mental simulation associated 
with the stimulus and the spatial arrangement of a stimulus presentation is responsible 
for the revealed effects (i.e., more overestimation in the males-top versus control 
condition).  Specifically, it is possible that the interaction of a stimulus (e.g., male 
names presented at the top) with its pre-existing mental representation (males are 
stereotypically more powerful than females and power is associated with upper spatial 
location) constitutes the prime.  However, this speculation needs further empirical 
support, as my data cannot indicate precisely what kind of mental representation was 
associated with the detected effects.   
According to grounded cognition, abstract concepts like power are grounded in 
sensorimotor experiences, and their cognitive representations involve properties derived 
from these experiences (Barsalou, 1999).  The literature clearly indicates that power is 
associated with the vertical spatial dimension (Schubert, 2005).  As males were seen as 
more powerful and metaphorically power correlates with physical size (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999; Schubert, 2005), in the present study I found that participants were more 
likely to overestimate the size of male names relative to female names, an effect that 
was consistent across conditions.  Interestingly, the presentation of male names at the 
top, without any explicit statement suggesting that males were powerful, primed 
perceptions of greater sizes of any subsequently presented stimuli.  This effect was 
present, but smaller, when female names were presented at the top.  The results suggest 
that the upper vertical presentation of a social group which has implicit power 
implications biases perceptions of physical sizes stimulating people to see subsequently 
presented category as bigger than it is in reality. 
While Study 13 presents evidence that location can bias size perception, in 
Study 14, I aimed at testing whether spatial simulations (quicker response to stereotype-
167 
 
consistent person in the congruent spatial location) would also bias stereotype-
consistent perceptions of gender in terms two stereotype dimensions associated with 
SCM, i.e., warmth and competence (Fiske et al., 2002).  First, by using pictures instead 
of gendered names, I detected spatial simulations of males as powerful and females at 
the top versus bottom.  This is in line with the findings from Study 11, which suggested 
that mental representations of power involve spatial features regardless of whether the 
power concept is attributed to male or female targets.  The results from Study 11, 
however, were only based on the outcomes of participants’ thought processes, that is, 
the frequency with which they chose each gender in each vertical position.  Recall, such 
choices are different to reaction times, e.g., the shorter the time to categorise males as 
powerful, the higher the ease to process such stimuli.  This distinction is important, as 
by simulation I refer to the processing time (hence the effort) with which participants 
make their decisions, whilst the outcome or choice indicates the type of judgement 
people made.  Therefore, the current findings indicating that both males and females are 
simulated at the top show that participants found it easier to process both genders as 
powerful at the top as opposed to the bottom.  This is not in line with my integrative 
analysis (Studies 1 - 6) and the pupillometry evidence from Study 7 that indicated 
processing advantage for males as powerful at the top, but not females.  However, it is 
important to note that when participants were presented with gendered names and 
professions in Study 3 only, they also showed evidence of spatial simulation of females 
as powerful at the top versus bottom.  The most plausible explanation for such findings 
is that in the present experiment, I used pictures as stimuli in contrast to gendered 
names.  It is possible that the vividness of participants’ associations between females 
and power was increased, which was related with increased salience of top vertical 
positions.  Increased salience of the vertical positions could be then associated with 
more readily accessible links between power and verticality resulting in representation 
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of females at the top.  In Study 3, such an effect could be attributed to the high-status 
professions that were presented with gendered names.  
In terms of the judgement task, participants tended to dislike males more when 
they simulated them spatially at the top.  This might demonstrate a rejection of the 
stereotype, especially given that my sample was mainly composed of female 
participants. Further, according to SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) people should perceive 
females as high on warmth and low on competence, whilst the opposite should be true 
for males.  I predicted that such perceptions should be especially reinforced by spatial 
location of simulated individuals.  These predictions were not supported by my data.   
Although the simulation scores were not associated with warmth and 
competence judgements, I found that the likelihood of categorising genders in different 
spatial locations was significantly correlated with perceived levels of warmth and 
competence.  Consistent with SCM, spatial correlates present in the mental 
representation of females as powerful were associated with lower femininity ratings of 
female targets.  Interestingly, this correlation was only true for choices of females at the 
top and not at the bottom.  Such findings are in line with the literature on ambivalent 
sexism and gender roles suggesting that femininity is stereotypically associated with 
warmth and lack of competence (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Rudman & Kilianksi, 2000; 
Rudman & Phelan, 2008).  Indeed, SCM points out that career women are perceived as 
competent, but not warm, as they do not conform to the traditional views of women of 
being warm and incompetent.  As the found association between femininity and females 
as powerful was specific only to the top positions, it seems that spatial location plays a 
role in reinforcing gender stereotypes.  Consistent with these findings, when males were 
picked as powerless, but only at the bottom, they were perceived as less masculine and 
competent.  Again, these results are in line with gender stereotypes, as stereotypically, 
masculinity is associated with competence and dominance.  The bottom spatial location 
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seems to reinforce such beliefs.  Finally, spatial location was not relevant to 
participants’ judgements when they categorised females as powerless, as they 
considered them as higher on warmth regardless of the indicated position.  Although 
these results are in line with SCM and suggest that spatial locations indeed reinforce 
stereotype consistent views, some of the predicted correlations were not detected.  For 
example, in principle, the likelihood of choosing males as powerful at the top should be 
associated with their higher competence and masculinity ratings.  Further studies should 
investigate under what circumstances such associations might emerge. 
Alternative theoretical interpretations 
I wish to argue that conceptual congruency effects (or spatial simulations in 
conceptual blending) were responsible for participants’ faster responses to males as 
powerful rather than females as powerful at the top in my initial studies (Barsalou, 
1999).  However, it is possible that other processes have contributed to my observed 
pattern of results.  Polarity correspondence theory (Proctor & Cho, 2006) postulates that 
some spatial facilitation effects occur because of the correspondence in polarities 
between concepts and people’s responses to those concepts.  That is, +polar (i.e., 
unmarked concepts) and -polar concepts (i.e., marked concepts) can be matched with 
+polar/-polar responses.  If the matching is congruent (e.g., +polar concepts are 
matched with +polar responses), then processing will be facilitated.  Therefore, this 
theory predicts that structural features of concepts in terms of polarity (i.e., linguistic 
markedness: powerful and top responses would be +polar; whilst powerless and bottom 
-polar) are enough to produce facilitations of responses to powerful individuals at the 
top and powerless at the bottom.  This prediction is partially supported in my studies – 
participants were quicker to detect males and females as powerful at the top of the 
screen.  On the other hand, I did not find significant processing advantages in the case 
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of participants’ responses to choices of males and females as powerless at the bottom, 
which polarity correspondence would predict.  In addition, it is not clear how gender 
should be coded in terms of polarity.  Therefore, spatial congruency effects of power 
interacting with linguistic markedness in the case of thinking about gender is a more 
plausible explanation for my findings.  Overall, the assumptions of polarity 
correspondence cannot fully account for my results (i.e., the role of stereotypic 
thinking).  Further research is necessary to address these theoretical issues. 
 
Limitations 
Spatial task 
I would like to point out that my findings are based on a quasi-experimental 
design in which gender choice was not manipulated per se, but was, as a variable, self-
generated by participants.  I firmly believe that this approach is important as it allows 
participants to generate their own responses about stereotypicality, rather than being 
constrained to make responses that would be correct or incorrect (as in Schubert, 2005).  
At any rate, my results suggest an association between stereotypic thinking and spatial 
simulation rather than a causal link.  As I argued earlier, spatial simulation is a process 
that likely underpins or supports thinking.  It is possible that concrete spatial reasoning 
about abstract concepts serves to facilitate judgments either by making people more 
subjectively confident about their decisions or by increasing the efficiency of their 
decision-making.  Yet, further empirical evidence is needed to elucidate such questions.  
In future research, a direct manipulation of stereotypic consistency could bring more 
insight into the potential causal link between thinking about gender and spatial 
processing. 
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 Another issue associated with the quasi-experimental design was that the 
number of trials on which participants indicated each of the choice categories (males as 
powerful/powerless and females as powerful/powerless at the top or bottom) could not 
be standardised.  That is, the trial number for each choice category was unequal.  
Although I found that the proportion of participants’ choices was unrelated to their 
reaction times, future studies should address this limitation by employing a more 
standardised paradigm. 
Participants 
I note that most of my participants were female.  This might have implications 
for interpreting the results.  On the one hand, females might perceive gender-power 
links differently than males, as traits of out-group members are usually seen as more 
homogenous (see Mason, 2006).  Also, my participants were more likely to respond in 
stereotype-consistent manner, especially when they had more time to think about the 
power concept in the context of gender.  This indicates that the relatively diminished 
cognitive load does not stimulate counter-stereotypic judgments, as females might be 
less motivated to appear less “prejudiced” (Fiske et al., 1999; Macrae et al., 1997).  On 
the other hand, a study based on a large dataset indicated that participants’ gender is 
only a minimal moderator of sexist beliefs, as sexism is best predicted by political 
attitudes (Roets, van Hiel, & Dhont, 2012).  Similarly, Rudman and Kilianski (2000) 
found that both males and females have equally negative implicit associations about 
females who have a high social status.  Overall, the evidence seems to indicate that 
people’s gender might not in fact moderate stereotypic associations or override learned 
social norms.  Yet, future research should investigate spatial simulations in the context 
of gender stereotypes using also mainly male participants. 
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Pupillometry 
It is also important to note that conclusions of Chapter 3 are based on an 
innovative measure of cognitive processing.  Pupillometry has not been widely used 
within social cognition.  Also, pupillary activity is an indirect measure of cognitive 
processes and LC-NE activity.  Therefore, my findings should be treated with caution, 
as we need more empirical evidence to support presented results.  Finally, raw pupil 
signal requires pre-processing.  The level of pre-processing that is needed, however, 
varies depending on the eye-tracker used and quality of the signal obtained.  Because of 
such variability, the techniques used to pre-process pupil signal vary across the 
literature (Cavanagh et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2018; Mathot et al., 2018).  Hence, the lack 
of consistency in cleaning pupil data may compromise our ability to compare the studies 
reported within the literature.  Nevertheless, as demonstrated by my data, the pre-
processing techniques might affect the significance of the tested differences.  On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that filtering/blink corrections/interpolations would 
qualitatively change the pattern of pupillary reactivity.  Also, in the case of Study 7, my 
pupil size data mapped onto my previous findings, suggesting that pupillometry can be 
indeed used to investigate cognitive processes in the context of social phenomena. 
Implications 
 Overall, my findings indicate that the perceptual symbol of space associated 
with sensorimotor experiences is present when people make stereotype-consistent 
judgements about gender and power.  That is, stereotype-consistent decision making 
involves concrete mental representations, whereby males, but not females, are simulated 
in the upper vertical positions when considered as powerful.  The literature on 
stereotyping indicates that the accessibility of learned stereotypic associations in a given 
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situation is an important factor in determining whether the stereotype will be activated 
and applied (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 
2000; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999).  Based on my findings, I 
speculate that the spatial features associated with the mental representation of gender 
stereotypes might promote such accessibility by increasing the salience of stereotypic 
links (males-powerful).  Such links might in turn be associated with an increased 
tendency to apply gender stereotypes in situations where power is relevant.  For 
example, when evaluating employees’ work performance, considering them for 
promotion, or choosing appropriate job candidates, people might be prone to implicitly 
apply the gender stereotype due to its concrete and therefore more vivid spatial 
representation.  This might be especially true when the employees’ or candidates’ 
gender is salient, that is, when females are compared to males (Ford & Stangor, 1992). 
Final conclusions 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that cognitive blending between social categories 
and power is assisted by spatial simulations and this process is dependent on stereotypic 
beliefs.  When people reason about power in the context of gender categories, they 
exhibit pronounced spatial simulation effects when they think about those categories as 
powerful, and this occurs in the case of stereotypic associations (i.e., males as 
powerful).  I argue that blending the concept of power with social concepts that have no 
immediate power implications (i.e., gender should be in principle power-neutral) is 
sufficient to activate the spatial features of grounded concepts, which are then used in 
spatial simulations.  Therefore, cognitive blending in human cognition depends on both 
the compatibility between mappings of space and abstract social concepts as well as 
socially constructed stereotypical beliefs.  These are the main aspects of concepts that 
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compete for activation within a mental model to accomplish conceptual integration and 
meaning production. 
The above findings were replicated with pupillometry.  I found that across the 
two blocks of trials (the Schubert and gender block), it seems that people experience 
higher cognitive effort when they indicate powerful groups and males as powerful at the 
bottom as opposed to the top.  Further, males as powerful seem to be processed with 
more ease when they are presented at the top and bottom than females as powerful at 
the top.  Such results are based on pupil size data indicating higher pupil dilation on the 
incongruent Schubert trials (powerful-bottom) as well as when participants indicate a 
counter-stereotypic individual as powerful and when that choice interferes with spatial 
positions (powerful-females-top versus powerful-males-top and -bottom).  The 
cognitive effort account can in principle explain the findings of increased pupil size 
after participants made their responses in my task.  This is because it accurately 
accounts for my finding in the light of the recent review on pupillometry presented by 
van der Wel & Steenbergen (2018) pointing out that pupil size is directly associated 
with cognitive effort.  Furthermore, increased pupil size in the pre-response period 
could be associated with cognitive conflict involved in preceptions of counter-
stereotypic or incongruent information (Preuschoff et al., 2011; Proulx et al., 2017; 
Sleegers et al., 2015; Smallwood et al., 2011). 
Having established the robustness of spatial simulations in stereotypic 
associations, in the next chapter I explored the dependency of spatial simulations on 
task features and stereotype activation.  In Chapter 4, I found that when power is 
attributed to male and female names in the absence of an explicit power context (i.e., 
power differences are made between same-gender names), spatial simulations do not 
occur.  Further, I also demonstrated that gender per se is not associated with spatial 
simulations.  To conclude, the mechanisms driving spatial simulations observed in my 
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previous studies (1 - 7) are likely to be based on the spatial correlates involved in the 
mental representation of power - spatial features can be observed in abstract thought 
only when the concept of power is activated in relevant conditions.  This occurs when 
thinking about power is meaningful due to stereotypic associations (Studies 1 - 7).  This 
is because when the power context is not present, spatial processing becomes irrelevant 
and hence it is not found (Studies 8 and 9).  This is also in line with conceptual 
blending, as spatial simulations are likely to occur when two concepts are combined in 
semantically consistent manner (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). 
 In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that cognitive components of social power involve 
sensorimotor features associated with verticality in the type of decisions that people 
make.  Power seems to be associated with verticality to the same extent whenever it is 
attributed to male or female targets.  At the same time, in my previous studies focusing 
on the duration (not the outcome) of the thought processes associated with linking 
gender-power and spatial location, I found that stereotype-consistent thinking is 
important in spatial simulations (Studies 1-7), as males as powerful, but not females 
were simulated at the top.  Therefore, it is likely that spatial simulations facilitate 
judgements about social power of males and females, only when people make 
stereotype-consistent choices.  However, I further found that the mental representation 
of power always involves spatial components, regardless of the social category it is 
attributed to (powerful-males/females as powerful) and such spatial components are 
associated with the outcome of judgements, but not processes leading to such 
judgements.   
Finally, in the last empirical chapter of my thesis, I demonstrated that spatial 
correlates observed in mental representation of power and gender not only are present in 
cognition, but they also have a potentially reinforcing effect on stereotype-consistent 
judgements.  In Study 13, presenting a stereotypically fitting person at the top of a 
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display was associated with greater perceived size of subsequently presented male and 
female names.  In Study 14, the likelihood of choosing females as powerful when they 
appeared at the top involved lower ratings of their femininity, whilst the likelihood of 
indicating males as powerless at the bottom was associated with lower ratings of their 
masculinity and competence.  Overall, it appears that space is involved in abstract 
thought and possibly it reinforces stereotypic associations by providing a more concrete 
mental representation of stereotyped individuals. 
Integrating the results across 14 studies, I showed that the mental representation 
of stereotypes about gender and power involves sensorimotor correlates.  Such 
sensorimotor features are active when people reason about stereotypically-consistent 
powerful individuals, such as males, but not females.  This is only true in power-
relevant as well as semantically and metaphorically meaningful contexts (thinking about 
power differences between two individuals of opposite genders).  These findings can be 
explained by the theory of conceptual blending, which suggests that mental 
representations of concepts that can be blended together, that is, combined in a 
semantically meaningful way, involve sensorimotor simulations.  In turn, such an 
account is consistent with grounded cognition, proposing that abstract concepts (e.g., 
power) are conflated with more concrete concepts (i.e., space).  Interestingly, the 
tendency to base power categorisation of gender on verticality cues is independent of 
the processing time with which such categorisations are made.  Further, the type of 
power-gender judgment that is made seems to be associated with spatial features and 
such an association is independent of stereotype activation.  Finally, spatial locations 
interacting with power-gender categorisations seem to promote stereotypically-
consistent thinking suggesting that such spatial locations might in fact reinforce 
stereotypic mental representations.   
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To conclude, sensorimotor spatial simulations are involved in the mental 
representation of gender via perceptions of power.  Individuals who are judged as 
powerful on the basis of stereotypes are represented in cognition in a more concrete 
way.  Such spatial correlates seem to also bias perceptions of gender potentially 
reinforcing the concrete representation of stereotypes.  It is possible that such concrete 
mental representations are more difficult to reduce.  This should be investigated in 
future research. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1   
Procedure of modelling effects 
In order to establish the random structure of the final linear mixed model for 
each study, I first estimated a minimal model, in which the intercepts varied across 
participants.  Subsequently, I estimated three other models that had a similar structure 
to the minimal model, except that in each model, I also introduced one random slope to 
test whether random effects improved the fit of my data in the final model.  That is, in 
Model 1, I introduced gender Choice (males and females as powerful and powerless) as 
a random slope, in Model 2, I included trial type (males-top or females-top).  After 
estimating the models, I compared the fit of each model that included a random slope 
with the minimal model by using Chi-square difference statistic Δχ2.  If a model with a 
random slope provided a better fit for my data (i.e., the loglik ratio was significantly 
smaller than the ratio of the minimal model), the given random slope was then kept in 
the final model.  The comparisons between minimal and random slope models as well 
as the structure of final models for each study are presented in tables below. 
Study 1. 
 
The final model included trial type as a random slope. 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal 
Model 10 42157 42217 -21069 42137    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
12 42156 42228 -21066 42132 5.54 2 .06 
Model 2 
Trial type 12 42147 42219 -21062 42123 14.24 2 .001* 
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Study 2. 
 
The final model did not include any random slopes. 
Study 3. 
 
The final model included gender choice as a random slope. 
Study 4. 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 40866 40925 -20423 40846    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
12 40868 40939 -20422 40844 1.54 2      .46 
Model 2 
Trial type 
12 40869 40941 -20423 40845 .50       2 .78 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal 
Model 
10 27885 27941 -13933 27865    
Model 1 
Gender 
choice 
12 27883 27950 -13930 27859 6.01       2 .05* 
Model 2 
Trial type 
12 28048 27889 -27956 27865 .01 2 .99 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal 
Model 
18 60161 60275 -30062 60125    
Model 1 
Gender 
choice 
20 60153 60280 -30057 60113 11.65       2 .01* 
Model 2 
Trial type 
20 60164 60290 -30062 60124 1.0 2 .61 
Model 3 
Prime 
20 60162 63000 -30061 60122 2.60 2 .27 
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The final model included gender choice as random slope. 
Study 5. 
 
The final model included gender choice as a random slope. 
Study 6. 
 
The final model did not include any random slopes. 
Studies 1-6 – integrative analysis  
 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 33065 33122 -16522 33045    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
12 33023 33092 -16500 32999 45.80 2 .001* 
Model 2 
Trial type 
12 33069 33138 -16522 33045 .16 2 .93 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 32471 32529 -16226 32451    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
12 32471 32539 -16223 32447 4.64 2 .99 
Model 2 
Trial type 
12 32473 32542 -16225 32449 3.01 2 .37 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal 
Model 
50 238639 239025 -119270 238539    
Model 1 
Gender 
choice 
52 238599 238999 -119247 238495 44.90 2 .001* 
Model 2 
Trial type 
52 239042 239042 -119268 238537 2.70 2 .26 
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The final model included gender choice as a random slope. 
 
Study 7.  
(a) Schubert block (overall analysis) 
 
The final model included response period as a random slope. 
(b) Gender block (overall analysis) 
 
Study 8. 
 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal 
Model 
6 184 214 -85 172    
Model 1 
Position 
8 184 225 -84 168 3.16 2 .21 
Model 2 
Response 
period 
8 155 155 -49 98 73.0 2 .001*  
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal 
Model 
6 115 166 -48 95    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
8 105 166 -40 81 14.41 2 .001* 
Model 2 
Trial type 
8 118 179 -47 94 1.32 2 .52 
Model 3 
Response 
period 
8 35 97 -6 11 84.11 2 .001* 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 69519 69584 -34750 69499    
Model 1 
Gender block 
12 69381 69459 -34679 69357 141.94 2 .001* 
Model 2 
Position choice 
12 69518 69596 -34747 69494  5.07 2 .08 
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The final model included gender block as a random slope. 
 
 
Study 9. 
 
The final model included gender block as a random slope. 
Study 10. 
 
The final model included gender and vertical position as random slopes. 
Study 12. 
 
The final model did not include any random slopes. 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 69242 69307 -34611 69222    
Model 1 
Gender block 
12 69117 69195 -34546 69093 129.67 2 .001* 
Model 2 
Position choice 
12 69246 69324 -34611 69222 .27 2 .87 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 50986 51050 -25483 50966    
Model 1 
Gender 
12 50983 51059 -25479 50959 7.62 2 .02 * 
Model 2 
Vertical 
Position 
12 50984 51060 -25480 50960 6.28 2 .04 * 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 24449 24503 -12214 24429    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
12 24448 24512 -12212 24424 5.16 2 .08 
Model 2 
Trial type 
12 24452 24517 -12214 24428 .17 2 .92 
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Study 14. 
 
The final model included gender choice as a random slope. 
 
Appendix 2 
Method of individual studies (1 – 6) 
 
Studies 1 and 2 
 Materials 
  Spatial task.  I selected ten popular British (Study 1) and Polish (Study 2) 
names (five female and five male).33  Each name was randomly paired with a name of 
the opposite gender (e.g., Oliver – Emily).  The matched pairs were then presented on 
the computer screen in white letters on a black screen (font size 15 – 21 points).   
 Design 
  Spatial task.  The same design was used in both studies.  Task condition 
(find powerful versus powerless) was manipulated between-participants while the trial 
type (males-top versus females-top) was manipulated within-participants.  There were 
four blocks of trials.  Each block included a presentation of five pairs shown twice (10 
trials in total).  In half of the trials, a male name (e.g., Oliver) was displayed at the top 
of the screen with a female name (e.g., Emily) at the bottom.  Both names were centred 
                                                 
33 See the most popular names: Popular British baby names: Year by year. (n.d.). Retrieved February 9, 
2015, from http://www.babycentre.- co.uk/popular- baby-names (Study 1); Academy of childbirth. (n.d.). 
Retrieved May 2, 2016, from: http://akademiaporodu.pl/top-news/najpopularniejsze-imiona-w-2015-
2016-mapy-ranking (Study 2). 
Model 
df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
Minimal Model 
10 34787 34845 -17383 34767    
Model 1 
Gender choice 
12 34777 34847 -17377 34753 13.58 2 .001* 
Model 2 
Trial type 
12 34791 34860 -17383 34767 .01 2 .99 
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and there was a 23cm vertical distance between the names.  In the other trials, this 
display was reversed.  There were 40 trials in total.  The order of trials within each 
block was randomized.  
  Social Status - Gender IAT.  I adapted the IAT of implicit attitudes 
towards high or low status males and females from research by Rudman and Kilianski 
(2000).  Within a single block participants were asked to categorise items that belonged 
to either high status/males or low status/females, or vice versa in another block.  The 
order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.  
 Procedure  
 The studies were presented using DirectRT (Jarvis, 2012).  Participants sat 
approximately 70cm away from the computer screen.  After reading the instructions, I 
verbally explained the concept of power to participants by adapting Galinsky, et al. 
(2003) definition of social power.  I explained the definition verbally to ensure that 
participants understood the definition of social power and to give them an opportunity 
to ask questions about it.  Subsequently, participants completed the spatial task by 
pressing A or L on the computer keyboard to indicate the powerful/powerless person on 
the screen.  In Study 2, the procedure was the same, but all instructions and stimuli were 
translated into Polish.  After the spatial task, all participants completed the IAT.34  Each 
experiment lasted approximately 15 minutes.  
Study 3 
Method 
Materials 
 Spatial Task.  The selected professions (derived from a pilot study) were 
assigned to male and female names (adapted from Study 1; e.g., Oliver-Professor, 
Sophie-Professor).  Each pair (profession and name) was assigned to a corresponding 
                                                 
34 Within all the reported studies, participants signed consent forms at the beginning of experiments and 
were debriefed at the end. 
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pair including a name of member of the opposite gender.  I created all combinations of 
professions and genders (e.g., male scientist - female professor; female professor - male 
scientist) within four sets of pairings.  Participants were randomly assigned to receive 
one set of combinations. 
Design 
Spatial Task.  I used the same mixed design as in Study 1 and 2 and presented 
participants with the same spatial task, except that in half the trials, presented in a 
random order, a male name and a profession were displayed at the top of the screen 
(e.g., Oliver-Professor) while a female name and a profession (e.g., Emily-Architect) at 
the bottom, whilst for the remaining half of the trials, this spatial orientation was 
reversed.  To facilitate responses, I asked participants to use arrows (up and down).  
Using these arrows provides a congruent mapping of mental simulations onto motor 
responses (see Schubert, 2005). 
 Social Status - Gender IAT.  I used the same IAT of attitudes towards high 
status males and females, as in Study 1, but I reduced the number of blocks from five to 
two (see Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).  Participants were asked to keep in mind two 
target categories within two blocks (male and high status in one block or female and 
high status in another) and respond as fast as possible by pressing a designated key 
when they saw an item that belonged to the target category on the screen.  When they 
saw distractors (female and low status or males and low status) they were supposed to 
press another key.  The order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure 
First, participants completed the spatial task and then the IAT.  Both tasks were 
programmed as in Studies 1 and 2.  The experiment took approximately 15 minutes. 
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Study 4 
 
Method 
Materials 
 Spatial Task.  I displayed the same gender pairs as in Study 1, but before each 
trial participants were presented with a social status item (gender-neutral profession 
adapted from Study 3, i.e.: scientist, architect, doctor, professor, dentist) or neutral word 
(i.e., vegetables: carrot, potato, lettuce, broccoli, cabbage).  The prime was manipulated 
within-subjects.  After making decisions about powerful/powerless person in each trial, 
participants were asked to report whether the initially presented prime word belonged to 
the social status (by pressing the arrow pointing left) or vegetable category (by pressing 
the arrow pointing right).35  In this way, the prime word was activated in participants’ 
minds during their decision about the powerful/powerless person.  
 Social Status - Gender IAT. I adapted the IAT from Study 1.  
Design 
Spatial Task.  I used the same mixed design as in Study 1 and 2, and presented 
participants with a similar spatial task, except that before half of the trials (males-top; 
females-bottom, n = 5) they were primed with a social status item, and before the other 
half (males-top; females-bottom, n = 5) they were shown a neutral word.  The same was 
done for the trials where females were presented at the top and males at the bottom, so 
there were 20 trials in total within each block.  The trials were randomised within each 
block within-participants; there were 4 blocks in total.  
Social Status - Gender IAT.  I used the same IAT of gender authorities as in 
Study 1. 
  
                                                 
35 The responses were reversed for the other half of our participants: they pressed the arrow pointing right 
for social status items and the arrow pointing left for vegetables (participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the key arrangements). 
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Procedure 
First, participants completed the spatial task and then the IAT.  The tasks were 
programmed using DirectRT (Jarvis, 2012).  The experiment took 15 minutes. 
Studies 5 and 6 
Method 
Materials and design 
 
Spatial task.  I used the same stimuli as in Study 1.  However, participants 
responded with the arrow up to indicate the powerful/powerless person at the top or the 
arrow pointing down to indicate the target at the bottom in Study 5.  Study 6 was a 
replication of Study 1, so participants responded with horizontally arranged keys on the 
keyboard. 
Rationality/emotionality and gender IAT.  I asked participants to quickly and 
accurately sort items that belonged to the category of emotionality (feeling, mood, 
sentiment, sympathy) and females (e.g., Karen, Caitlin, Jasmine), as well as rationality 
(intelligent, logic, reason, thinking) and males (e.g., Brian, Kevin, Paul), and vice versa.  
Rationality/emotionality and verticality IAT.  Participants categorized items 
that belonged to the category of up (above, top, over, upper) and rationality and 
categories down (below, under, bottom, lower) and emotionality, or up/emotionality and 
down/rationality (the items for emotionality/rationality categories were the same as in 
the rationality/emotionality and gender IAT). 
 Both IATs were designed in the same standard way as the Social Status - Gender 
IAT used in Study 1. 
Procedure 
 First, participants completed the spatial task, then the rationality/emotionality 
and gender IAT, which was followed by the IAT measuring the rationality/emotionality 
and verticality associations.  I presented the tasks in the same order to all participants. 
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Appendix 3 
Studies 1 and 3: Five matched pairs of names 
Pair 1. Oliver; Emily 
Pair 2. Jack; Lily 
Pair 3. Thomas; Chloe  
Pair 4. Jacob; Alice 
Pair 5. James; Sophie 
Study 2: Five matched pairs of names in Polish 
Pair 1. Adam; Julia 
Pair 2. Jakub; Emilia 
Pair 3. Szymon; Alicja  
Pair 4. Dawid; Marta 
Pair 5. Piotr; Anna 
 
Appendix 4 
Study 3: Four sets of assigned professions and genders 
Set 1. 
Pair 1. Oliver Professor; Emily Architect 
Pair 2. Jack Doctor; Lily Scientist 
Pair 3. Thomas Architect; Chloe Dentist 
Pair 4. Jacob Dentist; Alice Doctor 
Pair 5. James Scientist; Sophie Professor 
Set 2. 
Pair 1. Thomas Architect; Sophie Professor 
Pair 2. James Scientist; Alice Doctor 
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Pair 3. Jacob Dentist; Emily Architect 
Pair 4. Jack Doctor; Chloe Dentist 
Pair 5. Oliver Professor; Lily Scientist 
Set 3. 
Pair 1. Jacob Dentist; Lily Scientist 
Pair 2. Thomas Architect; Alice Doctor 
Pair 3. James Scientist; Emily Architect 
Pair 4. Jack Doctor; Sophie Professor 
Pair 5. Oliver Professor; Chloe Dentist 
Set 4. 
Pair 1. Jacob Dentist; Sophie Professor 
Pair 2. Jack Doctor; Emily Architect 
Pair 3. Oliver Professor; Alice Doctor 
Pair 4. James Scientist; Chloe Dentist 
Pair 5. Thomas Architect; Lily Scientist 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Studies 1 and 4: IAT categories and items 
Female names: Karen, Caitlin, Jasmine, Charlotte, Ruby, Mary, Lauren, Kate, Zoe, 
Lara, Ann, Victoria, Bethany, Daisy, Sarah.  
Male names: Brian, Kevin, Paul, Benjamin, Freddie, Joseph, Jake, Edward, Robert, 
Lewis, Toby, Liam, Patrick, Tommy, Arthur. 
High status: Boss, supervisor, expert, leader, executive, authority. 
Low status: Secretary, helper, aide, clerk, subordinate, assistant. 
Study 2: IAT categories and items 
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Female names: Hanna, Paulina, Barbara, Justyna, Magdalena, Helena, Weronika, 
Klaudia, Dominika, Zofia, Zuzanna, Katarzyna, Aleksandra, Joanna, Oliwia. 
Male names:  Maciej, Jan,  Filip, Wiktor, Gabriel, Marek, Konrad, Karol, Tomasz,  
Bartosz, Wojciech, Krzysztof, Patryk, Hubert, Adrian. 
High status: Zwierzchnictwo, kierownictwo, nadzór, przywódctwo, autorytet, dyrekcja. 
Low status: Asysta, podporządkowanie, zależność, podrzędność, podwładność, służba. 
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Appendix 6  
Results of individual studies (1 - 6) 
Study 1 
  Spatial Task.  Proportions.  First, I conducted a chi-square test to test how 
often participants indicated gender across the task conditions.  They were more likely to 
categorise males as powerful (68.7%) than females as powerful (31.3%), χ²(1) = 272.67, 
p < .001, odds ratio choosing males as powerful versus females = 1.80 (95%CI[1.67, 1.94]).  
Spatial Task.  Response Latencies.  Subsequently, I estimated a linear mixed 
model to analyse the response latencies of participants’ choices.36  I found that the fixed 
effect of gender choice, F(1, 2799) = 2.40, p = .12, dz = .03, was not significant, as was 
the fixed effect of task, F(1, 76) = .10, p = .75, dz = .06.  However, trial type was 
marginally significant, F(1, 84) = 2.95, p = .09, dz = .16, such that participants were 
marginally quicker to categorise powerful and powerless persons when they were 
presented with males at the top (M = 995ms, SE = 42.28, 95%CI[926, 1094]) in contrast 
to females at the top (M = 1025ms, SE = 47.09, 95%CI[942, 1130]).   
 In terms of two-way interactions, trial type by gender choice interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 1393) = .40, p = .53.  Further, the gender choice by task interaction was 
significant, F(1, 2799) = 9.05, p < .01.  Participants were significantly slower to 
categorise males as powerful (M = 1031ms, SE = 63.44, 95%CI[879, 1131]) versus 
females as powerful (M = 1022ms, SE = 64.96, 95%CI[941, 1198]), t(2672) = -3.08, p < 
.01, dz = .34.  Also, they were quicker to categorise females as powerless (M = 966ms, 
SE = 64.96, 95%CI[941, 1198]) than males as powerless (M = 1033ms, SE = 64.96, 
                                                 
36 See Appendix 1 – for the final structure of the model estimated for each individual study. 
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95%CI[941, 1198]), however, the difference was not significant, t(2849) = -1.08, p = 
.28, dz = .12.37 
 Next, the trial type by task interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 84) = 
3.27, p = .07.  Post-hoc comparisons revealed that participants were significantly 
quicker to categorise gender in the powerful condition on males-top trials (M = 994ms, 
SE = 60.70, 95%CI[890, 1132]), as opposed to females-top trials (M = 1063ms, SE = 
67.46, 95%CI[929, 1198]), t(93) = -2.41, p < .01, dz = .30.  The same difference was 
not significant in the powerless condition, (males-top:  M = 996ms, SE = 58.87, 
95%CI[892, 1127]; females-top: M = 987ms, SE = 65.73, 95%CI[877, 1139]), t(82) = 
.07, p < .95, dz = .01). 
 Inconsistent with my hypothesis, the three-way interaction between gender 
choice, trial type, and task was not significant, F(1, 1393) = .59, p = .44 (see 
Appendixes: Figure 1). 
 
  
                                                 
37 The difference in actual means is larger in the powerless condition (females as powerless versus males 
as powerless) than in the powerful condition (males as powerful versus females as powerful), however, 
the linear mixed model estimations of mean differences (lsmeans) demonstrated that the estimated mean 
difference was larger in the latter. 
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Figure 1.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom).  The error bars show -/+1 
standard error.38 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
 
  
                                                 
38 Note that “Males-top” refers to trials where males were presented at the top and females at the bottom, 
whilst “Females-top” represents trials where females were presented at the top and males at the bottom. 
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Study 2 
Spatial Task.  Proportions.  As in Study 1, participants had a tendency to 
indicate males as powerful (52.7%) as opposed to females (47.3%), χ²(1) = 24.34, p < 
.001, odds ratio choosing males as powerful versus females= 1.21 (95%CI[1.12, 1.31]). 
Spatial Task.  Response Latencies.  The results were not consistent with Study 
1 and did not support my hypotheses.  First, the fixed effects of gender choice F(1, 
2777) = 1.26, p = .26, dz = .01,  and task were not significant, F(1,72) = .04, p = .85, dz 
= .02.  However, the fixed effect of trial type was significant, F(1, 2627) = 4.22, p <0 
.04, dz = .17, suggesting that participants were significantly quicker to categorise 
gender as powerful/powerless on males-top trials, (M = 1116ms, SE = 40.02, 
95%CI[1099, 1258]), as opposed to females-top trials, (M = 1232ms, SE = 39.29, 
95%CI[1129, 1286]). 
Two-way interactions (gender choice x task; gender choice by trial type; task by 
trial type) were not significant, ps > .14.  The same was true for the three-way 
interaction (gender choice x trial type x task), F(1, 2764) = .64, p = .42 (see 
Appendixes: Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom).  The error bars show -/+1 
standard error. 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
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Study 3 
 Spatial Task.  Proportions.  In contrast to the previous studies, in Study 3, 
participants were equally likely to categorise males (50.5%) and females (49.5%) as 
powerful, χ²(1) = .27, p = .60, odds ratio choosing males as powerful versus females = 1.02 
(95%CI[.94, 1.20]). 
Spatial Task.  Response Latencies.  The fixed effects of gender choice F(1, 
185) = .05, p = .83, dz = .01, and trial type were not significant, F(1, 1886) = 1.44, p = 
.23, dz = .06.  However, the fixed effect of task was significant, F(1, 49) = 4.56, p < .04, 
dz = .39, indicating faster response times in the powerful (M = 1128ms, SE = 35.32, 
95%CI[1109, 1250]), versus powerless condition, (M = 1279ms, SE = 35.61, 
95%CI[1151, 1293]). 
Further, the gender choice by trial type interaction was marginally significant, 
F(1, 1889) = 3.47, p = .06, such that participants were faster to categorise males as 
powerful and powerless when they were presented at the top (M = 1173ms, SE = 51.25, 
95%CI[1176, 1382]) than bottom, (M = 1231ms, SE = 51.25, 95%CI[1176, 1382]), 
t(1876) = -2.17, p < .03, dz = .44).  The same difference was not significant when 
participants categorised females at the top (M = 1194ms, SE = 54.40, 95%CI[1119, 
1280]), and bottom(M = 1221ms, SE = 56.19, 95%CI[1128, 1290]), t(1868) = .48, p = 
.63, dz = .05).  The other two-way interactions (gender choice by task and trial type by 
task) were not significant, ps > .37.  
As expected, the three-way interaction (gender choice by trial type by task) was 
significant, F(1, 1889) = 7.16, p < .01 (see Appendixes: Figure 3).  Post-hoc 
comparisons indicated that participants were quicker to categorise males as powerful at 
the top (M = 1094ms, SE = 55.76, 95%CI[981, 1179]), versus bottom, (M = 1175ms, SE 
= 59.09, 95%CI[1055, 1256]), t(1870) = -2.77, p < .01, dz = .43.  The same pattern was 
true for females chosen as powerful, but the difference was marginally significant – 
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females were categorised marginally faster as powerful at the top (M = 1102ms, SE = 
54.39, 95%CI[996, 1221]) versus bottom, (M = 1154ms, SE = 57.03, 95%CI[1045, 
1273]), t(1870) = -2.77, p < .01, dz = .30.  Other comparisons were not significant, ps > 
.25.  
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Figure 3.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom).  The error bars show -/+1 
standard error.39 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Note that “Males-top” refers to trials where males were presented at the top and females at the bottom, 
whilst “Females-top” represents trials where females were presented at the top and males at the bottom. 
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Study 4 
 Spatial Task.  Proportions.  In contrast to Study 3, in Study 4, I found that 
participants were more likely to pick males as powerful (64.9%) rather than females 
(35.1%), χ²(1) = 170.59, p < .001, odds ratio choosing males as powerful versus females = 1.44 
(95%CI[1.36, 1.53]). 
Spatial Task.  Response Latencies.  None of the fixed effects (gender choice, 
prime, task, and gender position) were significant, ps > .21.  The same was true for two-
way and three-way interactions, including the predicted interaction among gender 
choice, trial type, and task (see Figure 4), ps > .15.  The predicted four-way interaction 
among gender choice, trial type, task, and prime was also not significant, F(1, 4051) = 
1.73, p = .19.  The only significant interaction was observed between gender choice and 
task, F(1, 50) = 4.74, p < .03.  Participants were significantly faster to categorise males 
as powerful, (M = 1017ms, SE = 57.03, 95%CI[915, 1146]), in contrast to females (M = 
1086ms, SE = 62.75, 95%CI[964, 1210]), t(53) = -2.187, p < .02, dz = .35, but the same 
difference was not significant in the case of categorising powerless individuals, p > .51 
(see Appendixes: Figure 4) 
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Figure 4.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom). The error bars show -/+1 
standard error. 
(c) Powerful condition 
 
(d) Powerless condition 
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Social Status - Gender IAT.  Studies 1 – 4. 
IATs:  I found that participants were significantly faster at categorizing males 
and high status items (M = 712ms, SE = 12.61) compared to females and high status 
items (M = 756ms, SE = 16.02), t(77) = 2.95, p < .01, dz = .30.40  The same pattern was 
observed in Study 2, t(72) = -3.32, p < .01, dz = .40.  Again in Study 4, the pattern of 
results was the same, but the difference was marginally significant, t(57) = -1.82, p = 
.07, dz = .27.  In Study 3, the difference between responses to males-high status versus 
females-high status, was not significant, t(72) = -3.32, p < .01, dz = .07. 
Correlations:  Subsequently, in each study, I calculated a facilitation score for 
each participant (by subtracting RTs from blocks in which participants responded to the 
category combination males/high status, from blocks in which they responded to 
females/high status; positive scores indicated a tendency to associate males with high 
status).  Linking this with my RT data, I also computed two separate difference scores 
subtracting the RTs for choices of males at the top from the RTs for choices of males at 
the bottom and, vice versa, the RTs for choices of females at the bottom from the RTs 
for choices of females at the top, as it was done for the integrative analysis.  I found that 
the IAT facilitation scores (i.e., the tendency to associate males with high status) did not 
correlate with the spatial simulation of males as powerful at the top: Study 1: r(32) = 
.17, p = .36; and of females as powerless at the bottom, r(39) = -.05, p = .79; Study 2: 
r(35) = -.17, p = .35 (males as powerful at the top), but there was a significant negative 
correlation between simulation of females as powerless at the bottom and the IAT 
facilitation score r(35) = -.36, p < .02.  In Study 3, there were no correlations between 
the IAT facilitations core and simulations of males as powerful at the top, r(24) = -.01, 
                                                 
40 All the IAT analyses in my studies were based on log-transformed data.  However, I report mean 
reaction times using raw scores. 
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p = .96, and simulations of females as powerless at the bottom, r(25) = -.18, p = .40.  
The same was true for Study 4, (powerful-males-top: r(28) = .12, p = .54; powerless-
females-bottom: r(28) = .20, p = .31). 
 
Study 5:  Results 
 
Spatial Task.  Proportions.  As in the previous studies (except for Study 3), I 
found that participants picked males as powerful (70.3%) more often than females as 
powerful (29.7%), χ²(1) = 313.07, p < .001, d > 2.0, odds ratio choosing males as powerful versus 
females = 2.10 (95%CI[1.92, 2.30]). 
Spatial Task.  Response latencies.  The fixed effects of gender choice, trial 
type, and task were not significant, ps > .14.  There were two marginally significant 
two-way interactions.  First, the gender choice by trial type interaction, F(1, 2241) = 
3.02, p = .08, indicated that participants were significantly quicker to categorise males 
when they were presented at the top, (M = 1009ms, SE = 33.03, 95%CI[965, 1098]), in 
contrast to females at the bottom, (M = 1084ms, SE = 41.40, 95%CI[1012, 1180]), t(89) 
= -2.12, p < .04, dz = .26, but other comparisons were not significant, p > .16. 
Second, the interaction between trial type and task, F(1, 2333) = 3.26, p = .07, 
suggested that participants were marginally quicker to categorise powerful individuals 
on males-top trials, (M = 1001ms, SE = 44.41, 95%CI[950, 1127]), as opposed to 
powerless ones on males-top trials (M = 1080ms, SE = 44.53, 95%CI[1000, 1177]), 
t(89) = -1.80, p = .07, dz = .19. 
Finally, the three-way interaction between gender choice, trial type, and task 
was not significant, F(1, 2242) = .83, p = .36 (see Appendixes Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom). The error bars show -/+1 
standard error. 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
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Study 6:  Results 
Spatial Task.  Proportions.  As in the previous studies, participants were more 
likely to indicate males as powerful (59.3%) than females as powerful (40.7%), χ²(1) = 
85.87, p < .001, odds ratio choosing males as powerful versus females = 1.49 (95%CI[1.34, 1.63]). 
Spatial Task.  Response latencies.  I found that the fixed effects of gender 
choice, trial type, and task were not significant, ps > .10.  The same was true for two-
way interactions, ps > .68, except for the interaction between gender choice and task, 
which was marginally significant, F(1, 2196) = 3.24, p = .07.  Post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that participants were significantly faster at categorising females as powerless, 
(M = 1024ms, SE = 71.65, 95%CI[897, 1184]), than males powerless, (M = 1052ms, SE 
= 72.41, 95%CI[952, 1241]), t(2194) = -2.45, p < .01, dz = .14.  Other comparisons 
were not significant, ps > .85. 
Finally, the predicted interaction among gender choice, trial type, and task was 
not significant, F(1, 2176) = .20, p = .66 (see Appendixes Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.  Response latencies to (a) males and females judged as powerful, and (b) 
males and females judged as powerless according to the trial type (males-
top/females-bottom or females-top/males-bottom). The error bars show -/+1 
standard error. 
(a) Powerful condition 
 
(b) Powerless condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
 
Rationality/emotionality and gender IAT. Studies 5 - 6 
 
IATs: In Study 5, I found that participants were quicker at sorting items 
associated with males and rationality (M = 716ms, SE = 15.58, 95%CI[685, 747) than 
females and rationality (M = 873ms, SE = 20.05, 95%CI[833, 913), t(59) = -9.78, p < 
.001, dz = 1.25.  Similarly, in Study 6, participants were significantly faster at 
categorizing items associated with males and rationality (M = 678ms, SE = 10.63, 
95%CI[657, 700) than females and rationality (M = 809ms, SE = 14.86, 95%CI[779, 
838), t(59) = -10.98, p < .001, dz = 1.48.  
Correlations:  I calculated facilitation scores based on participants’ reaction 
times (mean RTs to males/rationality were subtracted from mean RTs to 
females/rationality, i.e., the higher the score, the higher the tendency to associate males 
with rationality).  In Study 5, I did not find significant correlations between simulation 
scores to powerful-males-top, r(29) = .29, p < .13, or to powerless-females-bottom, 
r(28) = .15, p = .46.  The same was true for Study 6 (powerful-males-top and IAT 
score: r(29) = -.10, p = .61; powerless-females-bottom: r(29) = .22, p = .26). 
Rationality/emotionality and verticality IAT. Studies 5 – 6 
 
IATs:  In Study 5, participants were significantly faster at categorising top and 
rationality items (M = 802ms, SE = 19.91, 95%CI[762, 842), rather than top and 
emotionality ones (M = 875ms, SE = 23.91, 95%CI[827, 923), t(58) = -3.49, p < .001, 
dz = .47.  In Study 6, participants were marginally faster at responding to the categories 
of upper positions and rationality (M = 768ms, SE = 19.04, 95%CI[730, 806) than upper 
positions and emotionality (M = 807ms, SE = 20.12, 95%CI[766, 847]), t(57) = -1.87, p 
= .07, dz = .27.   
Correlations:  In Study 5, the tendency to associate top with rationality was not 
related to the spatial simulation of males as powerful at the top, r(29)= -.07, p = .73, 
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and females as powerless at the bottom, r(27) = -.20, p = .32.  Similarly, in Study 6, the 
IAT facilitation score did not correlate with participants RTs to choices of males at the 
top as powerful, r(27) = .22, p = .28 and females at the bottom as powerless, r(29) = -
.07, p = .71. 
 
Appendix 7 
Study 8: Four sets of assigned professions and their spatial position for each gender.41 
Females: 
Set 1. 
Top     Bottom 
 
Poppy-Professor Emily-Architect 
Olivia-Doctor Lily-Scientist 
Jessica-Architect  Chloe-Dentist 
Ruby-Dentist Alice-Doctor 
Molly-Scientist Sophie-Professor 
Emily-Architect Poppy-Professor 
Lily-Scientist Olivia-Doctor 
Chloe-Dentist Jessica-Architect  
Alice-Doctor Ruby-Dentist 
Sophie-Professor Molly-Scientist 
 
Set 2. 
Top     Bottom 
Jessica-Architect  Sophie-Professor 
Molly-Scientist Alice-Doctor 
Ruby-Dentist Emily-Architect 
Olivia-Doctor Chloe-Dentist 
Poppy-Professor Lily-Scientist 
Sophie-Professor Jessica-Architect  
                                                 
41 The same pairs of names were presented in Study 9, however, they did not include professions. 
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Alice-Doctor Molly-Scientist 
Emily-Architect Ruby-Dentist 
Chloe-Dentist Olivia-Doctor 
Lily-Scientist Poppy-Professor 
 
Set 3. 
Top     Bottom 
Ruby-Dentist Lily-Scientist 
Jessica-Architect  Alice-Doctor 
Molly-Scientist Emily-Architect 
Olivia-Doctor Sophie-Professor 
Poppy-Professor Chloe-Dentist 
Lily-Scientist Ruby-Dentist 
Alice-Doctor Jessica-Architect  
Emily-Architect Molly-Scientist 
Sophie-Professor Olivia-Doctor 
Chloe-Dentist Poppy-Professor 
 
Set 4. 
Top     Bottom 
Ruby-Dentist Sophie-Professor 
Olivia-Doctor Emily-Architect 
Poppy-Professor Alice-Doctor 
Molly-Scientist Chloe-Dentist 
Jessica-Architect  Lily-Scientist 
Sophie-Professor Ruby-Dentist 
Emily-Architect Olivia-Doctor 
Alice-Doctor Poppy-Professor 
Chloe-Dentist Molly-Scientist 
Lily-Scientist Jessica-Architect  
 
Males 
Set 1. 
Top     Bottom 
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Oliver-Professor Harry-Architect 
Jack-Doctor Lucas-Scientist 
Thomas-Architect  Ethan-Dentist 
Jacob-Dentist Daniel-Doctor 
James-Scientist David-Professor 
Harry-Architect Oliver-Professor 
Lucas-Scientist Jack-Doctor 
Ethan-Dentist Thomas-Architect  
Daniel-Doctor Jacob-Dentist 
David-Professor James-Scientist 
 
Set 2. 
Top     Bottom 
Thomas-Architect  David-Professor 
James-Scientist Daniel-Doctor 
Jacob-Dentist Harry-Architect 
Jack-Doctor Ethan-Dentist 
Oliver-Professor Lucas-Scientist 
David-Professor Thomas-Architect  
Daniel-Doctor James-Scientist 
Harry-Architect Jacob-Dentist 
Ethan-Dentist Jack-Doctor 
Lucas-Scientist Oliver-Professor 
 
Set 3. 
Top     Bottom 
Jacob-Dentist Lucas-Scientist 
Thomas-Architect  Daniel-Doctor 
James-Scientist Harry-Architect 
Jack-Doctor David-Professor 
Oliver-Professor Ethan-Dentist 
Lucas-Scientist Jacob-Dentist 
Daniel-Doctor Thomas-Architect  
Harry-Architect James-Scientist 
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David-Professor Jack-Doctor 
Ethan-Dentist Oliver-Professor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 
 
Paired gendered names presented in Study 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 
 
Table 4. Correlations between questionnaire items (Study 14) 
 
  F-L F-C F-W F-F M-L M-C M-W M-M 
F-L Correlation 1.00 .53 .79 .43 .39 .29 .44 .19 
 p-value .001 .001 .01 .01 .04 .01 .19 .19 
F-C Correlation .53 1.00 .44 .21 .32 .46 .39 .22 
 p-value  .00 .14 .02 .001 .01 .14 .14 
F-W Correlation .79 .44 1.00 .31 .36 .35 .45 .05 
 p-value .00  .03 .01 .01 .001 .73 .73 
F-F Correlation .43 .21 .31 1.00 .34 .14 .23 .30 
 p-value .14 .03  .02 .33 .10 .04 .04 
M-L Correlation .39 .32 .36 .34 1.00 .63 .81 .48 
 p-value .02 .01 .02  .00 .00 .00 .001 
M-C Correlation .29 .46 .35 .14 .63 1.00 .61 .47 
Ethan Zoe 
Michael Poppy 
Lucas Grace 
Ellis Evelyn 
Matthew Phoebe 
David Sarah 
Nathan Jessica 
Arthur Nancy 
Lewis Rose 
Toby Emma 
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 p-value .00 .01 .33     .001 .001 .001 .001 
M-W Correlation .44 .39 .45 .23 .81 .61 1.00 .28 
 p-value .01 .001 .10 .00 .00  .05 .05 
M-M Correlation .19 .22 .05 .30 .48 .47 .28 1.00 
 p-value .14 .73 .04 .00 .00 .05   
Note: F-L: Female faces liking ratings; F-C: Female faces competence ratings; F-W: Female 
faces warmth ratings; F-F: Female faces femininity ratings; M-L: Male faces liking ratings; M-C: Male 
faces competence ratings; M-W: Male faces warmth ratings; M-M: Male faces masculinity ratings. 
